

Political Economy Inquiries

Vol.2

Jan-Erik Lane



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University of Geneva, Switzerland

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The Political Economy Inquiries Vol.2

Author: **Jan-Erik Lane**

University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland.

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Dedication

To the memory of Professor

Ian Thynne

University of Hong Kong

Foreword

It is possible to present a brief summary of the subjects that the chapters in this book focus on.

Ch 1. The outcome of the COP27 confirms the PD game nature of the work of this UN club, CUT defeated by EMIT (emissions). The same will hold for forward COPs, until such time that the tipping points change the game for the great players in this global environment club.

Ch 2. The analytical-synthetic distinction keeps being of great interest. But why? Analytical sentences are camouflaged tautologies. They are not falsifiable, neither in this Kant's world or in any of Leibniz' possible worlds.

Ch 3. Communitarianism offers a rationale for the growing relevance of communities. Its key question is also the one that globalisation makes highly relevant, namely: Who are we? What way of life do we wish to support? Communitarianism underlines the politics of mutual respect as the democratic state's proper reaction to multiculturalism. Such a politics of mutual respect would be truly global. The paradox of globalisation is that it both makes communal politics more salient while it at the same time calls for a politics of mutual respect which may reduce ethnic and religious conflict. Globalisation increases the search for communal identity.

However, a politics of mutual respect may reduce conflicts between communities and enhance global respect for different cultures, where different civilisations accept a common core of institutions.

Ch 4. The theory of chaos has hitherto been pursued in the natural sciences. However, it may illuminate some issues in the social sciences too.

Ch 5. Professor Dowding has written an interesting and stimulating book on the relevance (R) of general philosophical insights for the conduct of political science enquiry. In this paper, I challenge his positive analysis due to the relevance (R) difficulty. The social sciences have to struggle with a set of philosophical questions, but they hardly belong to general ontological or epistemological theories.

Ch 6. More than half of the countries on the globe are dictatorships. What drives the dictator and his or her entourage is the quest for money. The standard wisdom says power, but it only applies to rule of law countries, i.e. the democracies. The politics of looting is more pervasive than the theory of power entails. This article examines the mechanisms of a dictatorship. The chapter concludes that the remuneration of politicians may get out of hand. This is very much the case when looting occurs. It is feasible in any dictatorship - actually its main reason. Keywords: Dictatorship, looting, principal-agent.

Ch 7. The philosophy of science today seems stuck between falsifiability (Popper) and meaning (Kuhn). Time to devote more to the philosophy of the social sciences, e.g. value loaded terms, stipulations, rationality and explanations.

Ch 8. Autonomy has two faces, individual autonomy and institutional autonomy. Political systems not only deal with demands for individual freedom, the traditional rights of citizens to freedom of opinion, association and contract. Institutional autonomy is a pervasive property of all kinds of political systems. To international political systems just as to local and regional political systems, autonomy is a basic property. Both types of systems face the difficult task of maintaining stable relations with the nation state, securing an amount of control for the nation state while retaining some autonomy for themselves. The demand of various regions for

independence or semi- independence within nation states has been a dominant theme in the politics of the sixties and the seventies. The autonomy of the nation state is its sovereignty. International political systems present a threat to the autonomy of the nation state, while at the same time they may provide mechanisms by means of which other sources of infringements on autonomy may be counteracted. Autonomy is a fundamental political property. A theoretical understanding of autonomy is conducive to the explanation of those aspects of political systems that are related to stability. Such an interpretation may place autonomy in an equilibrium analysis of how demand and supply of autonomy interacts with other basic political properties like influence and control.

Ch 9. The new political economy - public choice - has contributed considerably to a long-awaited inter-marriage between political science and economics. The economic approach to the interpretation of the public sector - politics as well as administration - has resulted in a number of interestingly relevant models. At the same time modelling political behaviour on the basis of the economic man perspective gives rise to puzzling difficulties creating much controversy. The article attempts to establish in principle the ethically neutral and scientifically objective nature of the public choice approach. It elaborates on the crucial concept of self-interest in the public choice behaviour assumptions in order to show that the criticism from the public interest adherents may be countered.

J.E. Lane

Switzerland

December 15, 2022

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1 Energy trumps ecology

Introduction

The Ukraine war confirms that violence is not a solution method of global conflicts such as that between the West and the Communist-Iran block of states. Conflict over Taiwan, Himalayas and Yemen must be handled somehow before destruction sets in as in the Ukraine. The global economy is a series of linked marked economies. What more is needed?

Economic theory always implies that an effective market economy was sine qua non, but yet not enough. In addition, a country needs the so-called public goods, now more than ever.

The basic needs diagram

The most powerful theory in the social sciences is the equilibrium theorem in theoretical economics. It predicts that competitive markets will achieve overall efficiency for fungible goods and services. But how about other needs?

The following Diagram 1 has different goods and services that people are in need of.

Diagram 1. *Excludability (E) and rivalry (R)*

	R	-R
-E	commons	public good
E	private good	toll good

Market allocation presupposes excludability so that free riding is impossible. Pure public goods like law and order is outside of the market, because free riding is feasible. People who boast of not paying tax also find it an attractive option in life. The core of the public sector is the state that is based upon money- market mechanisms like taxation and budgeting. Market allocation of infrastructure is only possible when fees can be levied or is desirable as with toll goods or services. On the contrary, market failure is complete in relation to commons since free riding can not be stopped.

Capitalism and market failure

When Schumpeter predicted the transformation of capitalism into socialism, his argument rested upon envy. Contrary to Marx, Schumpeter did not rely upon the working classes to bring forward socialism but the “intellectuals”.

Just as Marx was wrong about the cohesiveness of the working class facing dismal pauperization, so Schumpeter failed to see that intellectuals might work for capitalism. In fact, French sociologist Tocqueville already before *The Communist Manifesto* pointed out that real wages would go up in the market economy. The chief protagonists of capitalism after the second world war were intellectuals at universities like Chicago, Virginia and Freiburg.

In any case, no socialism has been forthcoming. China today is hardly a socialist country like the USSR was. And North Korea is not what Schumpeter dreamt about as replacing capitalism. However, today’s global market economy faces the very same problem that occupied Marx and Schumpeter, namely the enormously skewed distribution of income and wealth.

Look at the following Figure 1:




Figure 1. Gini Index by Country over Time (World Income Inequality Database, Business Insider, AMP Capital)

The skewed income and wealth distribution impacts upon global warming politics in two ways. First we have the argument that capitalist greed is a major cause of global warming. Second, we hear that climate policies must take into account the rich-poor cleavage, between countries as well as within.

The global market economy comprises a number of capitalist economies. Each of them faces a set of common problems.

Welfare state

The only countries that came close to democratic socialism were the Scandinavian welfare states. Here, public sector spending and taxation were increased to around 50 per cent of GDP, offering a number of merit goods and services impartiality, like health, social, old age care free university training as well as various transfer payments. The mixed economy was created partly under influences from Keynesian economics. However, recently the Swedish or Scandinavian model - "folkhemmet" - has lost its redistribution edge, allowing some privatisation as well as less progressive taxation. Several

EU countries have some welfare state programs, but socialism is no longer on the political agenda with EU.

French economist Piketty (2018) advocates the relevance of a major system transformation to a socialist economy now. He argues that most of the time capital owners take a larger share of national income per year than labour. It seems that Tocqueville in 1840 was right when he underlined that capitalism might benefit also labour. In any case, the future of the global market economy appears not in doubt, at least not the more institutional version (Williamson, 1985).

It has been argued the capitalism is the root cause of the ecological crises (Klein, 2015). However, the capitalists would suffer or perish too, advanced life becomes impossible. One can separate between institutional capitalism a la Williamson (1985) and criminal capitalism. Illegal capitalism no doubt hurts Mother Earth.

National and global commons

All countries have commons that they must confront somehow. Commons may be local, regional or national in nature, characterized by no private ownership or open access. Resources in common ownership may be e.g., water, land, forests or air. Thus, commons are e.g., sea, lakes, animals, mountains and the atmosphere or stratospheric. Their usage calls for state regulations.

Being non-excludable but rivalry holds, commons face overuse or misuse. The protection of commons differs from one country to another in terms of comprehensiveness and efficiency. In general, the better protection is offered by rich countries.

Climate change is a global commons phenomenon. It certainly affects national commons. Thus, there is much discussion of the extinction risks of species and the pollution of oceans as well as a decrease of ice. Although we find examples of strict and effective cases of commons protection, the overall situation is very negative concerning due to free riding:

- Overfishing

- Illegal killings of animals
- Destruction of rain forests
- Forest degradation
- Ocean pollution
- Air pollution.

Information, no policy coordination

Protecting global commons, one must see policy coordination. But it is inversely related to environment information. A plethora of sources indicate grave threats to the environment of the Earth but policy coordination is not up to tasks.

Thus the wider UN framework surveys regularly different aspects of global ecology, as do regional organisations survey regional ecology. The information is clear cut negative. One may separate between 2 kinds of literature or research.

First, the more exact information concerns the overall status of the global environment. It can be summed up as OVER-EXPLOITATION. Second, the less exact information deals with the so-called TIPPING POINTS. Whereas there are yearly data forthcoming on the misuse of Earth's resources, the tipping point literature is a set of predictions about what may happen 2030 or 2050 or 2100. A tipping point is a major ecological change that is unstoppable. The ecological crisis contains a number of tipping points related to each other. The goal of halting global warming to 1,5 degrees is based upon such a tipping point hypothesis.

The cop approach

The Conference of Parties (COP) has been going for almost 30 years, without reaching an agreement on halting CO₂ emissions. The COP has managed a lot though like focusing the governments of the states of the world upon CO₂ emissions and energy, deciding upon the major goal of 1,5 temperature unscrew and setting up a fund for compensation of poor countries for climate change damage. After the COP meeting in Egypt it seems that the 1,5 goal is no longer attainable 2050, because no limits on emissions were agreed upon. Why?

The information appears overwhelming in favour of global warming theory, emphasising emissions, especially CO₂ and methane. The emissions theory is corroborated by both data and physics. Besides the COP publications other research groups have the same result, namely that emissions must be halted as well as decreased. When global warming theory was launched in the 1990s, it was easy to ridicule it by cornucopians. But now the warming signals have much of veracity. The new lloborg 2020 position that global warming is true but yet not worth combating is not tenable. Two factors or circumstances explain why mankind is in a struggle for positive evolution at the risk of extinction.

Energy trap

Energy units in various forms is necessary for economic growth and development. The enormous economic expansion since 1945 would not have been possible without a formidable increase in emery consumption. And it is until recently based upon fossil fuel resources. Fossils have several advantages but on major drawbacks, i.e., the emissions driving global warming.

Fossils are very unevenly distributed on the planet, which leads to massive trade affecting the bourses around the world with speculation and volatility. Countries that lack fossils must import hugely. Only water power and wind as well as solar power are the alternatives besides thermal and nuclear energy.

Typical of fossils in particular and energy in general is that demand is higher than supply resulting in high prices and shortages except for the Oil Monarchies. The risk of natural gas dependency on Russia has increased volatility, especially after Ukraine invasion. The same applies to the fear for atomic power accidents.

Most governments plan for increases in energy consumption. They regard renewable energy as a means to more of energy and less as an alternative to fossils in the short run. Since energy is sought after but scarce in supply, the major powers in the world will not accept cuts in fossils, thereby increasing emissions.

Energy traps may evolve by misguided policy-making. For Instance, Germany and Sweden now face a serious energy shortage because several nuclear plants were closed down prematurely. Both country turned back to fossils. Denmark is the only country with a full supply of wind power. Actually, the EU is in the energy trap after loss of Russian gaz so is the UK. Before we bring up the second cause -free riding- of the COP failure we look at the great sinners.

The great powers: Energy need and CO₂s

None of the below heavyweights have driven the COP goals. Instead they continue with fossils, even coal power (Table 1).

Table 1. *Great Powers: Emissions and Economy*

Country	CO ₂ emissions 2019 / Gigatonnes	GDP 2019 / Billion USD
China	10,7	14280
United States	4,8	21373
India	2,5	2832
Russian Federation	1,7	1693
Japan	1,1	5123
Germany	0,7	3888
Iran, Islamic Rep.	0,6	291
Indonesia	0,6	1119
Korea, Rep.	0,6	1651
Canada	0,6	1742
Saudi Arabia	0,5	804
Mexico	0,4	1269
South Africa	0,4	388
Brazil	0,4	14280
Turkey	0,4	21373

Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.

Given both energy shortage and magnificent plans for even more of energy in the future, one understands why the big countries want to hold all options open, even with the immense risks involved. All future promises about CO₂ reductions are in any case renegable.

Free Riding

The problem of free riding -non-excludable but rival goods or services- has received two contrary solutions. One the one hand, one may insist upon complete market failure, which gives us the tragedy of the commons, as argued by Hardin (1967). We have then a double sided PD game with CUT = -3 and EMIT = 2:

Diagram 2. *One time emissions game*

		B	
		Cut	Emit
Cut	A		
		- 3, -3	10, 2
Emit			
		2, -10	-5, -5

The COP game as a whole of meetings -27- has one outcome or Nash equilibrium.

On the other hand, one may change the game in order to find the Pareto optimal solution:

- Threat
- Repeated play
- Meta strategies
- No time horizon.

None of these additions to the predicament of energy shortages will result in another outcome.

Conclusion

The COP club has failed to resolve the PD nature of cutting emissions. When there is both non- excludability and rivalry we have severe market failure. Resilience is now the main strategy against the consequences of the tipping points. It will not restore any new equilibrium at +2 degrees.

The demand for energy is such that emissions will not be cut. The role of energy for foreign policy is vital for the Great Powers above.

Mother Earth will heat up so that advanced life may become impossible.

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2

The analytic-synthetic distinction and the social sciences

Introduction

Analytical proposition, I argue, is a tool for scientific critique. Thus, its value is negative, namely revealing that sentences may just be true by definition lacking any correspondence to reality. In the social sciences analyticity offers a powerful tool to separate out definitions from truth. There is only implication and factual statements. Analytical statements are not falsifiable ([Popper, 2002](#)).

In philosophy today we notice a widespread scepticism about analytical propositions or sentences. There is a strong echo of Quines rejection of analytical relations debated much in the philosophy of science. However, in the philosophy of the social sciences the distinction between the analytical and the synthetic is useful for criticism.

In relation to a major social science theory, one needs to look more closely at the key propositions in order to test for falsifiability and empirical confirmation. Before one would test a theory by measurements and indicators, we ask which propositions are analytic and which are synthetic. This

amounts to sound methodology as one does not want to test propositions that are analytic. Yet, several philosophers of science deny analytical propositions or sentences, arguing that truth by virtue of meaning is impossible.

Denying analyticity

Already Hume spoke of the analytic-synthetic distinction, but it was Kant who developed it into a complex classification of propositions: logical, analytical, a posteriori, a priori, etc. The epistemological idea can be expressed in various ways. The most cited is Quine's analysis (1953) of the sentence:

(S) All bachelors are unmarried men.

Using the correspondence notion of truth, one would not look for empirical evidence for (S). Instead one could claim that (S) is true analytically through:

- a) Definition
- b) Meaning
- c) Set theory
- d) Predicate logic.

Quine (1953) denied that (S) was analytically true or a Kant's transcendent truth by rejecting all four interpretations. We will concentrate upon a) or i.e. that (S) is true by definition.

Language comprises definitions of words but there is hardly a one—one relation between words and meanings. If a dictionary D states that two expressions—"bachelor" and "unmarried man" are synonymous, one can then make the substitution:

(S₁) All unmarried men are unmarried?

(S₁) is a tautology, but is (S) then a transcendental truth? Dictionaries report facts about language usage which is often ambiguous and changing.

Quine's questioning of analytical sentences led to a wide debate about key concepts such as synonymity and meaning (Putnam, 1975). It was continued in modal logic where analytic truth was equated with necessary truth— see Kripke.

Analytical sentences in the social sciences

The epistemological situation in the social sciences is different as one relies much upon stipulative definitions. Since the theories are formulated in ordinary vocabulary—ambiguity and opaqueness—key terms need to be given an unambiguous meaning. Hence the use of stipulative definitions is important, but it also raises the problem of analyticity. Actually, analytic sentences take an important place in the social sciences. And with the multitude of definitions, analytical propositions, and especially stipulation seem non-appropriate.

We will argue for the relevance of inquiries into analytical sentences in the social sciences by focusing upon “democracy” and “polyarchy”.

Democracy: Many meanings

Philosopher A. Naess together with Stein Rokkan inquired into the many uses of “democracy” in a famous study from 1956. They found several meanings, often contrary ones. What should be done to reduce ambiguity and semantic confusion? The standard approach is to rely upon stipulation and then proceed with empirical enquiries. But it generates lots of analytical propositions. Let us exemplify:

(D₁) democracy = participation (D₂) democracy = rule of law
(D₃) democracy = socialism

Given these stipulations one arrives at propositions such as:

(P₁) The more of referenda the more democratic;

(P₂) The more of countervailing powers the more democratic; (P₃) The less of capitalism the more of democracy.

By pairing stipulations with propositions—D₁ to P₁ etc.—we arrive at truths by definitions. But are they not factually false?

These propositions together with its stipulation are empty, as assertions saying nothing about the world. One may say that they are true by definition, although they have no factual content but just reformulate the corresponding definitions: P₁-D₁, etc.

Often theories in the social sciences have these stipulations about key terms with the following “analytical” propositions

from stipulation, explicit or implicit. Revealing analytical sentences helps one determine the scope of a theory.

Given the much use of stipulations in the social sciences, one must handle the value loaded words with care. Some terms like “democracy” are positively valued and when defined as above D1-D3 the positive value is transferred and results in a tautology:

(T1) Swiss cantons are highly democratic; (T2) USA is the democracy par excellence; (T3) Soviet democracy was real democracy.

These statements correspond to the different definitions D1-D3 and are non-falsifiable.

Polarchy

The link between stipulations and analytical sentences in the social sciences appears in the discussion about

R. Dahl’s concept of polyarchy. This concept is found already with the Ancients. But Dahl (1970) made it famous in his book. So what is a polyarchy today?

“Polyarchy” means to Dahl a political regime where we have:

1. Constitutionalism
2. Legislation by representative bodies
3. Free and fair elections
4. Bill of rights
5. Freedom of association
6. Freedom of the press

These conditions are necessary and sufficient for polyarchy but not for democracy, states Dahl.

First, polyarchy is not the same as democracy according to D1, D2, and D3. Second, Dahl claims that “democracy” refers to an ideal where the state is ruled by everyone equally. Thus, polyarchy is just democracy in development—Dahl’s key thesis.

Here we have a conclusion that is an analytical statement summary of a few definitions or stipulations. In reality, the Dahl thesis is empty since democracy as real political equality can never be realised.

Real definition of democracy

Dahl invented the term “polyarchy” because the word “democracy” was too value loaded. Schumpeter had no reservations about listing the necessary and sufficient properties of existing democratic regimes. We quote from *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (1942):

“Democracy is a political method, That is to say, a certain type of institutional arrangement for arriving at political legislative and administrative decision and hence incapable of being an end in itself.”

This does not amount to a stipulative definition but is a characterization of living democracies when Schumpeter was around. Such an approach is sometimes said to aim at a real definition. And it does not result in any analyticity. “Democracy as the competition among political elites” is just the famous Schumpeter conclusion.

Conclusion

Analytical propositions are said to be true by definition or meaning. Endorsing the correspondence concept of truth, analytical sentences are merely camouflaged tautology.

True by meaning is typical of analytical propositions. Yet, meaning is always subjective—see Weber’s analysis of “Sinn” in *Wissenschaftslehre*. There is no objective meaning like Plato’s concepts. In the social sciences, terms mean how they are defined by dictionaries or individual scholars.

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3

Conceptualising globalisation, cultural identity and democracy

Introduction

The relevance for politics of cultural identities in the form of ethnicity, religion and values has risen during the post Second World War period. First, cultural messages have been formulated more sharply. Second, more compact groups have formed in support of these cultural identities. All over the world several groups having a cultural identity appear to be willing to engage in political action. Time has come to discuss the political implications of the emergence of communal politics. Since globalisation is very much characteristic of this period also, we will pose the question whether globalisation enhances or retards the spread of communal politics. Whereas the interrelationships between globalisation and communal identities and communal groups are complex and not easily entangled, it seems obvious that the democratic state is changing in one direction as a response to communal politics. Cultural identities are based upon a set of more or less coherent as well as more or less realistic ideas, which people accept as the foundation for belonging to a group as well as for taking

action. Cultural symbols may be more myths than truth. And cultural groups could display a low level of compactness, as people enter and leave such groups in a fluid fashion. However, cultural identities may become articulate enough to constitute the bedrock for compact groups taking political action. Small but highly compact or large but little compact communal groups may matter much in politics. More and more such groups focus upon rights, or the legal arrangements of the state. And the typical state responses to communal politics include the public recognition of communal groups through the creation of minority rights. The process of globalisation facilitates the drive towards the politics of mutual respect.

As social groups become more and more orientated around cultural identities, first and foremost ethnicity and religion but also universal values, democratic countries need to reflect upon the proper response to this challenge that is in accordance with democratic ideology and constitutionalism. How far can democratic governments employ rights in the new politics of mutual respect? Below I will discuss the pros and cons of such a constitutional policy in order to state the limits of any policy of mutual respect. First, we will examine why globalisation both increases and decreases the relevance of cultural politics. This is a paradox. Second, we will discuss what the democratic state can do for cultural groups without hurting democracy.

Globalisation and cultural identity

It is difficult to pin down globalisation, but at the same time globalisation affects the population in almost every country ([Appadurai, 2000](#)). The question: When globalisation proceeds, then what happens to cultural identity?, has two possible answers. Either cultural identity becomes more compact or it becomes less compact. What we wish to argue for is that both answers are true.

Globalisation fosters the creation of a true world community where people are highly interconnected, at least so in relation to the spread of news. Globalisation is not only the sharing of a high technology society but it also involves acceptance of certain values and ideas. It is unavoidable that the spread of

these ideas and values would not reduce cultural diversity. Yet, globalisation is first and foremost an institutional phenomenon being conducive to the creation of a world society ruled by a common set of norms. Globalisation also promotes the convergence around a set of rules and principles, but does globalisation also enhance a global identity of culture, i.e. beliefs and values?

Globalisation involves the increased interaction between many individuals and organisations in different countries. Such an increase in interactions over country borders could not take place without the erection of an institutional structure of rules that facilitate interaction. Thus, a set of international regimes have been created along with the growth of a global economy and polity. The emerging set of international norms could not operate without some degree of common understanding of norms and principles, establishing what are acceptable as well as desirable. The implications of globalisation for culture depend upon how far these common norms and principles will impact upon the beliefs and values of the participants in the global society.

The global society is still in its infancy, but it exists. In the private sector there is a rather broad common understanding of the benefits from a global economy structured in accordance with the institutions of the market economy. The global market economy is an institutional arrangement orientated towards competition between firms across borders and independently of who the owners may be. The key principles of this international order include: deregulation, incorporation, privatisation, new public management as well as regional integration. However, these shared principles are not strong enough to exclude considerable value disagreement about the country economy as well as the means and goals of economic policy-making. The goal of the international market regime is to promote fair competition between private firms and public enterprises in all countries: level the playing field. The accomplishment of this objective requires transparent rules, implemented either in regional co-ordination mechanisms or in international regimes such as e.g. the WTO.

Now, the agreement upon institutions in the international polity has not as yet reached the same level or depth as the convergence upon principles for the international economy. First, one must recognise that democracy is far from the one and only prevailing regime type in the world today, although the democratic form of government has made huge strides forward since 1990. About half of the countries of the world adhere to the democratic values, but far from all of them are to be considered as consolidated democracies.

In the eyes of a considerable portion of the world population the institutions of democracy - human rights - express a Western bias, which in their eyes is a negative. To them there are other values which may take precedence over the Occidental values that surface in a democratic regime, such as for instance Asian or Confucian values or the Muslim religion. It is far from certain that the expansion of democracy to more and more countries will simply continue year after year in the 21st century. In any case, the trend towards more and more agreement about human rights, which form a core in the democratic regime, is a major one with huge consequences for both international relations and domestic politics. The global polity has become more and more firmly institutionalised with a huge set of different rules, some of which are closely connected with human rights in a broad sense. Many of the institutions of the international polity concern the regulation of the member states of this community. One basic principle is non-interference in domestic affairs, which protects authoritarian states against the pressures for democracy.

When Huntington argues that globalisation will link politics with the major civilisations of the world, then he sees only one of the two possible effects of globalisation ([Huntington, 1996](#)). To him, globalisation reinforces communal politics to such an extent that there is a large risk for a clash of civilisations. In Huntington's framework, civilisations rest basically upon the various world religions. What needs to be underlined is that globalisation may reduce the tensions between countries adhering to different values, and thus further a global community of people adhering to similar ideas. And the civilisations of the world are in fact far less compact than

Huntington pretends. Globalisation may increase the prospects for peace, which Huntington bypasses entirely.

As a consensus about the global economy and polity is emerging, spreading to more and more persons and getting deeper in mutual understanding of principles, then such a major development will impact upon cultures, although this process is slow. Let us explain how globalisation makes nationalism less relevant, reduces the fervour of religion and creates communities of people all over the world sharing the same values.

Globalisation reducing nationalism and cooling religion

It may be argued against the future relevance of nationalism that globalisation does not go well together with nationalism in general. In a global economy as well as in global polity nationalism in the classical sense of this ideology has but a minor role. Globalisation undercuts nationalism in two ways: (a) It enhances multicultural societies, which do not support nationalism except in the form of certain minorities embracing xenophobia; (b) It reduces the relevance of the ideology stating the specificity of nations.

Again we have the distinction between group and cultural identity. Globalisation makes groups more heterogeneous and it undermines the belief in and value of separate nations co-existing as compact groups. How could a country proclaim that its nation is special today, especially when the country participates as an equal member in the world community, either in the international economy or in the international polity? And even if a country would cling to a national identity as a belief system, multiculturalism or the growth in social heterogeneity would make such a claim contested within the country.

At the turn of the 20th century nationalism as an ideology supported by huge groups of people gave the appearance of a belief-system of the future. It seemed both socially relevant and logically appropriate to the political problems at around 1900, identified by Lenin as “the national question”. Large minorities

were struggling to attain independence within long overdue empires at the same time as countries that had solved their national question were displaying increasing assertiveness on an international scale. One hundred years later this has all changed, and nationalism in the advanced countries of the world looks more and more as an atavism. Only in certain parts of the world is nationalism still an ideology of the future. It has been argued that nationalism was appropriate to the need of the industrial society. However, this ideology seems to offer little in relation to the post-industrial society (Smith, 1996, 1998).

According to several experts on nationalism, this ideology suited the industrial society well meaning that it was coupled intimately with the process of moderation. Smith states that the theorists who subscribed to the classical modernist paradigm endorsed the ideal of the nation “as a mass participant political culture and as a popular civic-territorial community, into which ever wider strata of the territorial population were drawn through processes of employment, mass education and citizenship”. In a modern, i.e. industrial-bureaucratic, era a high level of mass participation was possible; meaning that nations would be the sole political actors and units of government as an expression of self-government of the people (Smith, 1998: 20-21).

Is nationalism dead then in the post-modern society? Not quite, but it has lost its futuristic promise, at least so in the advanced countries characterised by decreasing social compactness and increasing regional integration. When nationalist parties succeed in elections, such as for instance FPÖ in Austria, then this is met with great astonishment. During the post-war period a number of nationalist or populist parties have attempted to attract voters in West European countries as well as in East European countries after democracy was introduced around 1990. However, they have at most received 20% of the support of the electorate, but certainly not so on many occasions.

Nationalism remains an attractive ideology only in a few Third World countries where ethnies still struggle for recognition and where stable states have never really been put

in place. A spectacular nationalist struggle recently took place in East Timor, where an ethnically identified group, mainly on the basis of Christianity, freed itself from Muslim rule by Indonesia. Nationalism in the Third World tends to almost exclusively take the form of separatism, as for instance in Ethiopia, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Russia, Iraq, Taiwan, Indonesia and China.

When ethnic groups struggle for recognition in advanced countries, then separatism is far from the only option chosen. As a matter of fact, separatism is so unusual in rich countries that the few cases of nationalism-separatism have received enormous attention: the province of Quebec in Canada and the Basque provinces in Spain. Even in these two examples it is not quite clear whether it is a matter of true separatism or only increased autonomy, at least for the majority of the population living in these provinces. In many countries ethnic groups have chosen other options in order to promote their interests than separatism.

To sum up, nationalism today is either an atavism in First World countries or merely separatism in a few Third World countries. This ideology coming out of the emphasis upon brotherhood - *fraternité* - in the popular movements initiated by the French revolution is under pressure both inside the country and outside the country by forces set in motion by globalisation. Nationalism as a group phenomenon is being squeezed by forces inside a country-multiculturalism, whereas nationalism as a doctrine continually loses in relevance due to forces outside a country-globalisation. Globalisation reinforces multiculturalism. Thus, the inside country factor undermining nationalism is to be found in the tendency towards social heterogeneity, which globalisation reinforces through its massive flux of people to and from countries. If nations are no longer compact social groups with one dominant ethnic heritage, then why would states have to be organised as nation-states? The outside country factor that makes the doctrine of nationalism less relevant in a postmodern society is the emergence of regional and global international regimes. If states can have several same legal frameworks to be co-ordinated at levels higher than the national government, then

why organise states as nation-states with separate and distinct legal systems?

In reality, these two factors - both the inside and the outside factors - combine to make nationalism out of tune with political realities in the advanced countries. Numerous attempts have been made to mobilise the electorate behind a nationalist party in Western Europe, but they have all failed with the exception of the Austrian FPÖ. One may consider the political career of Enoch Powell as evidence of the impossible task of rendering to nationalism a political future. He launched his campaigns against immigration already in the late 1950s and 1960, when the United Kingdom was far from as socially heterogeneous as it is today, when e.g. London is one of the most ethnically mixed cities of the world. And the sovereignty of Parliament has been replaced by British acceptance of the institutions of the European Union.

How difficult it is to interpret nationalism as a doctrine in global world is amply illustrated in the example of the ambitions of Quebec - the sovereignty-association option (Lévesque, 1979). Although there is much talk about independence or sovereignty among the French speaking population in this province, it often seems to be the case that the concept of independence or sovereignty is interpreted by many of these followers as meaning semi-independence or increased autonomy. The province of Quebec would have close relations with other parts of Canada no matter what legal framework is used to define these interactions. Perhaps it would not be a short-cut to leave the Canadian federation just to start building up regional coordination mechanism including a common currency etc.?

In any case, what stops or slows down the Quebec government when pursuing the independence option identified by René Lévesque is the increasing social heterogeneity of the Montreal area, which consists of large ethnic minorities from all over the world. As ethnic fragmentation will only increase in the future, time is running out for the sovereignty-association option. But is this alternative really much different from the option of seeking more autonomy within the Canadian federation?

Yet, nationalism remains a powerful force in the Third World where stable states have not yet been put in place. State consolidation may in several Third World countries involve the acceptance of the claims of secessionist movements, as in e.g. Morocco, Nigeria, Congo, Russia, Indonesia and China. The important thing to point out is that globalisation may facilitate this process of separation, not only through the attention given to separatist claims in the global networks. Before we discuss how globalisation may enhance the relevance of nationalism, in several Third World countries, we look at the impact upon religion where one would assume again that the main tendency is that globalisation reduces the strength or intensity of religious creed.

A religion does not lose its relevance due to temporal changes. The major religions of the world have existed for more than one thousand years and they have displayed great capacity to change and adapt to new circumstances. Why, then, would globalisation affect religion one way or the other? The major world religions and their various subforms have their own momentum, conditioned by both their historical evolution and the present environment in which they are embedded. Thus, several of the world religions have to struggle with a long-run downward trend in the development of their followers, their formal and informal membership as it were, whereas two world religions are expanding either in numbers or in intensity of belief. Globalisation when it impacts upon religion as a cultural identity may add or subtract to these two major trends.

Christianity in its three major forms - Catholicism, Protestantism and Greek Orthodoxy - is hardly a religion on expansion today. Although the followers of these religions increase in different parts of the world, it is still the case that they face serious problems in coping with the ever stronger process of secularisation which makes Christians either atheists or very lukewarm believers. One may observe an intensification of Christian belief in some Third World countries, but for Europe it certainly holds that secularisation has made a genuine Christian way of life much less observed than before. Protestant fundamentalism is expanding in Latin America, challenging Catholicism.

The same applies to Buddhism-Confucianism in the Far East, which religion in many countries appears to be on the verge on degenerating into crude forms of polytheism and the worship of amulets. The long experience with Communism in South East Asia has made atheism a wide-spread belief-system, which is also true of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The fall of Communism as a regime has not led to a major religious revival in either Catholic countries or in Greek Orthodox countries.

Concerning Judaism it may be stated that its sheer number of followers is not that large, no doubt due to the persecution of Jews in Europe before, during and after the Second World War. The large parts of the Jewish population are today concentrated to Israel and to New York. At the same time Judaism is as split as Christianity between various forms of this religion, ranging from fundamentalism to lukewarm acceptance of a nominal creed.

Matters are different in relation to Islam and Hinduism. Hinduism is a religion that is increasing in fervour or intensity meaning that its followers tend to observe the norms or the rituals of the religion in question more and more literally. This religion is restricted to India but one may also wish to include its followers in various Indian communities around the world - the Diaspora, which is not small and tends to increase due to migration. Yet, Islam is the fastest growing religion on earth. It receives every day new adherents, expanding southwards in Africa as well as eastwards and north in Asia. Due to migration there are quite sizeable Muslim communities all over Europe and North America. Also the intensity of belief has increased within Islam. Thus, fundamentalist groups stand strong in almost all Muslim countries, which even lukewarm rulers have recognised by accepting Sharia Law and building more Mosques.

To what extent is globalisation a factor that influences these developments of the world religions? The impact of globalisation upon the various religions of the world would be complex, as it facilitates the spread of them across the world but at the same time it cools them down. Globalisation involves a great flux of people, reinforcing the many Diaspora around the world. At the same time it is conducive to more of

relativism concerning matters of religion. We actually attribute both the decline of Christianity and the rise of Islam to globalisation, but why would globalisation have opposite impact upon these two world religions? The argument is here that globalisation makes Christianity wishy-washy but reinforces the fervour of Islam, promoting Islamic fundamentalism. Globalisation involves as one of its element the spread of a Western life style, which affects Christian values in one way and Islam in another way.

However, the main impact of globalisation upon religion is that of cooling it down. It is practically impossible to measure the intensity of religious belief - at least on such a grand scale as the entire world, meaning that the cooling down hypothesis cannot be tested strictly speaking. The cooling down effect upon religion from globalisation has two components, one may suggest.

First, globalisation is the increase in interactions between people in various countries. All other things equal, this would reduce mutual suspicion and favour mutual respect and understanding. Countries which isolate themselves in order to reinforce their religious identity will pay a high price for such a policy directed against participation in the international community. Thus, increased transactions promote mutual understanding and lesson the aggressive aspects of religious behaviour. Second, globalisation makes people more materialistic, as it open up the possibility of a more and more people sharing the material benefits of not only peace but also a world division of labour where all economies are governed under a similar institutional framework. Religious fanaticism would endanger the possibility of many poor countries to get a share in the affluence that the world economy promises. It is simply not worth while to opt for religious purity when it would only bring costs to the population. Finally, one may wish to add that globalisation involves as one heavy component the increased flux of information about the peoples of the world and their culture. More of knowledge about cultural differences tends to increase cultural relativity, or the willingness to accept other belief systems or values, especially if there is mutual respect. Globalisation needs not be conducive to the clash of

civilisations but may instead further a dialogue between cultures, from which understanding and even sympathy may emerge.

Globalisation creating worldwide communities of like-minded

Values as the foundation for cultural identities are much more flexible than ethnicity and religion meaning that they can easily be acquired and that they can change as a reflection of how times or the spirit of time change. Globalisation fosters the emergence of groups with similar values around the globe, often communicating with each other and influencing each other, despite the existence of political borders and ethnic and religious differences.

There exists enough evidence about this impact of globalisation upon the spread of universal values in relation to two groups, viz. homosexual and lesbian communities. The basic mechanism is that of diffusion: What is accepted in one advanced country could not possibly be rejected in another country. This is not to deny the role that the struggle that each of these two groups have had to go through during the post-war period has had for the improvement of their situation, especially in terms of rights and duties ([Adams, Duyvendak & Krouwel, 1999](#)).

Globalisation enhances the diffusion of both values and the claims group may rise in order to promote such values. The diffusion of values and claims may take on very specific forms as when legislation in one country is directly copied in another country. However, most of the time the diffusion of values and claims involves the transfer of general attitudes and ideas, which may be interpreted differently depending upon the country setting. Diffusion may also take place through the many international regimes, some of which are occupied with human rights and the status of collectivities.

Less omnipresent are groups who adhere to so-called post-materialistic values, but globalisation has no doubt contributed to the spread of the values that groups adhering to this culture believes in, namely quality of life and personal integrity,

concern for the environment, personal liberty and increased social equality, as well as fairness. The spread of post-materialist values is much linked with affluence, which entails that groups adhering to these values are numerous only in the very rich countries of the world.

Globalisation seems to foster a new confrontation between the left and the right in many countries. Instead of the opposition between capitalism and socialism or the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the global economy with its visible institutions linked together in a giant flow of transactions day and night seems to split the population or parts of the population into two groups, those who oppose the dominance of markets asking for more of regulation nationally or internationally and those who approve of the global market place.

So-called marketers would be the persons who accept and adhere to the global market economy, insisting upon the values of the decentralised market economy, institutionalised in the international market economy where many countries share the same rules governing economic activity. Such groups are to be found among people with various forms of capital assets, and they tend to follow or participate in the global market place, i.e. the various stock markets and the financial institutions, or they follow the events in the global market place with the Internet.

So-called egalitarians would be the groups who somehow oppose the global market economy or demand government regulation and intervention. The opposition to the global market economy comes from a variety of concerns with how markets allocate resources and especially distribute income. Environmental concerns make several groups critical of the global market economy, as such groups would focus upon the pollution problems generally and global warming in particular. To others distributional concerns call for government intervention, as the global market economy is seen as favouring the wealthy and neglecting the have-nots. Thus, instead of a confrontation between groups of people with entirely different models of the economic system to be used, there is a polarisation between groups with different images of the role of the state in a global market economy. This involves a basic

difference in the perspective upon the state and what government can or should do in terms of governing the economy.

Egalitarians believe in an activist stance on the part of government, having the capacity to steer the economy, at least to some extent. The global market economy is looked upon as negligent in relation to the rights of individuals and groups, where the implementation of these rights often requires strong intervention by the legal authorities. Egalitarians also favour government action in order to control that competition works, taking action against monopolies and trusts. They support the welfare state, as it restricts the market economy by the addition of numerous public programmes based to a considerable extent upon redistributational considerations.

Marketers are in favour of a lesser role for government in the economy. When government intervenes, then it should do in a non-discretionary manner by establishing a fixed institution the consequences of which the participants in the market economy can calculate and predict. State intervention should be kept at a minimum and take the form of independent agencies, staying at arm's length from government. Marketers tend to adhere to the welfare society model, involving considerably less of public programmes and rendering a bigger role for various markets ([Wildavsky, 1991](#)). Globalisation not only makes the confrontation between marketers and egalitarians more acute but it also fosters contacts between these groups across country borders. Perhaps the most spectacular event involving this type of confrontation was the meeting in Seattle of the World Trade Organisation in early 2000, when people opposing the new global market economy joined forces during this meeting in order to protest together. However, can one really speak of a common culture among all egalitarians in the world?

Globalisation increasing the search for cultural identity

At the same time as globalisation proceeds at an ever increasing speed it seems, one has witnessed a couple of

phenomena that involve the strengthening of cultural identities, or more correctly the search for new cultural identities alongside globalisation. In relation to ethnic identity there is the strong emergence of historical minorities or peoples who were left behind in the modernisation process. In relation to religion we have growth of the Muslim Diaspora in Western Europe as well as the coming of Hindi nationalism. And one may add here as an example of new culture identity the role that religion plays in US or Israeli politics today.

The historical minorities: During the last decades peoples who had been marginalised during several centuries have been more successful than ever before in claiming rights. In the debate about the nature of collective rights the claims of peoples like the Eskimos, the Samis, the many Indian tribes in North and South America, the Aborigines and the Maoris have figured prominently. And in several cases these claims have been successful meaning that they have to some extent been recognised and accepted by legal authorities or the state.

The rights of ancient peoples concern several things, from economic and social claims to political ones. The most spectacular successes won in and outside of courts by these so-called historical minorities refer to economic rights of a collective nature, i.e. either to land, the use of land or the compensation for old wrong doings concerning land or other economically valuable assets such as fishing rights, etc. For historical minorities representation rights are no doubt very important, but rights which directly involve monetary values or monetary compensation are even more vital for these socially deprived communities. Globalisation has made the struggle of historical minorities to have their ancient rights respected easier in several ways.

The Claims for Compensation: In a few major settlements minorities have secured huge compensation for wrongdoings in the past, which underlines the existence of a legal world community protecting ethnic and religious groups to some extent. Here, we have the final regulation of the Jewish accounts within Swiss banks, the payment of compensation to prison workers in Germany and the acknowledgments of Aboriginal and Maori demands in Australia and New Zealand.

One may regard the introduction of an International Criminal Court in 1999 as a further development towards the strengthening of the international community.

The Muslim Diaspora: The growth of the Muslim Diaspora in Western Europe to sizeable minorities of hundred of thousands or millions of people in several countries has changed these societies in a very short period of time towards multiculturalism. The sharp increase in social heterogeneity both from a religious and ethnic point of view has been accentuated by the emphasis upon a Muslim identity with attending rights. The assimilation strategy is only employed to a limited extent, or in so far as it may guarantee equal citizen rights. Cultural separateness is instead more and more the option opted for with attending claims to state recognition and government support.

In classical theory of social heterogeneity the distinction between the image of the melting-pot and the conception of the ghetto played a major role in outlining two alternative strategies as to how the majority population and the minorities would interact. This distinction appears to be far less applicable today than in relation to yesterday. The emergence of huge Muslim disappears in Western Europe shows that minorities may actually combine both strategy options of assimilation and differentiation.

The most visible symbol of the assertiveness of the Muslim Diaspora is the construction of many new mosques, of which some are almost as large as the famous mosques in the Arab world. If local government in the past had second thoughts about offering land for such projects, things are less complicated now, partly because having access to a mosque in one's vicinity is regarded as a collective right of this minority. However, the claims of the Muslim Diaspora are not limited to the right to religion or worship.

The Muslim Diaspora tend to demand also other kinds of collective rights, related one way or the other to the practice of their religion or to the protection of their culture and languages. Thus, Arab minorities for instance focus upon their access to the Arabic language in the form of for example educational facilities of their children or government support for the

cultural activities or the translation of book etc. What various Muslim minorities - Arab or non-Arab - seek first and foremost are symbols of state recognition of their special cultural status, but often such recognition is a means to acquiring financial support of one kind or another.

Rise of Hindi nationalism: The creation of India and Pakistan in 1947 was followed by a war between the two new states as well as by civil war between the Hindi and Muslim communities within the two countries. However, after this no doubt very bloody birth of the two new states things cooled down, especially as the Congress Party rulers in India emphasised the secular nature of the state. This strategy worked well for a number of years until the support for the nationalist party BJP started to increase in the 1980s. At the same time as the BJP has gone from been a small party in the shadow of the hegemony of the Congress Party to forming their own simply majority government in year 2000, India has responded the globalisation challenge by opening up its economy and reducing regulations of the import substitution kind. The surging support for BJP is - at least to some extent - a search for a cultural identity that the Congress Party in its modernisation efforts downplayed. Is Hindi nationalism a religiously or ethnically based phenomenon? Both would be the correct answer, but the emphasis is upon religion, as BJP mobilises the votes for both Hinduism as a religion but not so much the Hindi language, which would be too dangerous given the language diversity of India.

One needs to distinguish between stimulus and response when it comes to globalisation and its impact upon culture. As a stimulus globalisation reduces cultural diversity and also cultural extremism. But a reaction to globalisation may be the search for a stronger cultural identity. Globalisation evens out cultural diversity pushing people towards the willing or unwilling acceptance of the global market economy and its institutions as well as the international polity with its leaning towards human rights. However, these stimuli from globalisation upon each single country may well provoke a counter-reaction leading to a search for a deeper cultural commitment. How these two effects - stimulus and response -

work out in each country depends upon other conditions, which means that in some countries the response, or the search for cultural identity, may turn out to be especially strong.

Globalisation being a complex if not an amorphous phenomenon would in all circumstances have a set of several impacts upon societies and their political systems. The one single specific effect that globalisation has is to increase the relevance of groups rights. The idea of collective rights has long been criticised if not rejected as an incoherent addition to the idea of human rights. However, the more globalisation works out its consequences, the more the idea of group rights appears to be accepted. The combination of these three things - judicialisation, internationalisation and the emphasis upon justice - contribute to the increased legitimacy of the talk about group rights. Finally, when these three trends combine with the growing social heterogeneity as a result of globalisation, then multiculturalism with contain a strong dose of collective rights.

The politics of mutual respect

The politics of mutual respect is a constitutional policy using rights in order to accommodate a society with multicultural groups including historical minorities, immigrant groups, refugees as well as religious sects inter alia, which all orientated on the basis of cultural identity. It covers all kinds of mechanisms that enhance the position of minorities coming from ethnic or religious communities: group rights, consultation procedures, territorial decentralisation, veto players, state recognition, financial support, judicial protection, etc. It rejects the concept of democracy as an adversarial game between majority and minority where the winner takes all.

One fundamental argument in favour of collective rights states that even a complete implementation of universal individual human rights cannot fully protect weak minorities. Thus, group rights constitute a means to an end. The standard example is the native Indian or Aboriginal populations around the globe, who have not been able to protect themselves and their life-style against stronger groups, despite the recognition of human rights in the countries in question. Only if such weak

minorities can exercise collective rights, can they withstand the subtle or invisible pressures from the majority - at least so it is argued. This is the means argument. Collective rights would constitute an institutional mechanism for the empowerment of minority groups, especially historical minorities.

The ends argument is somewhat different, as groups rights would be an expression of cultural identities and not a means to their enhancement. These groups' rights would embody the identity of minorities, as without them they would cease to exist. Group rights are vital to minorities, as these rights constitute them so to speak. Minorities may wish to have collective rights introduced, despite the counter-argument that they are messy, difficult to implement and little efficient in order to enhance the interests of the individuals adhering to the minority. Group rights may be of little value as means to acceptable assimilation or proper differentiation, but they could be the constitution of their identity. Thus, whether collective rights work as means to whatever ends conceivable are beside the point, as they enter the essence of the cultural identity of the group.

Since collective rights are highly contested, the method by which they could become accepted as law has been much debated. Basically, there are two methods available for the introduction of group rights: legislation or judicial interpretation in the form of precedents. The initiative often today rests with judges. In public international law group rights have received more and more attention resulting in codification of such rights. However, in national legislation one observes a great reluctance to engage in the recognition of collective rights. The empty space is often filled by judicial activism, whereby case law establishes collective rights as important additions to individual human rights.

Recently, also politicians have paid more and more attention to group rights, deliberating over whether they could be recognised in a codified form as additions to already existing human rights legislation. However, both case law and codified legislation face a grave problem in relation to collective rights, namely: Who acts on behalf of a group when implementing collective rights, doing what for which members of the group?

Some argue that this problem is insoluble and severely restricts the use of collective rights. Others state that it presents difficulties that can only be solved on a piecemeal basis. It is a task for the politics of mutual respect to find solutions to this problem. The new politics of mutual respect sounds like a version of consociational theory, suggesting institutional mechanisms for so-called divided societies (Lijphart, 1977). However, it is not the same as consociationalism. Instead of the sharp distinction between homogeneous and heterogeneous societies, to which correspond two types of democracy (majoritarian and consensus), there is only one society model focusing upon a multicultural structure where lots of groups live together although they have different ways of life. One may wish to include also gay and lesbian communities, bypassing the entire issue whether sexual orientations are more socially defined than biologically derived or not.

The policy dilemmas of a politics of mutual respect include that it is very difficult to draw a distinction between the policy of promoting a culture and the policy of recognising a culture. Whereas the latter seems morally acceptable, the former may take on very ugly features of rent-seeking, using the state coffers for group egoistic materialism. If the latter occurs, then the politics of mutual respect may degenerate into a politics of difference where groups behave opportunistically in order to maximise their share of benefits from various public policies.

Democracy only entails two rules when a minimum conception is laid down. The first rule specifies political equality, i.e. it allocates one vote to each person. The second rule requires that group decision-making be based upon an aggregation mechanism which derives the collective choice from the preferences of the choice participants in accordance with either the simple majority rule or some qualified majority rule including as a theoretical possibility unanimity. Constitutional democracy goes beyond such a minimum definition of democracy adding a number of institutions to these two minimum ones.

The theory of procedural liberalism implies that a number of rules have to be added to the minimum set of institutions. A

constitutional state would according to this theory be based upon an overlapping consensus concerning first and foremost what a well-ordered society requires in terms of proper citizenship. It is a matter of a strictly limited theory of rights, “Altogether the possession of these basic liberties specifies the common and guaranteed status of equal citizens in a well-ordered democratic society” (Rawls, 1996: 335). Rawls presents a long list of such basic liberties which constitute the core of political liberalism in his interpretation, but it is hardly a very precise one: equal political liberties, freedom of thought, free and informed application of the principles of justice, some form of representative democratic regime, freedom of political speech and press, freedom of assembly, the liberty and integrity of the person, and the rights and liberties covered by the rule of law (Rawls, 1996: 334-35).

What political liberalism in Rawls’ interpretation contains is simply the set of negative rights in standard public international law. They have always been considered as the core of the doctrine of constitutionalism, which though contains more than the set of negative rights. Does Rawls also include positive rights in his conception of political liberalism? The answer is: YES, but they are not to be entered into the constitution of a state adhering to political liberalism. He states: “In the first instance, then, the constitution is seen as a just political procedure which incorporates the equal political liberties and seeks to assure their fair value so that the processes of political decision are open to all on a roughly equal basis. The constitution must also guarantee freedom of thought if the exercise of these liberties is to be free and informal” (Rawls, 1996: 337).

Actually, such a constitution would only contain the individual rights that have been considered as a logical consequence of the acceptance of the minimum definition of democracy as decision-making based upon one man one vote and simple majority voting, at least to some extent. What Rawls requires of a liberal constitutional state is the implementation of the civil and political rights included in the standard indices on human rights, which are also considered to constitute indices upon democracy. In other words, the Rawls’ definition

of political liberalism and a constitutional democracy is quite trivial, as nobody would reject it. But people may wish to add more rights to the Rawls' set, especially if they advocate the politics of mutual respect.

It is perhaps not astonishing that Rawls himself wishes to add more rights to this thin definition of a democratic state. Thus, he adds that his well-known difference principle is valid also for a country adhering political liberalism in the sense that it should be applied in the social and economic policy-making of the country without reservations. However, for some reason or other the difference principle is not to be placed in the constitution, where for instance it could constitute the bedrock for so-called positive rights, i.e. claims about what government ought to do in the form of public policies promoting employment, education and health.

Since the difference principle, if valid and if put into practice, is a most encompassing principle for creating rights between the state and society, both individual or collective rights, one would expect it to be given a constitutional status, if indeed it is to be a guiding principle of the state. Let us quote from Rawls again: "Although delegates have a notion of just and effective legislation, the second principle of justice, which is part of the content of this notion, is not incorporated into the constitution itself. Indeed, the history of successful constitutions suggests that principles to regulate economic and social inequalities, and other distributive principles, are generally not suitable as constitutional restrictions" (Rawls, 1996: 337). As an historical analysis of the coming and going of constitutions this statement is hardly true, as many governments have put in positive rights into their state constitutions, and some of these are to be found in states where constitutional stability is the case. Perhaps the difference principle is simply too radical or controversial in order to be put into a constitutions, meaning that its validity is maybe less self-evident than Rawls believes?

In any case, the argument for restricting the constitution of a liberal state to the set of negative rights is with Rawls political efficiency, i.e. the easiness with which representative bodies and other political assemblies can arrive at a decision. To take a final quote: "The emphasis is first on the constitution as

specifying a just and workable political procedure so far without any constitutional restrictions on what the legislative outcome may be” (Rawls, 1996: 337). We will argue that a workable decision-making process is a most relevant and important consideration when one talks about rights, especially as one moves to include much more rights than Rawls did in the constitution of a democratic state.

Democracy in multicultural societies: A global challenge

Democracy as a political regime is linked up with citizen participation as well as rights. According to the well-known framework of R. Dahl for the analysis of the concept(s) of democracy the participation aspect may be confronted with the rights aspect. In populist democracy there is a minimum of citizen rights, as what is essential is that each and every one is guaranteed the right to participate on the basis of the formula: One Man (Woman) - One vote. In Madisonian democracy the set of rights becomes plentiful, as checks and balances are considered the essence of a democratic state (Dahl, 1956). Consociational democracy may be regarded as a species of Madisonian democracy, as it also calls for the institutionalisation of democracy by means of rights which guarantee minorities influence or autonomy (Lijphart, 1999). The demand of cultural groups for state recognition - politics of mutual respect - enters the debate on the meaning of democracy today with a focus upon rights, individual ones as well as collective ones (Taylor & Gutman, 1994).

The emergence of communal politics on the basis of the mobilisation of groups with cultural identities rather than economic interests as with associational groups calls for the rethinking of political rights, especially collective rights (Kymlicka, 1995). The nature of group rights is a contested matter, as it is widely believed that collective rights may come into conflict with individual rights. Individual rights are strongly entrenched in the democratic state ideology, sanctioned by the many declarations of human rights. How far

can a democratic government go in the acceptance of group rights?

The interpretation of the nature of democracy in a post-modern society involves consideration of both participation (Rousseau) and rights (Madison). We argue that communal groups primarily target rights, or the introduction of new entitlements surrounding their minority status. The concept of citizenship has become a vehicle for this new debate on democracy and minorities (Kymlicka & Norman, 2000). Just as democracy may be developed by collective rights, so citizenship may become more complex and minority orientated (van Gunsteren, 1998). As communal ties grow stronger in the societies around the world along with the rise of multiculturalism, governments may wish to employ the legal machinery of the state to recognise this trend, the politics of mutual respect resulting in the formation of group rights (Avineri & de-Shalit, 1992). Collective rights can be seen as a conflict resolution mechanism. However, paradoxically too much of group rights may also become the vehicle of severe political conflicts in the state, both ex ante and ex post. To some scholars there is something fundamentally suspect about group or collective rights, and they would wish to send a warning to democratic governments when they engage in the politics of mutual respect (Posner, 1999). We will argue that group rights are not problematic so much from the point of view of the logic of justice, but - we emphasise - political efficiency limits their usefulness.

Group rights are much spoken of in relation to multicultural societies, as they could potentially constitute a new and comprehensive mechanism of conflict solution in these societies. Collective rights range from mere state recognition of the existence of all minorities to elaborate schemes of legislation involving a say if not veto powers on the part of minorities. The theory of group rights remains to be developed in a more precise manner, but it may be said that it faces two great challenges, namely: (1) the clarification of the concept of collective rights as distinct from individual rights; (2) the elaboration of how groups rights can be made to work in the judicial system, or how they are to be implemented. Following

the classical Hohfeld analysis of rights as claims, liberties, competencies and immunities (Hohfeld, 2000), we will first attempt to pin down what groups rights could amount to.

One should make a sharp distinction between two kinds of group rights. On the one hand there are group rights which are merely the sum of individual rights like the right of women to equal treatment in relation to men with regard to various things like salary, office, representation, etc. On the other hand there are group rights which are not reducible to individual rights like the position of minority assets like language, land, fishing, etc. One key to understanding what group or collective rights entail is to unpack which groups or collectivities we are talking about, using the Hohfeld scheme. Thus, we have:

a) Immunities: These are the rights that are strictly speaking not negotiable and they cannot be restricted through legislation. In relation to collective rights immunities would be the right to survival and happiness of minorities, involving prohibitions against genocide and discrimination. Groups have been active in calling for constitutional recognition of their special character in the form of rules about the heterogeneity in society, describing it as comprising different nations or ethnies or religious groups. What immunity would call for is the continued existence of the group(s) in question.

In democratic constitutions one often reads such immunities in relation to historical minorities meaning groups that have lived on the territory of the country since time immemorial. But can or should they also be enacted in relation to immigrant groups? Immunities, however, typically take the form of individual rights for instance in the form of guarantees about human rights concerning life, non-discrimination, physical protection and freedom of conscience and speech. The key question is whether these immunities need to be guaranteed in relation to groups. The standard argument against group immunities is that if individual immunities really are respected, then group immunities are superfluous.

Against the argument about the priority of individual immunities over group immunities it has been argued that group immunities secure something in addition to individual immunities, namely the cultural identity of the group in

question. It is not enough for an ethnic or religious group to know that any person has certain inalienable rights. What needs to be secured as immunity is the special nature of the group in question. The counter-argument is that groups may very well look after themselves and protect themselves without state interference, if individual immunities are put in place properly. This is very much a question of how groups secure their survival, i.e. whether small groups can survive in societies where one majority dominates without using formal mechanisms of subordination.

The argument about the insufficiency of the establishment of individual immunities is contained in the rejection of the politics of assimilation typical of the theory of the melting-pot society (Glazer, 1997). The politics of assimilation, it is stated, always works itself out with a bias in favour of the dominant group. It is assimilation on their terms that is aimed at in the melting-pot society. If minorities wish to maintain their identities, then they have to have a stronger net of protection, including the public recognition of the separateness of many minority groups, excluding or hindering assimilation.

Now, strictly speaking there are not many immunities even in democratic states, as liberties tend to be circumscribed by lots of conditions. Thus, life as well as liberty is restricted by many rules which change over time. Some states accept the death penalty and all states implement the principle that property that is in the public domain can be expropriated. Free speech also has its limits. Groups may well argue that the introduction of group immunities would make it more difficult for governments to restrict individual liberties, or at least force governments to make these limitations transparent and subject to legislation as well as judicial interpretation. Often groups seek only a state recognition of their right to exist, which may not mean much concretely but such immunity could be of immense symbolic import.

b) Competencies: These are the rights that bodies or organs in the state exercise when they deal with decisions of various kinds. Thus, federalism is a theory about the division of competencies along territorial lines. Constitutions tend to be very meticulous about the specification of the organs of the

state and their competencies. Thus, constitutions also instruct the judiciary to handle the problems of the interpretation of the constitution which often involve conflicting views about competencies. Groups may demand that the bodies or organs given various forms of competencies be made up of groups or minorities.

Groups demanding better constitutional protection of rights may focus upon competencies especially when groups are concentrated to certain areas of the country in question, then groups tend to demand increased autonomy of the relevant territory, covering a plethora of competencies linked with federalism, home rule, regionalism, local government, etc. However, when groups are spread out evenly over the land of the country in question, then groups may demand special representation rights. These may include various mechanisms of voice for the groups in decision-making such as minimum representation, the right to be heard on certain issues as well as possibility to deliver a veto on some of these as well as the competency to appoint certain officials etc.

Competencies may be framed in a highly complex manner in order to come close to what various groups demand. However, strictly speaking many competencies are not per se group rights or collective rights. Territorial competencies may foster the interests of groups, because it happens to be the case that certain groups can take charge of these competencies through for instance their overrepresentation in certain areas of the country. But, federalism for instance is not inherently a system of group rights.

Competencies may also be awarded on a functional basis. Thus, rights involving competencies over policy-making or implementation may be provided for interest organisations or for communities. Typically, functional competencies tend to belong to the informal system of government variously labelled e.g. “zuilen”, “corporatism”, “lobbyism”, “clientelism” etc. Sometimes, functional competencies become part of law or even the constitution as when groups are given a specific position on certain policy domains. Thus, communal groups may be given a special role in cultural policy-making.

Special representation rights belong to set of public competencies, which offer collective rights to groups. They may take a variety of forms from representation within Parliament, over the creation of special consulting boards to the general accomplishment of Proporz, or the proportionality of all key groups, all over the state, not only in representative assemblies but also in the structure of positions in the bureaucracy. These rights may involve the initiation of hearing on/and veto concerning policy-making or implementation.

c) Liberties: Such rights would provide groups with insurance that they can act as they wish. Thus groups would know that they could e.g. organise their own religious meetings, speak their language and follow their ways of life. Liberties are not immunities though. Thus, liberties could be restricted by means of legislation. Yet, putting them down explicitly may constitute a protection for the groups in question. Again, one may discuss whether such collective liberties could not be covered by a broad set of individual liberties.

Groups protect their way of life, or at least they try. Minorities with a cultural identity that is different from the culture of the majority typically pursue two strategies or some combination of them: On the one hand minorities attempt assimilation in order to enhance their chances to compete on an equal footing with other groups. On the other hand minorities may seek differentiation or recognition of their special nature in order that their cultural identity be strengthened. Liberties as rights belong more to the second strategy than the first one.

Opting for more of liberties entails that minorities wish to employ the state to set up fences towards other groups in order to demarcate where a group may do as it wishes. Liberties may include religious behaviour but also ethnicity. Furthermore, liberties are often sought by groups adhering to universal values, for instance homosexual groups or lesbian ones. Liberties for some carry no corresponding obligation on others, except that they must respect what they decide to do.

Liberties may be infringed upon by ordinary legislation. Liberties are never absolute but result from ongoing considerations about what may be left to individuals or groups

to decide themselves. Do group liberties constitute an addition to individual liberties? According to the theory that group rights are superfluous, if individual rights are in place, the liberties of groups could always be decomposed into individual liberties. Take the case of religious liberties, for instance the liberty to dress as one wish, for instance carrying clothes with a religious tone.

When Muslim groups constituting minorities in Western Europe demand the liberty to dress in accordance with they way of life, for instance the liberty of Muslim children to hide their hair when they are in school, then more is involved than simply the individual liberty to dress as one wishes, given the restriction that one cannot wear offensive cloths or no cloths at all, which would also constitute an offence to the ordinary opinion. When Muslim children hide their hair collectively, then it is more a group action with strong political implications than the mere circumstance that a few persons happen to do the very same thing. If this group liberty is accepted, then it would constitute a threat against the religious neutrality of public education, or at least so it has been argued by a few courts in West European countries.

d) Claims: These are the rights that groups would act upon in order to demand things from the state, such as resources, constituting obligations on the part of the state towards the groups. Here, we find a number of group claims that have emerged recently such as financial support for activities expressing or reinforcing the way of life of minorities. In reality, there is hardly any end to what groups may claim from the state and the ministry of finance.

Claims would constitute the other side of the coin in relation to liberties, as they constitute obligations, if accepted as rightful that is. There is presently a tendency on the part of both groups and governments to move from the acceptance of liberties to the promotion of claims. Thus, groups wish to have not only the freedom to act in accordance with their ways of life but they also want the economic support of the state in order to make their ways of life flourish.

A constitutional democracy is a system of government where the will of the people is aggregated and expressed under

numerous institutions, some of which restrict the capacity of a majority to take decisions. The politics of mutual respect adds a new layer to the constitutional state by designing rules that enhance mutual respect between the various social groups, especially collective rights. The goal of this new kind of constitutional policy is to enhance mutual recognition and toleration but not to promote assimilation. Its Achilles' heel is, however, that it may become so complicated that it reduces efficiency in interaction between groups - the transaction cost argument.

Transaction costs

The main objection against a policy of mutual recognition based upon an extensive use of collective rights is that it results in new forms of discrimination against individuals, either within the group itself or between groups. This is not the major disadvantage in our view. It is efficiency that is hurt by too much politics of mutual respect. The advantage is the cultural recognition that comes out of such a policy, but there is a price to be paid and it may run high. Life becomes too complicated, not only in society but also in the state. Let us explain this disadvantage by focusing upon how democracy may snare itself by too much constitutionalism or rights hurting participation, majority rule and the capacity to decide.

Claims may be driven very far. Thus, each minority could claim a plethora of support and recognition from the state. First, it is argued that such a social structure where each minority would live its own life supported by its own organisations enhancing ways of life corresponding to its cultural identity would result in a macro structure for that society which is not desirable. It would create a stalled society with a high level of intergroup conflict. Such a macro structure would make impossible the ideal of assimilation typical of a melting-point society, where groups compete under universal institutions. This is the macro argument contra group claims.

Second, in such a macro structure it would be difficult to individuals to claim fully individual rights. Indeed such a macro structure could pose a threat towards general human rights in

the form of immunities. An individual in a democratic society must have the right to equal treatment when it comes to jobs and opportunities. However, a macro structure could entail that such elementary micro rights could not be fulfilled, as all jobs and opportunities would belong to groups, deciding over them in terms of their strategy to favour their ways of life. This is the essence of the micro argument contra group claims.

Constitutionalism, or the theory about the constitutional state as government under the Rule of Law, has been married to democracy during the 20th century. When a democratic regime is put into a constitutionalist framework, then a set of rights is added to the minimum definition stated above. The politics of mutual respect and its model of a constitutional democracy should be confronted with the exigencies that flow from the notion of political efficiency. Now, the politics of mutual respect demands a sharp increase in the set of rights, which are to be allocated to not only individuals but also groups. What is the efficiency costs involved?

Thick constitutionalism entails the use of decision-making procedures that restrict the unfettered reign of the simple majority institution. Here we find ideas about rules that - at least so it is argued - increase political stability: (i) a critical role for veto players; (ii) qualified majority decision-making; (iii) legal review of both executive and legislative acts; (iv) bargaining and/or arbitration procedures; (v) immunities; (vi) recognition of group rights; (vii) federalism or decentralisation and devolution.

The main argument in favour of thick constitutionalism is that its employment enhances rationality in political life, avoiding political instability in the aggregation of preferences like the paradox (Arrow, 1963). Simple majority voting could generate voting cycles resulting in intransitive collective outcomes, if not restraining by the putting into place of institutions that make the expression of the popular will more difficult. The recent wealth of rational choice articles show that institutions enhance stability in decision-making. However, it does not say that thick institutionalism comes with a substantial cost, namely the reduction in efficiency in public decision-making.

There is hardly any limit to how thick a constitution can be made in a constitutional democracy, as under the headings above (i) - (vii) we find lots of possible institutional devices. However, the price to be paid in the form of a less efficient democracy increases the more devices are introduced. The introduction massively of collective rights could follow the logic outlined above. In the beginning such a constitutional policy could enhance democracy, as the benefits would be high and the costs low. However, after a certain amount has been created, such a constitutional policy would run into efficiency losses. We are trading rights off against efficiency. Democracies always face the task of making decisions for the entire group, initiating policies or implementing them. Rights increase the probability of a deadlock, which would reduce political efficiency.

Transaction costs include the effort and time devoted to the making and implementation of decisions. The drawback of the politics of mutual respect between communities is that societies would be confronted with a sharp rise in transaction costs when practicing democracy. In effect, transaction costs set a limit upon how far governments may wish to go in introducing the mechanisms protecting ethnic and religious communities.

Conclusion

The theory of communal relationships - communitarianism - offers a philosophical rationale for the growing understanding of communities, which almost seems to make these groups more important socially or politically than associations. In communitarianism the focus is almost exclusively at ethnicities and not nations besides religious groups and community groups. The key question that communitarianism tries to answer is also the one that globalisation makes highly relevant, namely: Who are we? What way of life do we wish to support? How do social relations define our identity? One may not wish to agree with the strong theses of communitarianism, but it is undeniable that this new philosophy emerging during the last

twenty years has increased understanding of community and communal interactions.

Communitarianism underlines cultural identities at the expense of universal orientations. Thus, people are so intimately connected with a culture that they are so to speak constituted by the culture in question or embedded in such a particular culture. The strong thesis about cultural identity defining persons is at odds with much evidence that shows people could decide to leave one culture and adopt another as well as that persons often adhere to universal values more or less at the same time as they identify with a particular culture. In response to the communitarian claim that cultural identities are stronger than value orientations various scholars have begun to develop a theory about the politics of mutual respect, which would be the democratic state's proper reaction to multiculturalism. Such a politics of mutual respect would be truly global, especially if it is to work in a period of rapid globalisation. At first it enhances democracy but when driven further it counteracts democracy reducing the efficiency of a larger group to take decisions in relation to its many subgroups.

The paradox of globalisation is that it both makes communal politics more salient while it at the same time calls for a politics of mutual respect which may reduce ethnic and religious conflict. Communal heterogeneity will increase as a function of globalisation and the search for communal identity will also intensify. However, a politics of mutual respect may reduce conflicts between communities and enhance a global respect for different cultures, where different civilisations accept a common core of institutions. The risk with the politics of mutual respect is that it leads to immense transaction costs in democratic decision-making.

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4

Notes on chaos: Draft political treatises

Introduction

Politics as well as social change in the early 21st century have taken a dramatic turn towards instability, change and uncertainty, i.e. towards chaos. This may be observed in domestic politics in several countries as well as in international politics in many domains. The overwhelming fear among citizens and inhabitants is that the idea of progress has played out its role: "Things will never be the same!".

The most profound anxiety for the developments in the 21st century stems from climate change that may wash mankind from the surface of Planet Earth. But there are many concerns: collapse of Islam internally, the growth of Euro Islam, the threat of nuclear confrontation in East Asia, the withdrawal of the US from international solidarity, the new imperialism of Russia, the resort to new search for the old nationalism as well as surging populism and the decline of the

Left, especially Social Democracy, the politicians' opportunism.

I will bring up global warming last, because it is the most lethal source of chaos. It is now unstoppable. The social sciences must start modeling real events with chaos theory, dealing with cataclysmic events and developments ([Gleick, 1988](#)).

Chaos theory was inspired in the 1960s by Lorenz ([1969](#)), who was studying equations applied to climate. He found that a system of three differential equations, coupled with a positive feedback and a negative feedback, could not predict the future. Chaotic events and developments stemming from climate change now affect social systems and the household economy, globally. Besides climate chaos, we must analyze both civilization chaos and international relations chaos, inter alia. Is not Brexit chaos politics just like the Trump presidency?

The koranic civilization

For the first time in history, the Shias have the upper hand against the Sunnis. The Arab League appears powerless against the Shias strongholds: Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, as well as to some extent Qatar.

No reliable statistics exists on the proportion of Sunnis and Shias in the Muslim civilization. If Turkey is added, then we must also separate between different kinds of Shia as well as of Sunnis. India has probably an equal division of Sunnis and Shias but the Shias are often Ismailia's, or seveners. It is stated that the number of Sunnis is much larger than the number of Shias—80-90 percentages against 20-10, but it is likely an underestimation of the Shias, who may be Twelvers, Seveners and Fivers as well as the Shiites in Turkey.

The conflict between Sunnis and Shias has always been there in the Koranique civilization, but it has risen to alarming heights, with the stand-off between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Civil war in the giant Muslim civilization wreaks havoc everywhere; first the Al Qaeda and the IISIS against moderate Sunnis and all Shias; now the confrontation between Sunnis and Shias, involving incredible cruelty—see Yemen.

The ISIS will kill more people by terrorist tactics, but a major confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran would bring gigantic misery to Arabs and Parses. In addition, the Kurdish problem remains unresolved, as always. The Kurds constitute a nation, and they are generally moderate Sunnis.

The outcome of the civil wars in the Moslem civilization has been a dramatic rise in death from domestic violence and countless casualties among civilians, especially women and children. Why would Muslim leaders tolerate and even support this dire development the last two decades? The Koranic predicament is reminiscent of Christianity with the struggle between Catholics, Protestants and sects. It came to nothing but sorrow.

The destruction of Syria and Yemen testifies about the complete absurdity of civil war in our time when conflicts can be brokered by peaceful means, like voting and bargaining. The collapse of Iraq followed the Allied Invasion: Operation Iraqi Freedom—the mistake of mistakes. The goal of removing Saddam Hussein, a Sunni, was to make Israel safer, said a French Arab specialist. Look at the outcome now with Shia hegemony.

Why kill and die for religion?

With millions of Muslims and others dead or molested from the civil wars in the Moslem civilization, the only relevant question is: Cui bono?

Terrorists, soldiers, civilians have been killed or damaged for the sake of religion, at least verbally. All this carnage and casualties for the purity of religion directly, or the search for power indirectly?

Eliminating or badly hurting religious opponents became a daily or nightly preoccupation in the Moslem countries, from Algeria over Turkey to Indonesia, from Nigeria to Somalia. Religious violence is counter-productive and its grand scale has weakened the Muslim civilization severely and hurt even the Koranic belief-system.

Koranic faith puts no limits to killing, just as Christian faith in history was extremely lethal in its consequences of dissent and opposition. Compare with Buddhist sects, where killing is forbidden and hardly occurs. Why cannot Sunnis and Shias live side by side?

With Christian developments in fresh memory, why turn the Middle East into Germany of the 30 years' war period? Religious or sectarian conflicts tend to remain indecisive, just causing misery and sorrow, like for the Yemeni children without milk. Are they infidels, deserving death from starvation?

Although the conflict between Sunnis and Shias date back to the death of the Prophet, recent surge in Islamic violence has to do with the rise of fundamentalism in the 20th century, with 3 men: Mawdudi, Qutb and Faraj. They inspired the AL Qaeda as well as the ISIS, theologically, philosophically and ideologically. They argue that true Islam can be distilled and practiced in today's world. They were completely wrong.

The 3—Mawdudi, Qutb and Faraj—initiated the process of political chaos in the Muslim civilization, including Northern Africa.

There is NO ONE SINGLE ISLAM. Koranic belief is diverse, as with all world religions. What the Prophet revealed is not known with certainty, and the Koran was forthcoming late after his death. It is open to different reasonable interpretations, and the messages are sometimes abstruse or even contradictory, pending between ALLAH the merciful and ALLAH the revenger.

The problem of Theodicy poses major difficulties for Islam. How come ALLAH does not intervene to save the innocent Muslims who die from civil war and terrorism? He is believed to be all mighty, but he stays away, silent/Does he regard Shias as infidels? Who knows?

The belief in all mightiness is impossible to reconcile with the new theory of the universe. When we have trillions of suns and planets, why would Planet Earth matter? How could ALLAH control the incredible forces operating in the universe?

Religious beliefs constitute stories or tales, nothing more. People adhere to them because they make up their culture, their ways of life and believing. But people want a peaceful message to adhere to, so that they can get on with their lives on a daily basis. The conflicts with Islam are fundamentally meaningless.

The books and pamphlets by Mawdudi, Qutb and Faraj stimulated people like al-Zawahiri and al-Zarqawi to commit crimes against humanity and the Muslims. They also were spread by the Muslim Brotherhood.

In his civilization enquiry, underlining the world religions, Maw Weber called Islam “a religion of warriors”, explaining its incredibly fast spread from Spain to India. This identification of the Muslim virtuosi was an expression of orientalism, which could please only the fundamentalists Sunni or extremists Shias.

To Weber (1978), Islam is like Judaism and Christianity an “other-wordly” religion (“jenseitig”). Since ALLAH is all mighty on Judgement Day, why kill or wage war in this world (“diesseitig”), the inner-world that is strictly finite?

Growth of Euro Islam

The internal chaos in the Muslim civilization has a counterpart in Europe, where the substantial Moslem groups challenge the established order of nation-states.

The Moslems are now so numerous in several European countries that the party system has been plunged into chaos.

The arrival of millions of immigrants, many Moslems from Africa, Arabia and Central Asia, has provoked a strong voter reaction, focusing upon the nation. Thus, nationalism is back with a vengeance. So-called populist parties have sprung up in almost all countries amidst much higher voter volatility.

The new populism is a mixture of protest phenomena: anti-immigration, anti-partitocrazia, but it is hardly fascism. The Left has difficulties finding a proper response to populism, Social Democracy declining in some countries chaotically.

Party politics does not fit the classical Lipset and Rokkan model—"frozen party systems in Western Europe". Instead, elections are hard to predict and earthquake outcomes may happen in several election.

Regionalism has crushed the myth of European Union identity with its nation-states members. The UK leaves the EU under chaotic form. And a province in Spain claims human rights for its demand for secession, meeting sympathy in Antwerp, Scotland and Lombardy.

One may await the formation of Islamic political parties in Europe, with explosive implications. In both France and Germany, the Moslems are so numerous that they could change the dominant Western culture in these secular nations.

Decline if the US and Public International Law (PIL)

The election of Donald Trump as US president has increased uncertainty in international relations, leading to the brake up of institutions that stabilized world politics. The space left from US withdrawal, initiated by president Obama, has rapidly been filled by Russia, conducting a more aggressive foreign policy, and by China, exporting its

successful economic model of market socialism to Africa and Central Asia.

As the international order among sovereign states is weakly institutionalized, it runs the risk of anarchy. Public international law has expanded much since the end of the Second World War, but its enforcement is still precarious.

World politics constitutes a Hobbesian jungle without rules that are stably respected. International anarchy should be tamed by normativity, i.e. rules by institutions like NAFTA, NATO, EU and the UN. But the enforcement of these institutions and their rule making is problematic or hardly fully probable.

The US is now destabilizing several global or regional institutions like e.g. the COP21 Treaty without contributing anything positive to replace them. US nationalism is likely less effective internationally than US participation in institutions and supporting multilateralism.

Goldsmith & Posner (2006) claim that public international law is radically different from domestic/national law, especially in lacking the property of being binding. Goldsmith and Posner state: "The book rejects the traditional explanations of international law based on legality, morality, *opinio juris*, and related noninstrumental concepts."

They provide an instrumental account of when and why nations use international law, when and why they comply with it, and when and why international law changes." (Goldsmith & Posner, 2006: 463)

The concept of validity—*opinio juris*—is a prominent element in the concept of law. Is it really true that domestic law or national law could be binding at the same time as public international law is not? When speaking about the nature of law, one often encounters the idea that law is a set of rules that are enforced? What then about the nature of public international law? Posner completely denies

normativity. How could a system of norms that constitute LAW lack entirely normativity?

Governments would have no obligation whatsoever to comply with PIL. Thus, the enforcement is entirely up to the states in the international system that may or may not comply. Alternatively, they may or may not retaliate against reneging by other governments, all based upon consideration of self-interests. Goldsmith's and Posner's rejection of any obligation with PIL appears drastic. Law, all tend to agree, is a huge ordered set of pairs of norms and their enforcement: Law = (norms, enforcements), where a set of criteria, like the basic norm (constitution) or secondary norms are introduced according to the rule of interpretation operating in the country.

The basis of national or domestic law in beliefs about subjective validity—normativity—recurs in the structure of international law. Public international law has expanded considerably after the Second World War into several bulks of norms, regulating purportedly interactions between states and protecting mankind. Yet, its claim to universal validity has been a serious issue of contention ([Goldsmith & Posner, 2006](#), [Posner, 2009](#)).

One finds reminiscences of the classical antimony in the debate on PIL (realism against moralism), as it has evolved after the Great War ([Besson & Tasioulas, 2009](#)).

The PIL framework has advanced slowly by means of the principle of “muddling through”. The PIL is not planned or designed as a whole set of rules.

Instead it has expanded in scope and range in an incremental fashion. It builds upon the accumulated wisdom of a variety of efforts over a few centuries to codify a set of reasonable rules for the interaction of states as well as the protection of persons.

PIL as a spontaneous order in appears in the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The US and UK led invasion of the sovereign state of Iraq violated PIL, as clearly expressed by French

foreign minister Villepin in the debate in the Security Council ahead of the start of the war. The reason for the attack proved erroneous, but the wider consequences of the invasion were disastrous to such an extent that it forms one of the catastrophes of human history: millions of Muslims dead or wounded, thousands of American and British killed or molested, the disintegration of whole states, the rise of insurgence, radical Islamic fundamentalism.

The new interpretation of PIL by Goldsmith and Posner (2006) replaces normativity with mutual advantage or utility:

“The primary intellectual target of *Limits* is the claim—widespread in earlier generations of international law scholarship and still dominant today—that nations comply with international law for non-instrumental reasons.” (Goldsmith & Posner, 2006:464).

To the extent that PIL is really law, it is Binding, to the extent that it somehow protects mankind. By defecting from the global warming treaty in Paris 2015, the US throws the entire PIL into question. It has dire implication for climate change governance and policy-making. A uni-lateral approach to global warming would be conducive to chaos.

The uncertainty and unpredictability in the international anarchy that characterizes international relations has augmented when the US no longer supports the validity of public international law and itself breaks it or reneges upon promises made.

Strategies of Russia and China

Both Russia and China have begun filling in the void left by the US withdrawal and new isolationism. It has halted the expansion of normativity in international affairs, as the respect for public international law is on the decline.

Russia has chosen the strategy of aggression, knowing that it will not be opposed by the NATO. Thus, Russia has

annexed the Crimea and in reality Eastern Ukraine. Moreover, it is much involved on the Shia side in the civil war in the Muslim civilization, bringing enormous fire power to Syria, defeating the Sunni-ISIS uproar against Assad.

The Russian ambition to re-create parts of the Soviet empire is risky, as its economy is weak and underdeveloped. It has been conducive to nervousness on the part of NATO as well as Saudi Arabia. A confrontation over the Ukraine could go nuclear. Russian support for the Shia regimes makes the Middle East instable and violent.

The strategy of China is entirely different, exporting its successful economic model with Chinese workers together with a massive scale of resources, China being much richer than Russia.

The penetration of African economies has been conducted by China on a huge scale, targeting infrastructure, communication and mining as well as rare resources like fine wood. Now, the plans for the New Silk Road from Beijing to Istanbul involve massive investments by China in the Khanates in Central Asia, as well as Pakistan and Iran.

There are now sizeable Chinese minorities in several African countries, leading the modernization of African economies, contributing both labour, capital as well as know-how and management. China's political influence is also on the rise on the African continent.

The huge Silk Road project with infrastructure, energy projects and transportation links will carbonize Central Asia. In addition, it puts China in competition with Russia's plans for new influence spheres.

China has the resources to expand outside. It employs its successful economic model: market socialism. The market socialism model was developed by East European economists in the 1950s and 1960s to counter-act the inefficiencies in the classical planned economy model of Soviet style. However,

neither Poland, nor Hungary nor Yugoslavia could make it workable. China succeeded!

Relying upon brutal market incentives in all markets, inside or outside the country, the overall control rests with the state, or the Communist Party. The Party members benefit much from economic development. So far, nothing seems to shatter the hegemony of the Party and its top officials, said to be very rich. China is primarily interested in economic power expansion abroad, not hesitating to use bribes to African dictators.

Under the 21 century Tsar, Russia has become a global problem, focusing on resuscitating Soviet power, although it is weak on all but arms and weapons of mass destruction.

Climate change chaos

The greatest scare for the future in this century stems undeniably from the danger than climate change develops into a gigantic chaos. There is the possibility of a Hawking irreversibility point in time, when global warming has proceeded so far it is unstoppable. The COP21 project is weak normativity.

To avoid Hawking irreversibility—Planet Earth becoming too hot and volatile in terms of climate with sea level rise of one meter and more—the UN and the governments of 193 states in the world has created a common pool regime (CPR) to conduct anti-global warming policy. It has succeeded to enact a COP21 Treaty, obligating the state to accomplish decarbonisation in the 21st century—a rare example of international governance under PIL. If the UNFCCC fails, then mankind will perish.

All countries in the world have formed a common pool regime (CPR) to save the atmosphere from more GHGs, focusing only upon the CO₂s. The global decarbonisation plan includes: Halting the rise of CO₂s by 2020 (GOAL I); Reducing the CO₂s by 30% - 40% by 2030 (GOAL II);

Complete decarbonisation by around 2075 (GOAL III); Decentralised implementation under international oversight, financial support and technical assistance. These are enormous goals, as only one country—Uruguay—is near GOAL I and GOAL II. Some countries have lately had stalling or even decreasing CO₂s, but many other still face an upward sloping curve.

Just before the start of the UN global environment reunion COP23 (6-13 November 2017) in Bonn, the study Climate Science Special Report: Fourth National Climate Assessment (USGCRP, 2017) was published in Washington, enquiring into the global warming consequences for especially the US but also the world. It recommends a combination of national and international policy-making to halt temperature rise, despite the fact that the US government is negative. We must then ask: Can decarbonisation policies be implemented or managed? I will suggest: NO.

Methane emissions are on the rise. Any short-term decrease in methane concentration is improbable: Agriculture emissions increase with the increase of population, the increase in meat diet in developing countries and the temperature increasing the metabolism of microbes in rice agriculture; Wetlands emissions do not diminish with the microbial chemical activity on increase with temperature rise; Melting permafrost releases methane from land and sea.

There has been a widespread hope that the augmentation of CO₂s would “stall”. Yet, China reports ominously that its CO₂s are set to increase again, considerably. Large polluters have still upward sloping CO₂ curves: India, Indonesia, Australia, Saudi Arabia, etc. Only one country would fulfil the COP21 goals easily, namely Uruguay.

GHGs have several sources, but the tipping cause is the anthropogenic set of emissions, stemming from energy consumption in a wide sense. The UNFCCC and the governments of the countries of the world want to

decarbonize maintain economic growth. They plan to increase the supply of energy by 20% up to 2040. This amounts to an impossible goal conflict between the COP21 Agreement and further increased energy consumption. Something has to give.

World politician and state leaders cannot sacrifice economic development for decarbonisation, totally excluded by economic establishments everywhere. Poverty would increase, unemployment rise and social unrest spread. The global market economy keeps rolling on, as if there could not occur the Hawking irreversibility.

Socio-economic determinism will seal the fate of mankind, as rich countries and emerging economies will not relinquish economic growth. World population is set to add 2 more billions: How to feed? Energy is the source of economic affluence, but how to access energy without GHGs?

With 90 per cent of energy coming from fossil fuels, and a further 29 per cent increase in energy demand is in the cards, how can the COP21 Treaty goals be fulfilled? Countries can renege at any time, stating they cannot make it for economic or developmental reasons. The COP21 club is a common pool regime (CPR) that is in reality an ocean PD game with an omnipresent temptation of defection. President Macron wants other countries to pick up the contribution of the US, meaning that US defection was rational (1-N problem). China or India may not wish to make an enormous sacrifice on socio-economic development by cutting 30 per cent of emissions (1/N problem).

The decarbonisation policies will not achieve the 3 major goals. Instead, the UNFCCC would have to take more drastic steps, whatever the consequences for economic growth:

- 1) Eliminate coal fired power entirely;
- 2) Build more nuclear power plants, safer ones;
- 3) Do not take out existing atomic power stations but improve them;

- 4) Reduce charcoal in the Third World;
- 5) Stop de-forestation completely, tropical as well as Siberia;
- 6) Halt the building of numerous dams in the Amazon; preserve the flow of water in great rivers of mankind: the Nile, the Niger, Indus, Ganges, the Mekong, etc.;
- 7) Build massive amounts of solar power parks and wind power plants.
- 8) Combat deoxygenation, forcing fisheries to close down in the Southern hemisphere. Tropical fish species in waters with 27 - 29 degrees Celsius will swim in warmer water, but adaption may be impossible, as warm water contains less oxygen;
- 9) Clean and restore the size of the great lakes of humanity.

Conclusion

The recent COP23 reunion in Bonn failed to push the COP21 Treaty into action. Instead, major implementation was delayed to the next meeting: COP24 in Katowice, in Poland, December 2018. Time is running out. Consider the pattern of energy consumption in EU member state Poland (Figure 1).

With this energy mix, Poland is a major contributor to global GHGs. It should change before December 2018. Germany also employs much coal too, despite its *Energiewende*—see Figure 2. Germany may very soon wish to change priorities and eliminate all the coal but keep and improve its atomic power. The only solution to the problem of avoiding Hawking irreversibility,




Figure 1. Energy mix.




Figure 2. Energy mix.

Notes: i.e. total climate chaos is to rely upon solar energy and use electrical vehicles. Referring to the giant solar power station, Quarzazate as benchmark, Table 1 shows what is necessary for decarbonisation now up to 2030.

If or when the COP21 approach fails, each country will have to rely upon resilience, or the capacity to handle the climate change repercussions. Resilience varies very much, as

a country e.g. Bangladesh and Vietnam or Kiribati and Fiji or the Saharan countries, has little of resilience.

Resilience helps to ward off the worst global warming effects, like rising sea level, hurricanes, typhoons, famine, etc. But as climate change grows into full scale chaos, not even much resilience will do.

Table 1. *Number of Ouarzazate plants necessary in 2030 for COP21's GOAL II: (Note: Average of 250 - 300 days of sunshine used for all entries except Australia, Indonesia, and Mexico, where 300 - 350 was used).*

Nation	CO ₂ reduction pledge/ % of 2005 emissions	Number of gigantic solar plants needed (Ouarzazate)	Gigantic plants needed for 40% reduction
United States	26 - 28 ⁱ	2100	3200
China	none ⁱⁱ	0	3300
EU28	41 - 42	2300	2300
India	none ⁱⁱ	0	600
Japan	26	460	700
Brazil	43	180	170
Indonesia	29	120	170
Canada	30	230	300
Mexico	25	120	200
Australia	26 - 28	130	190
Russia	none ⁱⁱⁱ	0	940
Canada	30	230	300
Mexico	25	120	200
Iran	4 - 12 ^{iv}	22	220
Saudi Arabia	none ⁱⁱ	0	150
Turkey	21	60	120
Thailand	20 - 25 ^{iv}	50	110
Germany	49 ^{iv}	550	450
Italy	35 ^v	230	270
France	37 ^v	210	220
World	N/A	N/A	16,000

Notes: i) The United States has pulled out of the deal; ii) No absolute target; iii) Pledge is above current level, no reduction; iv) Upper limit dependent on receiving financial support; v) EU joint pledge of 40% compared to 1990.

The UNFCCC framework with yearly reunions—COPs—is inefficient due to heavy transaction costs. Promises but no results! The G20 group of nations should be responsible for the conduct of anti-global warming policy-making and policy implementation. They are responsible for more than 70 percent of GHGs and they have the necessary financial resources to do something concrete, like the quick elimination coal power plants.

Climate change presents such a formidable threat to mankind that it should not be mixed up with general developmental goals, the idea of a sustainable economy or environmentalism in general. The rise in the Keeling curve must be halted—otherwise the point in time of Hawking irreversibility, conducive to global chaos.

It is time to stop the meaningless killing and destroying in the Koranic world, from Nigeria to Afghanistan, as well as time for peaceful interaction in the Korean peninsula and Myanmar. All efforts should be concentrated upon anti-global warming policy-making and implementation.

The making and implementation of anti-global warming policy should not rest upon the UNFCCC—transaction cost heavy framework, but with the G20 group of nations, responsible for more than 70 per cent of CO2 emissions.

The COP21 project amounts to nothing but all too weak international coordination, and it neglects the coming methane emissions.

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5

Philosophy of science and political inquiry: Notes on Dowding, Weber and Myrdal

Introduction

There has been a large debate about the study of politics, viz. can it be scientific? Politics, domestic and international, does not seem to fit very well with the tenets in standard textbooks on the scientific method and general philosophy of science.

The study of politics appears to be closer to the *Geisteswissenschaften* or *Kulturwissenschaften* in H. Rickert's (1896, 2012) famous distinctions between natural sciences and history and social sciences. One could argue that political science harbours a lot of enlightened journalism and little of theoretical or empirical generalization.

Keith Dowding has had the courage to discuss the nature of political science again from the general perspective of today's philosophy of science in *The Philosophy and Methods of Political Science* (Dowding, 2016). Drawing upon immense reading, Dowding makes a herculean effort to present key issues.

The aim of my critique of Dowding (2016) is twofold. First, I believe that his approach is too much founded in general philosophy, which raises the problem of relevance (R). For

instance: Why would political science scholars and students want to know much about Saul Kripke and his analysis of the sentence “water = H₂O”?

Second, I would argue that political science struggles all the time with a few central questions that belong to the philosophy of science in particular. They were identified by Maw Weber (1922), but Dowding does not even mention him. His book is too much focused upon topics in general Anglo-Saxon philosophy.

Dowding: Relevance?

The relevance problem (R) surfaces immediately in Chapter Two in Dowding (2016) on “isms”. An overview is made of various fundamental doctrines about research and science in general, covering the entire history of philosophy of knowledge, besides a few specific isms in international relations. Here, there is a confusion of two different philosophical problems, namely the nature of universal concepts (“universals”) on the one hand and the question of the reality of physical objects or events in time-space, realism versus phenomenology. Dowding claims: “Traditionally in philosophy, realism is opposed to nominalism,”, having described “scientific realism”...as the “thesis that there is a world that exists independently of us.” (Dowding, 2016: p.14, 10). A realist like Quine is a hard core nominalist (Orenstein, 2014). His college Goodman was a nominalist and phenomenalist (Cohnitz, 2006). Armstrong (2009a, 2009b) is a realist about the external world as well as concerning the problem of universals, where many adhere simply to conceptualism: universals are abstractions from particulars. But why teach politics students these doctrines—the R question?

The R question must also be raised against the longish discussion in Chapter 3 on the analytic-synthetic distinction—so classical problem in centuries of philosophy. It became relevant again when Quine rejected Carnap’s distinction, because in American pragmatist “meaning” as concepts do not exist—nominalism again. Thus, truth by analyticity can be scrapped. Dowding goes to great length at

several places to describe Kripke's (1981) solution that bypasses Quine: the sentence "water = H₂O" is a synthetic proposition that is true apriori. This equation links observable with unobservable in a lawlike generalisation, a natural law. But natural laws are not generally true apriori.

This renewal of Kantian language may be philosophically very important, but hardly for understanding politics. To me "water = H₂O" is a proposition about a both necessary sufficient condition, whether true aposteriori (I think) or a priori. I have no difficulty with analyticity or meaning as concepts, like many European philosophers. In political science, one must be extremely careful about the definitions of key terms, in order to avoid analyticity, or circular argument.

When exploring the nature of explanation, Dowding's Chapter 3's focus is again very much centered on the natural science debate, concerning the Hempel (1965) models. This is a huge debate in the philosophy of science, with a rather marginal input from the so-called cultural sciences. The R question comes back when the criticism of Hempel's models are rendered account for. One recalls the counter-argument that history and the social sciences employ law like generalisations like physics, but they are just truisms.

One really lacks the alternative explanatory model—"the thing to do", as G.H. von Wright (1971) phrased it. It outlines an explanatory sketch that is much closer to what goes on in the social sciences, referring to intentionality and rationality. The Wright model appears to suit game theory very well, although not recognized. Reasons as the explanation are not much discussed, as one misses the distinction between the micro and macro that plays such a large role in the social sciences. Microscopic explanations could not possibly avoid intentions and reasons, whereas macroscopic explanation could speak of structures or culture.

The chapters 4 and 5 on theory and the testing of theories contain a lot of interesting information, but how about the R question? Take for instance the longish discussion of Kuhn's (1962) book on scientific revolutions in the natural sciences. What primarily would be of interest to the social science scholars and students is whether there occur paradigm shifts in

political science and sociology for instance, so that we can speak of real revolutions also in these disciplines. There are candidates for Kuhn's concepts, not only in economics (Keynesianism, monetarism, etc.) but also in political science (rational choice—new institutionalism, realism—constructivism), but somehow we do not find Kuhn's language appropriate, perhaps because it really refers to the natural sciences.

Philosophy of science emerged as a sub discipline within theoretical philosophy after the Second World War with a distinct focus upon the growth of scientific knowledge. Do new theories advance our knowledge and if so, how? In the centre of attention was the concept of a scientific theory as well as how theories could be tested empirically so that we could speak advancement in our knowledge of the external world. Theory and observation was much discussed by scholars like Nagel, Hempel, Kuhn, Popper and Lakatos ([Goodfrey-Smith, 2009](#); [Cover, 2012](#)), for instance. Theory versus observation soon turned out to be a very thorny problematic, with ramifications for verification and falsification of theories.

Dowding writes: "In this book, 'theory' is a general term that can stand for any of the following: ...conjecture framework, generalization, hypothesis, mechanism, methodology, model, organizing perspective, paradigm,..." ([Dowding, 2016](#): p.70).

This amounts to a much too wide definition or characterisation of a scientific theory. In standard textbooks in the philosophy of science, we often find the following definition:

DEF: A theory is a set of interrelated hypotheses in which figure prominently theoretical terms.

Thus, the theory of consensus democracy would fall under this definition, but hardly a classification scheme or methodology for identifying various governments. Global warming would qualify as a theory but hardly a perspective like environmental skepticism.

The central components of a theory are:

- integration by deduction or a pattern of hypotheses
- a set of hypotheses with

- a few theoretical terms or concepts ([Kaplan, 1964](#); [Quine & Ullian, 1978](#)).

A single hypothesis like “Nietzsche suffered from megalomania when writing his auto-biography *Ecce Homo*” is not a theory, nor the hypothesis that “Illness affected Nietzsche’s later books or booklets”, although the syphilis hypothesis is discarded. It is true that Nietzsche presented a new morality, comprising a set of hypotheses, containing terms like personality, honour, valour and rejection of sin, pity and compassion.

Consider the most famous theory in the social science, Max Weber’s theory of Protestantism and Capitalism. It comes in two versions ([Weber, 2010, 1983](#)):

- sufficient condition (Weber in 1904), historical approach:
- necessary condition (Weber in 1913), comparative approach.

The theory is full of hypotheses, centered on a distinction between two types of religious asceticism, and it comprises several theoretical terms—universals—and indirectly observables ones. Elegant and simple, considering the complexity of phenomena of civilisations. But is it true?

Weber’s theory has aroused a huge literature, debating his concepts and the model of world religions and types of asceticism. Is it about Occidental rationality in general, not only the modern market economics and its new capitalist institutions?

Swedish economic historian Kurt Samuelson ([1961](#)) wrote an underestimated book on Weber’s, questioning his correspondence or coherence with observable facts, or the phenomena. However elegant and encompassing the model may be, the derived implications must fit with the phenomena:

- Were all capitalists in Western Europe really Calvinists or Lutherans?
- Was there not capitalist trade on the Indian Ocean by Arab, Indian and Chinese merchants?
- Were not Chinese huge scale pottery factory capitalist enterprises, both public and private ones?

- Did not industrialization start early in Japan with the Meiji restoration with roots in advanced handicraft under the Shogunate?

The most crucial question in the philosophy of science is to clarify the following: How to test theories by means of indicators on its universal concepts, or unobservables? Dowding devotes too little attention to this, which would be high on the R aspect. In the social sciences, we talk about manifest and latent variables: How are they related?

Dowding turns to the other extreme when introducing the concept of a model, equating it with the very demanding concept isomorphism. But this is mathematics and basic measurement theory: “Formally, an isomorphism is bijective morphism. Informally, an isomorphism is a map that preserves sets and relations among elements.” Or to consult standard dictionaries:

1) Biology Similarity in form, as in organisms of different ancestry.

2) Mathematics A one-to-one correspondence between the elements of two sets such that the result of an operation on elements of one set corresponds to the result of the analogous operation on their images in the other set.

3) A close similarity in the crystalline structure of two or more substances of similar chemical composition. These definitions from standard dictionaries have no R.

A model in the social sciences is a) an equation or function on the one hand or b) a simplified conceptual picture comprising a few theoretical terms (Kaplan, 1964). Well-known modeling like in Rokkan’s (1970) comparative work on Western Europe—cleavages, or Durkheim’s model of social cohesion in primitive and industrial societies, have nothing to do with mathematical isomorph modeling.

On Kant: Dowding spends much time on Kant, but not his political theory that is appreciated more and more, focusing upon Rule of Law in its German version = Rechtsstaat, both domestically and internationally (Kant, 1991).

Here, we have a quote on what he says about Kant: “Immanuel Kant distinguished categories of realism. Transcendental realists believe that the nature and existence of

objects are wholly independent of us; the empirical realist believes that we can perceive the real objects and gain knowledge of them. Kant also believed that perception gives us knowledge only of appearances and not reality, so the empirical realist must also be a transcendental idealist—that is, material objects only consist in their appearances to us.” (Dowding, 2016: pp.14-15).

I fully agree with Bertrand Russell (2004) that Kant’s epistemology—“das Ding an sich”—is fundamentally flawed. Here, the R-question comes with full force: Why teach political science students this? The point is not whether Dowding describes schools of epistemology and ontology correct (doubtful—why not indirect realism?), but that he insists on teaching a Kant that is largely irrelevant.

To take an example: Assume we observe the 1871 conference at Versailles, and focus upon Bismarck: What is appearance against “Ding an sich”? Colours, clothes, mustage versus atomic structure or molecules? The political scientist would concentrate upon Sayings and Hidden Intention: Did Bismarck already 1871 anticipate French “revanchismus” (Alsace-Lorraine) that would crush his newly created Empire?

In Chapter 6 (causality) and Chapter 7 (methods), there is much to learn for students, as the problem of relevance[®] is less acute. Causality is decomposed into correlation/regression plus counter-factual. Universal generalisations, A is B, are said to harbor necessity, but there is nothing necessary about the classical laws of nature. The paradox of counter-factuals is that they are always true, because the antecedent is false. I would agree with Hume that causation is a murky concept and not really so important in an age with probabilism, randomness, reversed causality and the chaos approaches.

Chapter 8 presents a profound analysis of the nature of concepts, but the R-question returns. Dowding says that concepts should be primitives as much as possible, meaning undefined. Why? That is a requirement in axiomatization, which hardly ever takes place in political science or the social sciences. Moreover, concepts must be value-free or value neutral—Can they really be so? See Weber against Myrdal below!

Then he does not hesitate to bring up the problem of whether concepts “exist”. This is perhaps the most debated issue in the history of philosophy—medieval philosophy e.g.—besides the existence of an external world of some kind. What is the relevance[®] of the following statement: “Our conception of a minister thus generated will be theoretical. But we can consider that the concept exists...And it is doubtful there are any significant changes in empirical analysis if you prefer to take an anti-realist or instrumental stance... (Dowding, 2016: p. 202). So, why bring up this issue again from Chapter 2?

Terms offer concepts when they have connotation. They may also have denotation. Only denotation can be said to exist in space-time, as sets or values for variables. Muddled concepts have too many connotations or contrary ones, like ‘social capital’. ‘Social capital’ also lacks an unambiguous measurement indicator for determining the denotation.

Finally, Dowding brings up “analytic political philosophy”. We miss very much an overview of its themes like e.g.: n-person games, Condorcet winner, Arrow, Nurmi, the chaos theorem, etc. Instead, Dowding brings up his mentor, Brian Barry (1970), who wrote an excellent textbook on analytic political philosophy. Dowding, however, introduces his work in ethics, which is not philosophy of science due to the meta-ethical difficulty: What is truth in ethics?

Barry (1995) transformed Adam Smith’s idea of the impartial observer (Theory of Moral Sentiments from 1759) into a full scale definition of justice as impartiality. Yet, impartiality is a necessary condition for legal justice, but not a sufficient condition for social justice. Consider a race in the Olympic games: Impartiality *ex ante* would be justice, but impartiality *ex post* would be incomprehensible. Justice is mutual agreement, as Hume taught. Or when a left government is elected, one may expect to pursue partial policies for the lower and middle classes.

In textbooks about the methodology of the social sciences, one finds a list of issues that bear upon the philosophy of science. I guess politics students would be more interested in these than in Kripke’s new solution of the synthetic *a posteriori*

problem, inherited from Kant. Here, we have for instance: the subjectivity-objectivity problematic.

The subjectivity-objectivity problematic is at the core of the social sciences and humanities, figuring most prominently in the post-modernist upheaval against analytical philosophy of science. It covers two very different themes:

Subjectivity I. The subjective nature of social science, from the point of view of the humans: interior aspects, the mind, beliefs, values, etc.

Subjectivity II. The subjective mode of analysis, from the point of view of the author/scholar: value loaded concepts, biases, value premises, etc.

I will look at these two entirely different forms of subjectivity below.

Subjectivity I Weber

The conceptual scheme of means and ends for the analysis of action in a wide sense used to be considered a basic paradigm in the social sciences. Thus, Weber stated: “All serious reflection about the ultimate elements of meaningful human conduct is oriented primarily in terms of the categories “end” and “means.” We desire something concretely either “for its own sake” or as a means of achieving something else which is more highly desired. The question of the appropriateness of the means for achieving a given end is undoubtedly accessible to scientific analysis. Inasmuch as we are able to determine (within the present limits of our knowledge) which means for the achievement of a proposed end are appropriate or inappropriate, we can in this way estimate the chances of attaining a certain end by certain available means.” (Weber, 1949: pp.52-53).

In the above quotation, Weber makes strong ontological and epistemological commitments: 1) Is human behavior intentional, i.e. involve means and ends? 2) What is the nature of an end or goal subjectively, and how can we know what ends drive a behavior? We have here a set of basic philosophical problems for the social and political sciences about behavior, action, goal-directed, motivation, intention, outcome.

Objectives or goals are subjective: If ends are simply the expression of preferences and if means and ends are difficult to separate, if ends are ambiguous and difficult to pin down, how can there be objective means-end analysis? If ends are subjective, can means-end analysis be scientifically objective? If the distinction between means and ends is a relative one, ends being in their turn means to further goals, and if ends are preferences, then how can the feasibility analysis of the means be value-neutral? People have ends and these are often means to further ends: the mean-end chains.

Teleological fallacy: The means accomplish the ends, we are told, but the outcomes follow the means, presumably, yet the end must guide the search for the means. Obviously, ends have to exist both *ex ante*—before the policy is put into effect—as well as *ex post*—after the policy has been implemented—labyrinthine problems. Both ends cannot exist both before and after action.

If means-end analysis appears troublesome in the enquiry into actions—past or present, then it is worth calling attention to its potential use in policy analysis, as it encompasses both value analysis and technology analysis. How are we to understand political technology in policy analysis? Political technology is the capacity of policymakers to accomplish goals by producing outputs in an environment; political technologies are the bases of policy-making, deriving the ends, searching out the means and finding the outcomes of political programs; economists approach public policy-making in a similar vein.

Teleology: ends as goals or means-*end* chain (desires, wishes, beliefs)—see Parsons, (1968). An analysis of the purpose and motive of an actor with these means-end concepts may be called “teleological analysis”. The description of the units at the intentional level may be called “means-end context 1”. Example: Napoleon believed that *la grande armee* was the instrument with which to realize his objective of subjugating Russia.

Causal analysis: Ends as real, results or outcomes. The other type of means-end sentence: *x* is in fact a means to a real end, is also common—“means-end context 2”. Here “end” refers to actual or objective states, “means” refers to actual or objective behaviors that are sufficient conditions for ends fulfillment,

and x and y are not intentional objects. “Means-end relationship” denotes the actual causal relationship between real objective variables, x and y . Example: Napoleon’s invasion of Russia 1812 became the cause of the start of his final defeat.

Sentences of this type may be used about performed means behaviors and of given end states—real outcomes—and of the relationship between these. On the other hand, this is a universal sentence and can then be formulated as follows: X is a means to end Y —“the paradigm-sentence of the policy sciences”. Here x is called “means” only in the sense that an actor by performing x can bring about a real state y . An analysis in the policy sciences of the relationship between behavior x and state y with these means-end concepts may be called “causal analysis”.

Weber attempts—stunningly—to show that means-end analysis is simply the same as causal analysis. Weber asserts: “Economic theory can tell us absolutely nothing more than that for the attainment of the given technical end x , v is the sole appropriate means or is such together with y_1 and y_2 ; that in the last analysis these and these differences in consequences and in rationality are associated with y , y_1 and y_2 respectively; and that their application and thus the attainment of the end x requires that the ‘subsidiary consequences’, z_1 and z_2 be taken into account. These are all merely reformulations of causal propositions, and to the extent that ‘evaluations’ can be imputed to them, they are exclusively of the type which is concerned with the degree of rationality of a prospective action.” (Weber, 1949: p.37).

A proposition X is a means to end Y states something about what is a means and an end in a policy; of course, it cannot be translated into X is the real cause of the real effect Y , because we cannot assume that the policy rests upon correct theory. There are policies that have beliefs about means and desired ends, but where the means will not cause the ends to be accomplished wrong beliefs! It is, of course, possible in policy analysis simply to state generally what in fact is a means—a real activity to an end as real outcome, but it not the reversal of cause and effect. Weber actually confuses teleological

analysis—intention, motivation and other mind phenomena—with real causality in the external world.

Weber wrote a number of articles about the scientific status of the social and political sciences, gathered in his *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre* (1922) about subjectivity II. The target of Weber's critique is the argument that social and political analysis cannot be value-neutral. If social analysis presupposes ends and if ends are inherently subjective phenomena, and if ends are only means to further ends, how can policy analysis be objective or value-neutral? Weber has two counter-arguments against the idea that means-end analysis is as mingled with values as the ends and means themselves.

Firstly, Weber tries to establish a distinction between the task of the scientist and the role of the citizen (Weber, 1949: p.58). The argument that “the scientist qua scientist makes no value judgements” is based on a distinction between two types of analysis, theoretical analysis (“lays claim to validity as empirical truth”) versus practical analysis (“validity of ethical norms”). Means-end analysis may be employed for various purposes; even if ends and means are subjective phenomena, then the analysis of these ends and means does not have to be subjective. It seems possible to make theoretical statements about ends and means, just as it appears to be possible to make practical statements about ends and means Weber clearly saw the possibility of a value-neutral description of end and means in policies *ex ante* their implementation.

Weber adhered to a non-cognitivist view on values.

Subjectivity II Myrdal

Gunnar Myrdal developed his methodological ideas in relation his empirical work in political economy and social economics, including a few large studies. He arrived late in life at conclusions much different from those he started from as a brilliant young scholar.

Myrdal's methodology—called “the theory of value premises”—was put forward for the first time in 1930 (Myrdal, 1930; Myrdal, 1933) and then formed an integral part of every

work Myrdal published (Myrdal, 1944; Myrdal, 1957; Myrdal, 1968). Myrdal's vision in 1930 was "...the methodical and consistent application of a distinction in the philosophy of science" (Myrdal, 1930: p.12). He writes: It is a question of drawing a completely clear line between 'what is' and 'what should be', between what can be affirmed to be true and what should be regarded as valuable (Myrdal, 1930: p.11).

Myrdal states that one of the tasks of political economy is to describe actual facts and to analyse causal relationships, and another task is to analyse conditions and relationships within imagined social conditions, to consider means and ends. It is often possible to state something from a scientific point of view about the actually existing possibilities of realizing different political ends through certain means (Myrdal, 1930: p.14). On the other hand it is not the task of political economy to try to prove ends or normative sentences; if political recommendations about ends and means are to be made on the basis of the results of scientific research, Myrdal continues, ...another premise is required which scientific research does not dispose of: a value sentence that decides what effects are politically desirable and what means are permissible (Myrdal, 1930: p.14). It is obvious that Myrdal has in mind some form of practical syllogism, consisting of some theoretical premises, but where "...the conclusion is not scientific..." (p.14). Starting from this philosophy of the social sciences Myrdal wanted to destroy "...social metaphysics, i.e. the method of rationalizing, of disguising politically normative sentences scientifically" (p.13).

Two fundamental assumptions in the theory of value premises can now be specified: Scientific sentences consist of cognitive sentences, i.e. sentences (A₁) which are either, true or false Cognitive sentences are different from normative sentences (A₂). Myrdal started from a distinction between two kinds of propositions, those which are either true or false, and those which are neither true nor false, and which Myrdal calls "value sentences". To express this distinction Myrdal used—in 1930 as well as in later works—"theoretical" and "practical". For Myrdal the following identities hold true: theoretical or scientific sentence = cognitive sentence; practical sentence =

value sentence or normative sentence. For the theory of value premises the distinction between theoretical sentences and practical sentences has nothing to do with the distinction between theoretical terms and observational terms or theory versus observation (see e.g. [Kaplan, 1964](#): pp.54-62). Instead, the theory of value premises aims at a distinction expressed in other ways between “is-judgements” and “ought-judgements” or between “descriptive” and “prescriptive” language (see e.g. [Ross, 1967](#)).

Myrdal made in 1930 a sharp distinction between theoretical science and practical science: a theoretical science (scientific knowledge) is a science consisting only of theoretical sentences, and a practical science is a science including besides theoretical sentences at least some normative sentences. Another basic assumption is: Scientific knowledge can be objective, i.e. valid for all times, people (A₃) and situations. By distinguishing between cognitive and normative elements in the construction of concepts and propositions Myrdal wanted not only to clarify the cognitive status of scientific knowledge (theoretical science). Conversely, the application of this basic distinction in the philosophy of science would reveal the epistemological conditions of a practical science; as Myrdal expressed it in 1930, it would render an economic technology possible ([Myrdal, 1930](#): p.281).

According to Myrdal such practical knowledge cannot be based on normative arguments about general social principles stated in the name of science. Such an approach would obliterate the distinction between theoretical and practical science. The foundation of a practical political economy is “...that definite, concretized value premises should be-stated” (p.285). Myrdal thought it possible to deduce policy solutions in a practical syllogism with the aid of normative sentences along with scientific sentences. The validity of a practical science depends not only on the truth of the cognitive sentences entering into it. The normative conclusions of a practical science cannot be derived from theoretical sentences alone, but require normative sentences as premises. And as the theory of value premises emphasizes, the practical argument is elliptic, if the normative sentences necessary for the derivation

in a practical science are omitted. These value premises are statements expressing ends. How then are these value premises to be specified? Myrdal answers: In order that this relativized social policy may be practical in a proper sense, the only prerequisite is that the value premises mentioned are selected in such a way and so comprehensively that they correspond to the somewhat differing interests of strong social groups (Myrdal, 1930: p.285).

A fourth basic assumption in the theory can be established here: Value premises are those normative sentences that express the values corresponding to the interests of strong social groups (A4). Two problems arise with regard to (A4). Why should only normative sentences that fulfil the restriction be value premises? The argument “practical in a proper sense” is precisely an expression devoid of content such as Myrdal wants to do away with. Secondly, how is this correspondence—provided that it is possible to make clear what it implies—to be established? The central idea is that, with the aid of the modern methods used in social psychology, economic technology... is built up on the views these people with their general attitude to social problems would hold, if they observed reality more correctly... (Myrdal, 1930: p.289).

In the argument about economic technology a fifth assumption is inherent which can be formulated in the following way: If a science has relevance for practical issues, practical sentences or normative sentences must enter into this science, making it a practical science (AS) In 1930 Myrdal started from certain philosophical principles usually connected with the Uppsala school of philosophers as well as Max Weber, and of course from certain basic distinctions in the theory formation of political economy (Myrdal, 1930: Chap. 1). The assumptions (A1), (A2) and (A3) may be called “epistemological objectivism”.

Myrdal's article from 1933 was an important addition to the methodology of 1930 (Myrdal, 1958: pp.206-230). Value premises are now said to be relevant also for theoretical science, not only for an economic technology. Myrdal now argued that ends are not the only expression of value premises but also the means recommended are determined by value premises; in

traditional policy analysis it was assumed according to Myrdal that: The basic idea of this principle in this: By splitting economic processes into 1) a given initial situation, 2) alternative means, and 3) the hypothetical end, it should be possible to concentrate all value judgements on the third link, viz., the purpose. However, the means-end analysis cannot be value-neutral: Now it is quite obvious that values are attached not only to “ends” but also to “means”. Means are not ethically neutral. The value judgement must compare and choose between alternative courses. Value judgements thus refer always to whole sequences, not merely to the anticipated final outcome (Myrdal, 1958: pp.210-211).

Thus, value premises have to be included in the means-end schema; Myrdal argued that “a priori ideas” are essential as principles of selection and that such ideas are in the last analysis “...an expression of a valuation which lends ‘interest’ to certain hypotheses and certain relations between facts” (p.228). Myrdal supplemented his theory of value premises as the basis of practical syllogisms with a description of conditions that must be satisfied so that theoretical knowledge may emerge: Scientific knowledge is causally dependent on values (A6) However, this assumption has no logical relevance whatsoever for the distinction between is- and ought-sentences and thus between theoretical and practical science, but it reorients the methodology of 1930 towards the sociology of knowledge. “Value premise” refers not only to a type of normative sentence, but also more generally to values or valuations as distinct entities.

In an appendix to *An American Dilemma* (1944) entitled “Facts and Valuations” (Myrdal, 1958: pp.119-164) Myrdal discusses methodological problems. The theory of value premises is rendered more complete in two respects. Firstly, the theory is expanded by the identification of criteria of value premises: explicitly stated, specific and concrete, relevant to the ideals of important social groups, realistic, consistent (pp.157-158). Secondly, a new basic assumption is formulated: The value-loaded terms have a meaning and represent a theoretical approach, because the theoretical approach itself is determined by the valuations inherent in the governing ethos

of a society (Myrdal, 1958: p.163). This assumption can be formulated as follows: Scientific knowledge is determined by valuations (A7) (A7) is unclear as the sentence can stand for two different propositions. It could be (A6), but it could also refer to a different assumption: Scientific knowledge (theoretical science) is logically dependent on values (A8). In his next work Myrdal specified which of the interpretations should enter into the theory of value premises. Here (A7) is repeated: On the contrary, every study of a social problem, however limited in scope, is and must be determined by valuations (Myrdal, 1970: p.55). But—and this is the essential thing—it is made quite clear that it stands for (A8).

In 1930 Myrdal was of the opinion that the validity of practical conclusions depends on the value premises that have to be made explicit in order that the syllogism is not to be elliptic. In 1970 Myrdal asserted that data should be established “...by theoretical analyses with the use of the same value premises...” (p.56). Furthermore, he makes the demand that: (we)... determine approach and define concepts in terms of a set of value premises which have been explicitly stated (Myrdal, 1970: p.5, my insertion) . The position of 1970 implies that the validity of cognitive or theoretical sentences also depends on values, for logical reasons. Myrdal’s conclusion in *Objectivity in Social Research* may be stated thus: Scientific knowledge is subjective, i.e. valid only for certain times, (A9) people and situations (for certain values) The assumption (A9) may be called “epistemological subjectivism”. Myrdal’s methodology, the so-called “theory of value premises”, has now been analysed into a set of assumptions (A1)-(A9).

Below I will put forward a number of arguments by which I want to show that there are various flaws in the conjunction (A1)-(A9). The argument of contradiction: (A9) and (A3) are contradictory. The theory of value premises cannot contain both assumptions and at the same time be consistent. Nor is (A8) compatible with (A1) and (A2). If (A2) holds good, it cannot be true that valuations permeate cognitive sentences by logical necessity—as Myrdal writes. It is possible that there are causal relationships between valuations and cognitive sentences—i.e. what (A6) states. But this is not stated in (A8).

The theory of value premises develops in the direction of epistemological subjectivism. According to Myrdal 1970 the results of theoretical research cannot be merely valid—as in 1930—but must be valid relative to certain values.

The argument of non-sequitur: The following consideration forms the basis of (A5): But, of course, political economy must be practical. Also on that point there is full unanimity. The problem is only how it is to be done (Myrdal, 1930: p.276). (A1) and (A2) are the starting-point and Myrdal distinguishes clearly between theoretical sentences (cognitive sentences) and practical sentences (normative sentences). Myrdal asserts consistently that in order to be practical a science must contain practical sentences. The next task is then to specify exactly how these value sentences are to be selected and combined with cognitive sentences. But—and this is the objection—why “must political economy be practical”?

Myrdal answers: Political economy has always aimed at being socio-political (Myrdal, 1930: p.285). However, it does not follow that political economy—or any social science whatsoever—must be practical, i.e. contain normative sentences. It is quite feasible to establish different alternatives in a socio-political issue along various dimensions without simultaneously putting forward sentences about which alternative is to be preferred to others for ethical reasons. When (A5) falls, the construction of value premises and their selection, (A4), is superfluous for any relevance policy analysis may have for social problems. (c) The argument of *reductio ad absurdum*: The theory of value premises asserts that Scientific knowledge is subjective (A9) The sentence “Scientific knowledge is subjective” enters into scientific knowledge. What is then the status of the sentence (A9) with regard to objective-subjective? We have: (A9) is subjective if (A9) is objective. (A9) thus implies a contradiction.

The combination of (A4) and (A8) results in an absurdity. On the one hand the theory of value premises contains the requirement: 1)... to raise the valuations actually determining our theoretical as well as practical research to full awareness (Myrdal, 1970: p.5). 352 On the other it asserts that the value premises should not be chosen arbitrarily. They must be

founded on people's actual valuations (Myrdal, 1970: p.65). In whatever way the argument about so-called "actual" values is specified, this requirement—i.e. 2)—involves the empirical description and establishment of values. This can only be done in theoretical science. A starting-point for the former requirement—1)—is that the distinction between theoretical and practical research can be maintained—even though Myrdal does not explain how.

The conjunction of 1) and 2) then produces the following argument: 1) If theoretical research, then values in theoretical research 2) If values in theoretical research, then they should be transformed into value premises 3) If value premises, then knowledge of actual values 4) If knowledge of actual values, then theoretical research 5) If theoretical research (on actual values), then values in theoretical research and so on. It is impossible to maintain at the same time that knowledge of values (valuations) is a necessary condition for theoretical research and that theoretical research is a necessary condition for knowledge of values (valuations).

Theories cannot be valid only in relation to certain value premises, logically.

Conclusion

Dowding writes about the philosophy of science from a most general philosophical approach, which results in the relevance R question. The methodological positions of each Weber and Myrdal claims that the social sciences must have a different conduct of inquiry due to the subjectivity-objectivity difficulty—the great role that subjectivity, or mind phenomena plays in these disciplines as well as the value ingrained nature of social and political enquiry. The separation between epistemological subjectivism (II) and ontological subjectivism (I) is also relevant for the critique of post-modernist philosophy.

Subjectivism I is worth more research in order to clarify the role of mind phenomena in explanation in the social sciences.

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6

Politics of looting

Introduction

In most modern democracies except Switzerland there is no system of constant referendums. Economists would explain the omnipotence of representative democracy with transaction costs whereas politologues would refer to political instability in preference aggregation. Democratic governance is connected with regular elections and the daily workings of a bureaucratic system. Yet, the core of modern democracy is the rule of law.

Rule of law

There is no neat and tidy definition of the expression “rule of law”. The Oxford English Dictionary offers the following entry:

“[t]he authority and influence of law in society, especially when viewed as a constraint on individual and institutional behavior; (hence) the principle whereby all members of a society (including those in government) are considered equally subject to publicly disclosed legal codes and processes.”

Now, this sounds rather complicated as well as somewhat legalistic: how to measure it in order to compare states? One may deconstruct this concept with other concepts or criteria like:

- 1) Strong legal formalism promoting equality under the laws;
- 2) Individual rights covering contract, free labour and property;
- 3) Checks and balances, i.e. institutionalized mixed government with countervailing competences between executive, legislature and judiciary.

A political regime characterized by limited government and countervailing competences may satisfy different institutional models of democracy.

The global picture

Spreading democracy around the globe is tantamount to inserting rule of law. The world justice project (WJP) measures today the existence of rule of law. The WJP unpacks a rule of law regime as follows:

- a) Constraints on Government Powers
- b) Absence of Corruption
- c) Open Government
- d) Fundamental Rights
- e) Order and Security
- f) Regulatory Enforcement
- g) Civil Justice
- h) Criminal Justice.

The WJP underlines accountability, judicial independence, legal formalism and balance of power between executive and legislature. It is worth pointing out that democracy is not mentioned. Rule of law was conceptualized before the advent of democracy after the Great War. Rule of law as legality, rights and countervailing rule may be combined with democracy as popular rule, but it has not always been so.

Table 1 presents the results of the most recent survey of the RL Index for 128 countries around the world, presenting the mean value by region.

Table 1. *Average RL index by world region by 2020.*

Region	Min	Average	Max	Number of countries
East Asia & Pacific	0.33	0.60	0.83	15
Eastern Europe & Central Asia	0.43	0.51	0.60	14
EU + EFTA + North America	0.53	0.74	0.90	24
Latin America & Caribbean	0.27	0.53	0.71	30
Middle East & North Africa	0.36	0.50	0.65	8
South Asia	0.36	0.45	0.53	6
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.34	0.47	0.63	31

Source: (WJP 2020, p.16).

Not merely Western countries score above 0.6 on this scale. Rule of law countries include: Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay, United Arab Emirates, Mauritius and Namibia as well as Rwanda.

Dictatorship

Dictatorships are more numerous than democracies. Why? Because it is feasible to subjugate a whole people by means of naked power. It all depends upon the solution to the political agency question. But who will guard the guardians? The response to Roman Juvenal's question is: rule of law and citizen or people responsiveness. When Madison wrote the American constitution, he targeted rule of law but missed out on people participation – an omission never fully undone. For Trump, rule of law was very much negotiable.

Cui Bono?

Modern dictatorships have a conspicuous economic face. It is driven by the search for material advantages like luxury lifestyle and the accumulation of wealth and properties. Nowhere is this motivation more apparent than in the former USSR (Belton, 2020) and the Gulf monarchies. Let me call this human drive “looting”. It is closely connected with the orientation of dictators and their entourage towards the family and kin.

Weber on political motivation

Max Weber writes in his famous article "Politics as a vocation" that politics is all about power. No, I would say. In dictatorships economic benefits is the end and policy the means, whereas in political life economic policies are the means and power the end.

The Weber focus is power, as ends and means. Nowhere does he talk about economic motives. Instead he opposes the ethics of righteousness with that of realism.

In a democracy politicians and bureaucrats are openly paid a fixed salary in combination with strict rules about the public and private. In looting dictatorships things are entirely different. Even in ad hoc dictatorship established by coup d'etat the political elite engages in embezzlement. In stable dictatorship the private control of the dictator and his entourage or kin may include banks and firms, resources and finance as well as foreign trade and finance.

The basis of looting: Agent dominance

Government is basically the management of the public sector. The principal is the nation or the people/citizens. They hire managers to handle state affairs by sending signals like voting, laws, constitution and opinion polls. In a dictatorship these restraints are few and not taken seriously. Instead the dictator employs them with myths about the will and needs of the state or the ordinary man and woman. In the end the agents become the principal. State looting appears to yield more money than private sector looting in some Latin American countries.

Conclusion

The remuneration of politicians may get out of hand. This is very much the case when looting occurs. It is feasible in any dictatorship - actually its main reason. Weber stated that a regime based upon naked power was instable. And Lenin argued that the revolution need an agency - the party vanguard (Nimtz, 2014). Both were wrong. The agents can sit for a long

time embezzling the principal. Only rule of law and competitive politics can stop looting.

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7

Open texture, stipulation and explanation in the social sciences

Introduction

The social sciences import a lot of words with open texture, meaning terms which are essentially contested. The only way out of semantic confusion is to employ the stipulative definition. Stipulation of key terms like “democracy” and “capitalism” paves the way to research into real life phenomena instead of argument over ambiguity. Stipulation can be done in two ways – connotation and denotation. The connotation approach to definition deals with necessary or sufficient properties. The denotation approach points at the real units that have these properties.

Real definition

Brian Barry (1995) states that:

(J) Justice is impartiality.

What kind of sentence is (J)? It is hardly a definition of the word “justice”. There are many such definitions – see Kelsen (1957). Instead it must be viewed as an explication ([Carnap](#)

1947). Analysing a few well-known theories of justice, Barry came up with his idea of the essence of justice and offered the real definition (J).

Now, we face the question if justice as impartiality contains necessary and sufficient conditions and is not just another stipulation. Thus:

N-condition would be:

- (1) Justice in taxation requires that citizens are treated impartiality; T-condition:
- (2) When citizens are treated impartially, there is just taxation.

The difficulty is elliptical definition, namely impartiality in terms of what? Legal justice would require impartiality, but it is still an opaque definition. How about proportionality? Intention? Clemency?

To be specific, social justice may require partiality with regard to income and wealth, age and character, merit, etc.

Value loaded terms

It was Max Weber who first underlined the role of values in social research in his *Wissenschaftslehre* (1922, 2014). Although he knew that values or valuations affect the conduct of inquiry in several ways, Weber still stuck to the notions of objectivity and value neutrality. It was Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal who argued for the impossibility of objectivity in social research in his large sociological studies (1958).

Inner and outer behaviour

The second feature that makes social inquiry special is the place of intention, which is lacking in most of the natural sciences. Social inquiry studies not just behaviour like events or objects in time and space but intentional behaviour, i.e., mind phenomena or consciousness (Searle, 1996).

The language of intentional behaviour or action is teleological in nature, i.e. describable in terms of ends and means:

“All serious reflection on the ultimate elements of meaningful human conduct is oriented primarily in terms of the categories ‘end’ and ‘means’.” (Weber, 1922).

The recognition that social sciences study a subjective dimension – ends, means and means-end chains

– has had both ontological and methodical implications.

Firstly, the social sciences study both objective phenomena – outer behaviour – as well as inner behaviour or subjective phenomenon like beliefs and attitudes. Thus, we have the following 2x2 table:

Table 1. *Subjectivity*

	Ontology sub	obj
Epistemic		
Sub	1	3
Obj	2	4

Note. e.g. 1=value, 2=belief, 3=faith, 4= natural science.

Subjectivity - 1 and 2 - 1 that behaviour. Epistemic subjectivity provides an important role for the researcher in valuating social systems.

Rationality

Social reality is made up of mind data, whereas ontological objectivity focus upon outer.

Theories of rationality behaviour abound in the social sciences, like economic man, rational voter or politician etc. The rational choice approach as well as the public choice framework explains action by means of a few assumptions about the logic of intentional behaviour. This micro model of individual choice behaviour transforms ends and means into preferences, utilities and probabilities of belief (Neumann, 1946).

The micro model of rationality is seriously questioned in pp and political science. At least in macro models the perspective is broadened to include cause and effect variables.

In economics and public administration the rationality framework is challenged by a concept of soft rational behaviour

– bounded rationality. The champion of bounded rationality is Jim March, who has criticized rational choice for its extremely demanding assumptions from 1958 and onwards.

March developed two alternative maxims to full rationality as utility x probability maximization:

(a) Satisfying: people in an organisation – public or private – do not orientate in terms of an objective function but follows standard operating procedures that guide them towards a satisfying result;

(b) Appropriateness: people are not driven by goals searching for the means that make them realised. Instead they act in an institutional setting trying to deliver appropriate behaviour towards institutions.

Thus, March deviates much from Weber's emphasis on inner behaviour - ends and means – while focussing upon outer behaviour.

The relation between inner and outer behaviour is a most difficult problem in the social sciences. Goals drive people in search of outcomes, which may or may not match the ends

End and means

Intentional behaviour has proved difficult to analyse both ontologically and epistemologically. Goals, ends and means make sense as mind objects, but what are they and how to study them?

Oxford English Dictionary has the following entry on “goal”: aim, something you hope to achieve. And the Cambridge dictionary gives the following key words: The object of a person's ambition or effort, aim or desired result.

Goal or aim is of fundamental importance in human life. Yet, it has not received its proper place in social theory.

Although historians speak of ends and means when accounting for individuals' walk of life, social scientists prefer to talk about incentives, preferences or needs, partly due to the dominance of behaviorism like e.g. with Ryle or Quine.

A goal is a state of mind that orientates behaviour. It could be realistic or unrealistic, worldly or religious, attainable or

unattainable, short term or long run. It could enter into means-end chains as when a goal is means to further ends.

Goals are only indirectly observable, except for introspection. Goals may be hidden or strategically played out. To attribute a goal to someone is an hypothesis that requires confirmation by outer behaviour.

Can goals explain behaviour? A person like Hitler is not understandable, if his cruel means and ends from his Vienna visit are not taken into account. Do Trump really believe in the fake election story? It certainly drives his performance. The relationship between inner and outer behaviour may be causal in nature.

Explanation

G. von Wright, well-known giant in philosophy, presented two basic modes of explanation: nomothetic and teleological. The former employs Hempel's (1965) well-known model - law like generalizing, while the latter points at motive and intention. This distinction between Galilean model and Aristotelian model is developed by means of von Wright's insights into deontic logic – the logic of norms or what one OUGHT to do. Can goals explain behaviour? Von Wright rejects the Hempel (1965) explanation model for the social sciences and history.

In the latter the aim is all important, “the thing to do”. Understanding the behaviour of humans one must take mind into account: the perception of the situation and the motive. Von Wright argues that teleological or goal explanations are logical, and not causal in the empirical meaning of “causality” or probability. This is strange claim about human actions.

Consider the following syllogism:

X INTENDS TO BRING ABOUT P

X CONSIDERS THAT HE CANNOT BRING ABOUT P
UNLESS HE DOES HE DOES A

Therefore X sets himself to do A

Yet, Wright's explanation model is incorrect, as it does not explain the action A but the intention of P to do A. The relationship between the intention to do A and actually doing A is probabilistic ÷ not logical

Goal and action

Hitler was told by Wehrmacht that only Blitzkrieg could defeat Soviet. He thus launched Barbarossa . When Moscow was almost in sight, he turned his troops around to capture 600 000 Russians at KIEV, making the war a matter of exhaustion. People do not always do "the thing to do," as Weight argued. First inner behaviour - ends and means, then outer behaviour – conduct and outcome.

Conclusion

Philosophy of science today is too dominated by the methodology of the natural sciences. The social sciences and the humanities face different challenges that need special attention, especially the goal oriented behaviour: ends and means.

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8

Principles of autonomy

In this chapter I will present and defend some notes or principles concerning autonomy and its modes; my attempt is to outline an approach which is less oriented towards an interpretation of what the word 'autonomy' means, but which puts emphasis on the significance of autonomy for the political system. I wish to concentrate on what autonomy does for a society and how autonomy interacts with important political properties like influence and control.

I Autonomy has two faces, personal autonomy and institutional autonomy. Personal autonomy or freedom is a property of individual action whereas institutional autonomy is an aspect of organization behavior. The liberty of modern society depends both on the amount of personal autonomy that its individuals may dispose of and the degree of institutional autonomy that its organizations may command.

'Autonomy' is spoken of in connection with several different types of social units. There seems to be no restriction on the

use of the word limiting it to the micro or macro level. Individuals as well as organizations have more or less autonomy and societies could be characterized by the amount of autonomy its various subunits have. Basically, 'autonomy' stands for a property of action or behavior.

The amount of liberty of a society is a function of both personal and institutional autonomy. A free society contains not only autonomous citizens but also autonomous institutions. As a matter of fact, autonomy of institutions and organizations is just as important as the basic liberties of the individual citizen concerning his beliefs, his right to vote and his right to anonymity and security.

Whereas philosophers like Kant, Hegel and Moore analyzed the concept of personal autonomy ([Sartori, 1976](#)), social scientists have stated the importance of autonomous and competing organizations for democracy and political stability. Actually, liberty implies both personal and institutional autonomy, because a decline in the amount of institutional autonomy will have just as serious effects on political stability and democracy as a reduction of individual freedom. Modern society is not just a collection of atomlike citizens; it is a network of institutions and organizations which seek autonomy just as individuals do.

Liberty used to be interpreted as individual rights: the rights of property and contract as well as the freedom of association, thought, assembly and religion. Institutional autonomy is, however, just as fundamental to liberty for three reasons. Firstly, institutional autonomy is a condition for personal autonomy, because individuals materialize much of their freedom through participation in organizations and institutions. Secondly, the autonomy of organizations creates a setting in which individual autonomy takes place. Thirdly, organizations and institutions are important entities in the social fabric of modern society and their autonomy is a value on itself besides its contribution to individual autonomy.

There is a relation of reciprocity between personal and institutional autonomy. The rights and liberties that constitute personal autonomy would be of little significance without the existence of a structure of autonomous institutions. Organizational autonomy feeds on personal autonomy just as personal autonomy is stimulated by the fight to maintain and develop organizational autonomy.

Autonomy of the state or the nation may be considered the womb of individual autonomy in a society. Indeed, it is also the setting for institutional autonomy. The autonomy of the nation state is its sovereignty. It may be threatened from the environment or from within. Much of what goes on in international politics is aimed at maximizing autonomy. Loss of autonomy versus environmental forces means loss of territorial independence, which may go as far as the complete absorption of one state into another. However, there are steps in between complete autonomy and complete absence of autonomy.

The autonomy of institutions is highly valued in some political systems. Today many governments recognize the demand for decentralization for the various subunits of society. Universities try to protect the autonomy they used to have and state agencies look for increased autonomy versus the government. Local and regional governments have been particularly sensitive to changes in their autonomy in relation to central authorities.

To international political systems just as to local and regional political systems autonomy is a basic property. Both types of systems face the difficult task of maintaining stable relations with the nation state, providing the nation state with an amount of control while retaining some autonomy for themselves. Several political systems face the demand for autonomy. The demand for independence or semi-independence for various regions within nation states has been a dominant theme in the politics of the sixties and the seventies. The urge for institutional autonomy concerns all aspects of the political territory. International political systems present a threat to the traditional autonomy of the nation state (sovereignty) while at the same time they may provide

mechanisms by means of which other sources of infringement on autonomy may be controlled, e.g. the market, multinational companies and external threats.

Basically, 'autonomy' stands for a property of action. An action of an individual is autonomous when the performance of the action is decided by the individual; an action of an institution or organization is autonomous to the extent that the institution decides itself about the performance of the action.

The definition relates the concept of autonomy to that of decision. To make decisions with regard to the performance of actions means to set the directives governing the actions. In every situation there are at least two alternatives, to do something or to omit to do something. With regard to positive action, the number of alternatives depends on the situation. If action is not to be random or traditional there must be a choice between the alternatives. The outcome of that choice is a decision as to the directives that govern the action. Fundamental to the idea of personal autonomy is that the individual decides the directives, just as it is basic to the idea of institutional autonomy that the institutions decide the directives in terms of which their actions are oriented.

Negative autonomy is complementary to positive autonomy. It is just as vital and valuable to be able to resist power and coercion as to be able to choose one's own line of action. The opposite of autonomy is heteronomy.

Autonomy is the capacity of an actor not only to pursue the course of action he has decided himself, but autonomy also involves the capacity to resist the power and authority of other social units. The distinction between negative and positive autonomy is a valid one, though some philosophers have developed the notion of positive freedom into ways of thinking that are incompatible with the concept of negative freedom (Berlin, 1969, 131-134).

An action is heteronomous when an institution performing an action does not decide the directives governing the action; what the organization is to do is decided by some other unit.

An autonomous action is always a voluntary action. In an autonomous action the institution sets its own will. The organization determines what it is to do and the action follows its will. A heteronomous action may be either voluntary or involuntary. An involuntary heteronomous action is the result of a social relation where a unit enforces its will upon the performer of the action. An action that is heteronomous and voluntary occurs when an institution accepts of its own will what another unit wants. The party that sets the directives governing the action of the performer does not coerce the performer; voluntary heteronomous action is the basic building-stone in authority structures according to M. Weber (Weber, 1964).

To make a decision concerning the performance of actions implies two things, on the one hand a decision that the action is to be performed and on the other hand a decision how the action is to be performed. A directive governing an action contains two norms, one stating what should be done, the other stating how what should be done should be done.

Two distinctions follow from the separation between the two aspects of decision: the distinction between primary and secondary autonomy and the distinction between primary and secondary heteronomy.

The concept of personal autonomy has two basic dimensions, primary and secondary autonomy. The concept of primary autonomy is a classificatory concept. An actor performing an action either has or has not primary autonomy. It is the actor who decides that something is to be done or it is someone else who makes that decision. The concept of secondary autonomy seems to be comparative. With regard to the question how an action should be performed it seems to be reasonable to talk of various amounts of secondary autonomy in proportion to the degrees of freedom the actor commands when making his choice between the alternatives. Autonomy is a property of actions; since actions may be aggregated and an individual person may be interpreted as a pattern of action, autonomy may also be predicated upon these entities. Perhaps

the autonomy of an individual person is more often talked about than the autonomy of an action. During a time interval a person performs a number of actions. These actions form a set of actions, which can be divided into two subsets, the set of primarily autonomous actions and the set of primarily heteronomous actions. And an overall measure of freedom could be devised in the following way:

- (1) If the actions {A₁, A₂, ..• AN} of a person are usually (larger than 2/3) primarily free, the person is predominantly primarily free with regard to that set;
- (2) If the sum of secondary autonomy of the actions {A₁, A₂, ... AN} is larger than 2/3, then the person has a high degree of secondary freedom with regard to that set.

The basic typology on institutional autonomy is as follows:

Table 1. *Types of autonom*

Decision that	Primary Autonomy	Primary Heteronomy
Decision how		
Secondary Autonomy	Full Autonomy	Limited Heteronomy
Secondary Heteronomy	Limited Autonomy	Full Heteronomy

Primary autonomy occurs when an institution itself decides what it should do. The opposite of this concept is primary heteronomy, i.e. when a unit gives an institution a directive as to what it should do and its action follows that directive. Secondary autonomy occurs when an organization decides how an action it performs should be performed; an action can be performed in a number of different ways. These constitute alternatives between which there must be a choice or decision. Secondary autonomy occurs when the institution decides on the alternative ways in which what should be done should be done. The opposite of secondary autonomy is secondary heteronomy, which occurs when another unit determines the way the action of the institution is to be performed.

An organization performing an action may be able to decide both that the action is to be performed and how it is to be performed. A local government may decide that its waste water is to be cleaned and it may also decide how this is to be done. Such a case is an example of full autonomy. The opposite, full heteronomy, would be the case when the government decides that the local government shall clean its waste water and also how the cleaning operation should take place. There are two types that are combinations of autonomy and heteronomy. A local government may decide to build a bridge but it may have to accept that the government decides how it is to be built by means of its appropriation for the construction. This case exemplifies limited autonomy. The organization decides that something is to be done but it cannot choose between the alternatives. The opposite occurs when a local government is obliged by the government to clean its water, but the government leaves the choice between alternative cleaning procedures to the local government. When some other unit than the organization decides that an action is to be performed and the organization is left with the choice between alternatives, there is limited heteronomy.

The concept of institutional autonomy has two basic dimensions, primary and secondary autonomy. Whereas the concept of primary autonomy only admits of a nominal scale, the concept of secondary autonomy may be handled by means of an ordinal scale in the following manner: An action can be performed in a number of different ways. Theoretically there are N alternatives. It is possible to decrease the amount of autonomy in two ways. On the one hand some alternatives may be prohibited. On the other hand an organization may be under the obligation to use one or a few alternatives. Let M be the actual number of alternatives open to the performance of an action. And let x and y be variables for actions. Then it holds that:

- (1) x and y coincide with regard to secondary autonomy, if and only if
 x and y have the same number of alternatives ($M(x) = M(y)$)

- (2) x precedes y with regard to secondary autonomy if and only if the number of alternatives of x is greater than the number of alternatives of y ($M(x) > M(y)$)

On the basis of these two conditions it is possible to introduce an ordinal scale which will order actions with regard to secondary autonomy. The scale may have the following measures:

- (1) High = $\text{MIN} > 2/3$
- (2) Medium = $\text{MIN} \approx 2/3$
- (3) Low = $\text{MIN} < 1/3$

On the one hand the scale may measure how high a degree an action that is primarily autonomous is also secondarily autonomous. If M is less than N when an action is to be performed it means that there are restrictions on the way the action can be performed. On the other hand, the scale can measure how high a degree an action that is primarily heteronomous is secondarily autonomous.

Suppose a local government decides to clean its water and the number of possible alternatives are five, depending on the percentage of effective cleaning (0-20, 21-40, 41-60, 61-80, 81-100). The number of actual alternatives M may not be identical with N . Suppose that the national government has prescribed that only two alternatives may be used (21-40 or 81-100). The local government thus has primary autonomy and a medium degree of secondary autonomy. Had the local government been obliged to clean its water it would have been primarily heteronomous and had the national government prescribed no alternatives the local government would have had a high degree of secondary autonomy.

Possibly autonomy is more often spoken of with regard to areas of activity than with respect to one single action. Organizational actions may be aggregated into areas of activities. The classification of actions into areas of activity may use functional criteria. The autonomy of local governments may be compared on the basis of their actions in fields like housing, social welfare, physical environment and so on. Some actions tend to constitute regularities, and the autonomy of

such actions can be aggregated into a measure of autonomy of the area of activity composed of these actions:

- (1) If the actions $\{A_1, A_2, \dots A_N\}$ constituting an area of activity are usually (larger than $2/3$) primarily autonomous, then the area has a high degree of primary autonomy.
- (2) If the ratio of primary autonomous actions to primary heteronomous actions within the area is larger than or equal to $1/3$ or smaller than or equal to $2/3$, then the area has a medium degree of primary autonomy.
- (3) If the actions of the area are usually (larger than $2/3$) primary heteronomous the area has a low degree of primary autonomy.
- (4) If the sum of secondary autonomy of the actions $\{A_i, A_2, \dots A_N\}$ is larger than $2/3$, then the area has a high degree of secondary autonomy.
- (5) If the sum of secondary autonomy of the actions $\{A_1, A_2, \dots A_N\}$ is larger than or equal to $1/3$ or is smaller than or equal to $2/3$, then the area has a medium degree of secondary autonomy.
- (6) If the sum of secondary autonomy of the actions $\{A_1, A_2, \dots A_N\}$ is smaller than $1/3$, then the area has a low degree of secondary autonomy.

The conceptual distinction between primary and secondary autonomy may be employed to introduce another pair of concepts, administrative and regulative action. Organizations act in various areas. Not only will the number and types of areas that are the target for organizational action vary over time. The organization also makes a choice between alternative ways for organizational activity in various areas. Two basic types may be identified. On the one hand the organization may carry out activities on its own, administrative action. On the other hand the organization may restrict itself to the regulation of activities, regulative action. The organization may set the rules according to which activities are to take place when and if people want to engage in such activities. The institution does not carry out these actions through its own people; it decides how these actions are to be performed once people decide to perform them.

The state is an organization. All modern states regard warfare as a proper field for administrative action. Some states organize part of their transportation system as administrative action, i.e. nationalized railroad systems. Some states restrict themselves to regulative action within fields like transportation and business, favoring private transportation system and a system of private enterprises. States differ in the distribution of their activities between administrative action and regulative action. In some countries some areas are considered fields for administrative action, whereas in other countries these areas become the target of regulative action. In effect, the problem of the separation of state and society concerns the division between these two types. In Western democracies areas like property, economic management, the formation and persistence of associations, the upbringing of children are classified as primarily fields for regulative action. The state affects institutions for these areas by systems of norms, but the state is very restricted in the way of handling such areas itself. In Communist states the opposite is true, as the state finds such areas proper fields for administrative action. In reality, if

administrative action

(1) is low regulative action

the state is a liberal state. The smaller the ratio the more liberal. If

administrative action

(2) is high regulative action

the state is a socialist state; the higher the more socialist. If the amount of regulation is high within the liberal state, then it is a welfare state; if the amount of regulation is low, then it is a laissez-faire state. If the amount of regulation is high within the socialist state, then it is a totalitarian state.


A distinction between external autonomy and internal autonomy may be introduced.

The autonomy of an organization has two basic dimensions, the external autonomy and the internal autonomy respectively. The external autonomy is a function of the relations to other organizations and the total environment. The internal autonomy is a function of how the external autonomy is

distributed within the organization among its different units (the degree of decentralization).

An organization like the nation state may command a large amount of autonomy versus its environment at the same time as it is highly centralized. Or a state may be highly decentralized but command little autonomy versus its environment. Napoleon's France would be an example of the first type and the Holy German Empire is an example of the second type.

An organization O may command different degrees of primary and secondary autonomy in various areas of activity $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_N$ in different relations $R_1, R_2, \dots, R_N$ to its environment. By aggregating the primary and secondary autonomy for each area, a measure of the degree of primary and secondary autonomy for a relation R is arrived at. If a measure of the degree of primary and secondary autonomy for a relation R can be arrived at, then it is possible to give an overall measure of the primary and the secondary autonomy of the set of relations $\{R_1, R_2, \dots, R_N\}$ that make up the relation of O to its environment. The external autonomy of an organization can thus be analyzed with two variables, primary and secondary autonomy:



Relations of domination or subordination are examples of type C. Not only will the dominating state tell the subordinate state what to do, it will also interfere in the way the subordinate state tries to accomplish what it is to do. The relation between

the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia may bear resemblances to C. The territorial occupation of one state by another is usually accompanied by drastic changes in autonomy, e.g. the expansion of the Nazi state subordinated Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland. There are various amounts of domination depending on how far an organization is from C. Finland has always stubbornly resisted Russian attempts at domination. Over the last hundred years there have been substantial changes in the autonomy of the Finnish state. The development since the Second World War has been characterized by a movement towards type A. The Soviet Union has been less interested in deciding on the national objectives of Finland and more interested in controlling the choice between the means for achieving the objectives. The development of Swedish local government since the Second World War is an example of reductions in both types of autonomy, a movement from D towards C.

The degree of decentralization is the amount of internal autonomy.

Organizations consist of parts, which may be of various types. An organization may be divided into suborganizations or into persons or into roles. The measurement of internal autonomy or degree of decentralization depends on the unit that is chosen as part. Each part may have various degrees of primary and secondary autonomy depending on the degree of primary and secondary autonomy of the areas of activity the parts engage in. Internal autonomy may be analysed by means of the same positions: A, B, C and D. Swedish universities are parts of the nation state. They used to have a low degree of primary and secondary autonomy. The 1977 reform, however, increased their secondary autonomy significantly. Swedish universities are moving away from C towards B.

Two basic aspects of decentralization may be identified. Institutional autonomy may have a territorial orientation, which implies that decentralization will focus on the amount of internal autonomy of a region or a locality. Institutional autonomy may have a functional orientation, which means that decentralization concerns the amount of internal autonomy of

an area of activity. The government may increase the autonomy of religion by loosening the grip on the State Church and its associations. This is an example of functional decentralization. The government may increase the autonomy of local governments or regional governments by transferring decision competence from the central authorities to these units. This is a case of territorial decentralization.

An organization is autokephalous to the extent that it decides who should be the leaders of the institution. An organization is hetero- kephalous to the extent that some other unit decides who should be the leaders of the institution. Autokephaly and heterokephaly are vital aspects of autonomy.

Autokephaly is a type of autonomy, the autonomy of an institution with regard to the recruitment of its leaders. Autokephaly is thus autonomy within a functional area, recruitment. If a distinction between auto- kephaly and autonomy in other functional areas besides recruitment is introduced, a typology on organizational dependency may be introduced:

Table 2. *Typology of autonomy*

	Autokephaly	Heterokephaly
Autonomy	Independence	Semi-independence
Heteronomy	Semiindependence	Subordination

One way to rule another state S₂ is to pick the leaders of S₂ so as to make sure that these actors will follow directives set by S₁ or that they will rule the country to the best of S₁'s interests. This may be called indirect rule. It may be enough for a state S₁ to appoint the leaders of another state S₂; further involvement in the operations of S₂ may be unnecessary or too costly. S₁ may be satisfied with allowing S₂ a high degree of autonomy as long as S₂ is heterokephalous. Sweden and Norway in the 19th century would be an example of this situation.

A state S₁ may rule another state S₂ by making S₂ heteronomous to a considerable extent. It may reduce the autonomy of S₂ by decreasing the primary and the secondary

autonomy of S₂: the activities S₂ engages in are decided by S₁. Taxation in America may be decided from London or cultural policy in Finland may be determined in St. Petersburg. The less primary and/or secondary autonomy the more direct rule. The British victory over the Scots was followed by the introduction of direct rule from Westminster.

A state S₁ may be able to determine some basic frame within which S₂ has to act. Further encroachments upon autonomy may be too costly. The USSR seems to be satisfied with having achieved some basic control over Finnish policy alternatives. Decisions are made in Helsinki but the choice between alternatives is severely restricted in some important areas, such as foreign policy, economic cooperation, economic policy and energy policy. The USSR exercises its control over the Finnish state by means of restrictions on the amount of secondary autonomy. It happens that the Soviet Union tells the Finnish leaders that certain alternatives within policies are strictly prohibited, like economic cooperation within the EEC; the USSR may even directly tell Finland which alternative to choose. Another method for S₁ is to force S₂ into a situation where S₁ may reserve to itself final approval of important policies. Decisions concerning the Czechoslovakian state seem to be made in Prague today, but certainly no important policy will be implemented until there is approval in Moscow. A state may govern another state by active heteronomy or passive heteronomy. In the first type S₁ tells S₂ what to do and how to do it. In the second type S₂ cannot do anything until S₁ gives its consent.

A state S₁ may rule another state S₂ both indirectly, i.e. by means of heteroképhaly, and directly, i.e. by reducing primary and secondary autonomy. The USSR dominates Czechoslovakia by means of a double grip; it picks the leaders and it decides the important policies of the country. Finland at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century is an example of heteroképhaly-heteronomy rule. It may perhaps be questioned whether the USSR does not keep Finland under both direct and indirect rule today, at least to some extent. In the nineteen-fifties the USSR managed to prevent some prominent leaders of the Social Democratic Party from gaining

access to cabinet positions. Perhaps it is not out of place to assume that the growing autonomy of the Finnish state during the last ten years depends on the fact that the USSR has trust in its president. Once Kekkonen is gone, there may be new encroachments on autokephaly from the USSR.

In the politics of the sixties and the seventies, demands for increased regional autonomy have been connected with proposals for strengthening the autokephaly of regional organizations. Direct election of regional parliaments as well as a widening of the competence of such institutions have been considered just as important as increased autonomy. The Catalans not only seek more autonomy versus Madrid; they also wish to elect their own leaders.

After these preliminary conceptual considerations I turn to a systems analysis that may explain the basic logic behind demands for autonomy. I propose a theoretical model in which the demand for autonomy is related to influence and political stability. The interdependencies of these variables are analysed by means of an equilibrium model. Demands for increased autonomy have cropped up in many political systems. Sometimes these demands have concerned institutional autonomy, a demand for decentralization or regional semi-independence or a demand for less interference in the life of organizations. Sometimes these demands have been oriented towards personal autonomy, a distrust in big government and government regulation. People and organizations have demanded both increased institutional autonomy and increased personal autonomy.

People and organizations maximize the control over their actions.

The plausibility of such a general statement about the ends of individual and organizational action has to be tested by looking at the implications of the proposition in connection with the other assumptions. Maybe it is enough to state that it deviates from traditional generalizations about ends and goals, which emphasize some property external to the actor or the organization like material objects or power or which imply that emotional states like pleasure and pain are the driving forces

behind behavior. The focus on control in § 10 is in consonance with the general emphasis on decision, which is reflected in the definition of autonomy.

Control= Autonomy & Influence.

The proposition states that there are basically two ways for an individual actor or an organization to control the activity it engages in: either the action is autonomous or, if the action is heteronomous, the individual actor or the organization may control it indirectly by means of influence over the person or the group that decides the directives governing the action. To control the performance of actions means to decide the directives governing the action - what is to be done and how it is to be done. If an action is autonomous, then the organization controls it. If an action is heteronomous, then the organization controls it as far as its influence on the decisions governing the action goes. Influence may be attained by means of two mechanisms, representation and participation. Some scholars, the so-called consociational school, talk of the crucial importance for political stability of the presence of consociational devices like veto, proportionality and grand coalition (McRae, 1974, Lijphart, 1977). Like Calhoun and the idea of concurrent majority, they speak of mechanisms of influence (Calhoun, 1953, first published 1853).

These two assumptions introduce a control function,

$$C = f(x, y)$$

which only depends on influence, x , and autonomy, y . I assume that the following conditions are satisfied:

(i) $f(x, y)$ is two times differentiable, i.e. the function has continuous W partial derivatives of order two

(ii) $f(x_1, y) > f(x_2, y) > 0$

when $x_1 > x_2$ 0 and $y > 0$; $f(x, y_1) > f(x, y_2) > 0$

when $y_1 > y_2$ 0 and $x > 0$

i.e. the amount of control increases as the influence increases while the amount of autonomy is constant, and

- the amount of control increases as the autonomy increases while the amount of influence is constant
- (iii) $f(x, y) = K$, constant, is an indifference curve.
- If we solve $f(x, y) = K$ for y , then we obtain

$y = YK(x)$ satisfying:

$y' < 0$, $x > 0$ and

$y'' > 0$, $x > 0$;

i.e. the indifference curves must have negative slopes and be convex.

I now introduce a linear resource function.

$R = p_1x + p_2y$, where p_1 is the price unit for x and p_2 is the price unit for y .

The resource function states that an individual or an organization faces a constraint on the amount of autonomy and influence that an individual or an organization may have or exercise. Though autonomy and influence belong to the type of entities which do not carry ordinary prices, the acquisition and employment of autonomy and influence carry costs for individuals and organizations. Though individuals and institutions in some societies may enjoy (as basic rights) some amount of autonomy and influence in various areas of activity, an expansion over and above that level may require the consumption of considerable amounts of resources, material as well as immaterial ones. In political systems, autonomy and influence are scarce resources, which are allocated under terms of competition; even if the price function for autonomy as well as for influence is a complex one and not easily measurable in terms of an index, the theoretical assumption of its existence does not seem empirically counterintuitive.

Every individual and organization maximizes autonomy and influence.

The principle is a theorem of the assumptions 10 and 11. It states that an organization will allocate its resources R in such a way as to achieve as much autonomy as possible and to secure as much influence as possible or that each individual will allocate his resources R in such a way as to achieve as much

autonomy as possible and to secure as much influence as possible.

Using the resource function we see that we can write

$$y = \frac{R - p_1 x}{p_2}$$

We find maximum control at the equilibrium point (x_1, y_1) , when the resource function is tangent to an indifference curve, i.e.

$$\frac{\partial t / \partial f}{\partial x \quad \partial y} \quad \begin{matrix} p_1 \\ p_2 \end{matrix}$$

If R increases from R_1 to R_2 there is a new equilibrium; the new point of equilibrium (x_2, y_2) will be on another indifference curve C_2 .

Every individual and organization compensates for decreased autonomy by increased influence and for decreased influence by increased autonomy.

The proposition states something fundamental about human and organizational motivation. If an organization finds that its activity in an area is no longer autonomous or at least has no longer the same degree of autonomy, it will try to influence the unit that sets directives governing its actions. Or if it finds it cannot exercise enough influence on the units making decisions concerning its life it will try to make more of its life autonomous. The chief of an agency may accept that a board is established that will take over most of his decision-making simply because he may be able to influence the decisions of the board by various means, by holding the chairmanship, by picking the people on the board and so on. When people begin to experience that they cannot handle vital problems by themselves, they tend to ask for governmental action. Even though there is a loss of autonomy, citizens remain confident as long as government takes the steps which they want. There are limits to the possibility of substituting influence for autonomy. Basic liberties cannot be thus substituted. On the other hand people substitute autonomy for influence when they experience government as irresponsible

and inefficient. When influence does not work, citizens look for more autonomy.

An organization has a certain amount of resources, R , at its disposal. It can allocate R between combinations of autonomy and influence in the following way (Diagram 2). The organization considers C_2 better than C_1 . It divides its amount of resources between autonomy and influence in an optimal way, depending on the cost for autonomy (C_a) and the cost for influence (C_i) respectively. The organization can choose x_1 units of influence and y_1 units of autonomy. It chooses influence x_1 and autonomy y_1 respectively, i.e. equilibrium G . Suppose that cost of influence decreases owing to the fact that the organization obtains a central position in a decision-making group from which it can control the decisions of the group to a much higher degree than before. The organization's resource R can then be said to have increased. At the same time as the organization increases its influence to x_2 , it also increases its autonomy to y_2 . The organization is better off than earlier, i.e. it is in a new equilibrium H .




Diagram 2.

If there are restrictions on autonomy set by other units, an organization will demand compensation in influence.

If there are restrictions on influence, an organization will demand compensation in autonomy.

The dynamics of organizational autonomy may be analyzed in the following way; if there only is the control function $C = f(x, y)$, then it appears from Diagram 3 that if a restriction r is imposed on the autonomy of an organization by another unit, the organization will demand compensation in influence:




Diagram 3.

If (x_1, y_2) is the point the organization is at before the restriction is set, then the organization moves to the new point (x_2, y_1) on the same indifference curve, thus compensating the loss of autonomy with an increase of influence. If a restriction is imposed on the other variable then the organization compensates a loss of influence with an increase of autonomy.

If we have the control function $C = f(x, y)$ and the resource function $R = p_1 x + p_2 y$, we have a new situation (Diagram 4).

If R_1 is the resource function, then (x_1, y_2) is the point the organization would have chosen if there were no restrictions. When we introduce the restriction or the organization is forced

to choose the point (x_2, y_1) , where it achieves maximum control in the new restricted area. If p_1 and p_2 are the same while some restriction r is imposed, then an inferior situation occurs since the organization has to move to a lower indifference curve (C_2-C_1). In order to be able to stay on the same indifference curve, a new resource function R_2 has to be introduced, which makes a movement back to C_2 possible.




Diagram 4.

The reform of the Swedish university system in 1977 decreased the amount of influence of the universities in government bodies. At the same time the autonomy of the universities was increased. Perhaps the universities will manage to retain the same level of control over their activities even though they will use other techniques.

The system of local self-government in Sweden has suffered substantial losses in autonomy since the fifties. Particularly the government has given the communes more and detailed directives. They have reacted to this development by trying to build up influence at the governmental level. Every commune has increased its participation in national decision-making and

they have built up big national organizations to protect their interests in the governmental decision-making. These national organizations are also represented in various government bodies. The communes have looked for compensation for decreased autonomy in increased influence.

When the nation states in the free world began to experience decreased autonomy in the post-war period because of the development of the world economy they also started to build up new organizations and bodies by means of which what they could not control themselves could be controllable. When Great Britain suffered losses in autonomy it became imperative for that nation to enter the Common Market. The opponents of such membership talked about jeopardizing sovereignty.

Of course, people who were in favor of entry pointed out that a nation cannot lose what it has already lost. By means of one kind of influence mechanism, representation, Great Britain looked for compensation in the EC boards and the EC Parliament for what it had lost in autonomy.

People and organizations demand autonomy and influence in certain combinations. A decrease in the supply of autonomy or influence is followed by a demand for an increase in influence or autonomy respectively. If the demand for autonomy and influence for every person and organization is added, a demand curve for society can be drawn.

The demand for influence is a function of the supply of autonomy. The demand for autonomy is a function of the supply of influence.

In order to arrive at proposition 15, I introduce a control possibility line, i.e.

$$o \ x+y \ l$$

i.e. autonomy as well as influence have a highest value, and when the autonomy is high, influence is low, and vice versa.

The control possibility line states that there are limits to the production of autonomy and influence in a society, and that these two entities are technologically interdependent, i.e. if the supply of one of the entities is maximized then the supply of

the other entity cannot be maximized, and vice versa. By means of this assumption of the existence of a control possibility line I define one demand function for autonomy and one demand function for influence:

$$\begin{aligned} Dy(x) &= 1 - x - y & y &= \text{constant} \\ Dx(Y) &= 1 - y - x & x &= \text{constant} \end{aligned}$$

We see that when x increases Dy decreases (y is constant). The same is true for y and Dx . When we have n individuals and organizations we get n demand functions Dy_i . Now we define a general demand function

$$\begin{aligned} &n \\ D &= \sum_{i=1}^n Dy_i \cdot \\ &y, \quad y = \text{constant} \end{aligned}$$

Since each demand function is decreasing when x is increasing, the same holds for the general demand function D (y is fixed). We may conclude that the demand for autonomy is a function of the supply of influence.

In the same way we can derive that the demand for influence is a function of the supply of autonomy. Suppose that a society offers a low degree of influence as well as a low degree of autonomy to its various organizations and citizens; then an unstable situation results (Diagram 5).




Diagram 5.

If a society finds itself at the point x_1y_1 we see that the demand for influence (x_2, y_1) as well as for autonomy is high (x_1, y_2). The situation is unstable and there will be a movement towards the line D inside the shadowed region. When a society reaches the line D it is stable.

if the supply of influence and the demand for autonomy are allowed to interact with each other, an equilibrium arises, i.e. stability.

Suppose that the Basque provinces in Spain are able to exert the influence x_1' through participation and representation in legitimate ways (Diagram 5). They would then demand a certain amount of autonomy, y_2 . However, the Spanish government would not allow this amount of autonomy. Only y_1 is available and the provinces face the choice: demanding more influence (x_2, y_1) or more autonomy (x_1, y_2). Since the provinces are only a minority in the Spanish society the Basques cannot hope for more influence. Consequently, the choice is the demand for autonomy.

Societies that lack equilibrium between supply of autonomy and demand for influence are unstable. The further away they are from equilibrium, the more unstable they are. Societies that lack equilibrium between supply of influence and demand for autonomy are unstable. The further away they are from equilibrium, the more unstable they are. In societies

lacking equilibrium, organizations and individuals will demand increased autonomy or increased influence or both.

If the supply of autonomy and the demand for influence are allowed to interact with each other, equilibrium arises, i.e. stability.

Suppose that the province of Quebec has a certain amount of autonomy, y_1 . It then demands a certain amount of influence at Ottawa, x_2 . Suppose that the other Canadian provinces are not prepared to accept more influence than x_1 . An unstable social situation would arise as the province of Quebec could not reach an equilibrium situation, H or G. The province would face a choice between demanding more autonomy (x_1 , y_2) or more influence (x_2 , y_1); there is the autonomy solution and/or the influence solution to the Canadian state problem (Diagram 5).

The problem of stability in democratic political systems has received attention in the debate during the last decade. One hypothesis focuses on the relation between political stability and social fragmentation or heterogeneity. One of the leading proponents of such theories, Arendt Lijphart, states:

'Consociational democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy.' (Lijphart, 1974, p. 23)

The theory of consociational democracy implies that;

- (a) If a democracy is fragmented, it is stable only if it is consociational, and
- (b) If a democracy is homogeneous, it is stable.

Possibly the Lijphart argument does not distinguish the analysis of the expressions of stability from the analysis of the causes of stability. The use of consociational devices is one effective tool to bring about stability- when they are effective. The model begs the question: when are consociational devices effective? If stability means effective government and consociational devices are one way to run a government effectively, then surely Lijphart's proposition (a) is true. Consociational democracies are stable, but they are not stable

because they are consociational. The stability of consociational democracies depends on the extent to which the consociational devices are effective in reducing conflict between groups and organizations. The stability of non-consociational democracies depends on the same condition. Societies may be run by the majority-minority pattern, the minority pattern or the grand coalition pattern. Whether they are stable or not depends on the distribution of control among its groups and organizations. In this respect there is no difference between different governmental elite patterns nor any difference between homogeneous and heterogeneous societies. And the distribution of control is the distribution of autonomy and influence.

Is there unrest in Northern Ireland because the contending parties are ethnic groups and such groups have particular difficulties to accommodate? But perhaps these groups fight for the same reasons that Finland suffered a civil war in 1918? Maybe they fight because they are in conflict. But why are they in conflict? Northern Ireland does not give its various units much autonomy (y_1). However, the Protestant group has a much larger amount of influence on governmental decisions than the Catholic group, which implies that the Catholic group is in a non-equilibrium point. It does not command enough autonomy to compensate for the small amount of influence (x_1) and it lacks the influence necessary (x_2) to compensate for the small amount of autonomy. If a system of government based on consociational devices is implemented, stability will not result until the influence (x_2, y_1) or the autonomy (x_1, y_2) of the Catholic group are increased (Diagram 5).

Both Sweden and the Netherlands are stable political systems. An explanation of this fact according to the Lijphart theory would look something like this. The Low Countries are a fragmented system which overcomes its inherent tendencies towards instability by means of its elites' adherence to consociational devices. Sweden is a homogeneous country and thus the probability that it is stable is high. There are thus two different cases or two different sets of conditions for stability. However, it might be more fertile to look for similarities between these two countries that might explain why both are

stable. Maybe there are similarities in the distribution of political variables for the various groups that participate in the power play and maybe these similarities account for the stability. If the groups are satisfied why try to upset the equilibrium?




Diagram 6.

Let the diagonal line in Diagram 6 denote equilibrium points where the demand for and supply of autonomy is matched by the supply of and demand for influence respectively in such a way that there is equilibrium. The Swedish society may be placed at point H, giving a smaller amount of autonomy to its groups but on the other hand full compensation in influence. The Dutch society may be placed at point G, on the one hand admitting more autonomy and on the other hand establishing less influence on its various groups. These societies are stable for the same reasons; because the important groups control their own activities, though in different ways.

Autonomy is not the value of social action or social systems. Autonomy is one value. Autonomy is placed in a web of inter- dependencies, in which there are trade offs between autonomy and other properties.

Autonomy cannot be maximized at the expense of all other considerations. An organization that only seeks autonomy may become isolated and an individual actor who only looks for freedom may suffer losses with regard to other values because of lack of influence. Few states manage to uphold total autonomy, even fewer regard it as a goal. The growing international interdependencies can only be accommodated if complete autonomy is abandoned. It would cost too much to cling firmly to the ideal of complete autonomy. It used to be a dogma that sovereignty was a minimum property of the nation state; if a state did not command sovereignty it perished. Some scholars have recently reinterpreted the classic idea of sovereignty and they maintain that the growing international reciprocity between states reduces autonomy and may even constitute a threat to democracy. In *Size and Democracy* (1973) Robert A. Dahl and Edward R. Tufte state:

'Thus size enters into the very question of how and indeed whether democratic systems with a high degree of autonomy or sovereignty can survive in a world of great interdependence. Can local governments survive, except as agents of the national government? For that matter, can nations, especially small ones, retain much of their sovereignty? But if every unit surrenders its autonomy to the next larger unit in an ever-ascending series is there any place left for popular control over government?' (p.2).

I will call the hypothesis that reciprocity decreases autonomy the dogma of interdependency.

It is perhaps somewhat astonishing that scholars begin to talk about reciprocity reducing autonomy at a time when the power of the state has grown to an extent that earlier authors on democracy would have found difficult to imagine. The amount of administrative and regulative action of the welfare state far surpasses what the state used to do in the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century when democratic rule was introduced in several western countries. Undoubtedly, the

state in pre- sent welfare societies has much more control over what goes on in society. It engages in more areas itself; it extends its control by an ever increasing system of rules covering most areas of society. Yet there is of course · substantial evidence of growing interdependency between nations. There seem to be various ways in which such interdependency increases. On the one hand the economies of the western countries have become more interdependent in the sense of an ever increasing degree of division of work. To a much greater extent than earlier each country is connected with other economies by trade. Disturbances in the world economic system have immediate effects on every country. Problems that used to be the headache of each country have now become common problems for all countries in the western world. With growing inter- dependency the problems seem to get worse. Inflation becomes international and no country knows what to do about it; inflation runs together with balance of trade deficits and creates unemployment. A technological innovation in Japan may destroy whole sectors of industries in Sweden and the local communities in which they are placed. The growing economic interdependency is transmitted to the politics. The expansion of the political system has had the effect that it is extremely vulnerable to disturbances in the economy. Since present day governments have taken over the responsibility for the economy they perform a number of activities, both administrative and regulative. Maybe the state has grown powerful versus other bodies within the society, but at the same time the very same development has made the state vulnerable vis- a-vis the environment.

The growing international dependence concerns not only the econo- mies. It pertains directly to the political system. Supranational bodies make recommendations to governments on how to frame laws regulating various aspects of the welfare state. There are strong tendencies toward uniform standards of employment conditions, pollution, traffic and so on. Moreover, the size of operations within modern welfare societies imposes narrow limits on government action due to the responsibility towards various nations incurred by such operations. The introduction of nuclear power plants affects other countries

and ties countries together in cooperation to solve waste and storage problems. The growing political interdependency of states has resulted in the creation of a number of supranational systems and various agreements on cooperation. Defence policies have been coordinated within a few major supranational bodies and within an international system of different pacts. The economic and political costs of warfare have grown to such an extent that even minor conflicts have repercussions on many states, particularly the Great Powers. There are strong tendencies operating towards some control over military operations and political conflict between nations; such efforts create supranational bodies and systems of agreements limiting state autonomy in this area. The staggering size of state involvement in defence policies, the tremendous effects on all systems of a war, the still profound political division of the world into a few major blocks, the enormous risks connected with military defeat - all this works towards the creation of some mechanism for reducing risk, thus containing conflicts, creating possibilities for peaceful settlement, reducing the rate of increase in military spending, safeguarding small nations, keeping hostile nations within a system of checks and balances.

Thus it may be very true that reciprocity between states increases, but the dogma of interdependency states that there is an inverted linear relation between reciprocity and autonomy. Actually, there are four possibilities:

Table 3. *Reciprocity and autonomy*

	Autonomy	Heteronomy
Reciprocity		3
Isolation	2	4

These four cases are equally possible; autonomy may even be more vulnerable if a nation isolates itself (2). By means of reciprocity a nation may safeguard a higher degree of autonomy than it would have in isolation. Economic interdependency may give a nation more resources than by refraining from trade and international cooperation. Political

and military interdependency may be the only available means to a nation against external threats from another nation seeking to make that nation heterogeneous. The interdependency dogma is wrong, because reciprocity may be conducive to autonomy (1).

Even when interdependency reduces autonomy it is not self-evident that a nation should take counter-measures. The costs of autonomy must be compared to the gains with regard to other values, like control over various resources. Modern nation states face the increasing challenge of separating those areas of decision-making where autonomy is a realistic goal from those where autonomy is not attainable at acceptable costs. Look at Diagram 7.




Diagram 7.

R is a resource function which states the amount of autonomy and influence a state may command. It appears that a one-sided orientation towards autonomy would provide the state with less control than a rational choice between autonomy and influence (G-H).

Autonomy must be analysed in terms of its social interdependencies. Democracies face that rational choice between the degree of autonomy of its institutions and the extent of control over other values by means of influence on other nations or supranational bodies.

When analysing the relationship between democracy and autonomy Dahl and Tufte commit a fallacy. They introduce a 2 x 2 table covering the conceptual relations:

Table 4. *Dahl & Tufte: System capacity and citizen effectiveness*

Citizen Effectiveness	System capacity	
	Low	High
Low	1A	1B
High	2A	2B

Now, about this 2 x 2 table Dahl and Tufte state:

'This shift in perspective has come about, at least in part, because the two basic criteria come into conflict with one another. In these circumstances, a reasonable person who wishes his polity to measure up to both criteria might, and indeed surely would have to consider the trade-offs'. (p. 23)

And thus they introduce indifference curves into the 2 x 2 table, which have a slope and curvilinearity that is based on the following assumption:

(A) *A person is indifferent to certain increases in citizen effectiveness that are accompanied by certain decreases in system capacity.*

However, both the construction of the 2 x 2 table and the assumption (A) rest on the idea that the two dimensions, citizen effectiveness and system capacity, are conceptually independent. To assume this is a mistake. On the basis of the Dahl-Tufte criteria it is true that

- (1) If the citizen effectiveness is high, then the system capacity is high
- (2) If the system capacity is low, then the citizen effectiveness is low

Only in a system that has the capacity to respond fully to the collective preferences of its citizens is it meaningful to inquire into the amount of citizen effectiveness. In the Dahl-Tufte construction (Table 4), 2A is impossible and 1A is self-evident. Only in 1B are the two dimensions independent of each other. It is erroneous to maintain that system capacity and citizen effectiveness 'come into conflict with one another'.

To Dahl and Tufte, system capacity is the same as autonomy:

'System capacity. (1) Only the nation-state has the capacity to respond fully to collective preferences. (2)

Therefore the nation-state (but no smaller units) should be completely autonomous' (p. 22).

The identification of system capacity and autonomy is erroneous as autonomy may only constitute a sufficient condition for system capacity.

Democracy is possible only within a polity which commands a certain amount of control over its activities. If the political system lacks such control, democratic institutions cannot operate. Polities may control their activities in two ways: autonomy, or influence on nations or sup-ranational systems that make decisions reducing the autonomy of national systems. Democratic polities like any polity face the challenge of dividing its resources R between the two alternatives conducive to control.

What has been stated about nation states is just as valid for federal systems. If Quebec were to become a separate nation it could actually suffer a significant loss in system capacity or control over the forces conducive to the welfare of its population, because the province of Quebec would no longer be able to exercise any influence on decision-making in Ottawa. Levesque is a representative of the autonomy solution whereas Trudeau stands for the influence solution to the problem of how Quebec is to control its affairs.

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9

The epistemological foundations of Public Choice Theory

Introduction

The distinction between the IS and the OUGHT may be employed as a demarcation line between two types of social science theories: strictly theoretical-empirical ones on the one hand and normative ones on the other. Although not all theories fall neatly within one or the other of these categories, the distinction may be used as a tool for pointing out implicit or explicit normative elements in theories which claim to be strictly neutral or objective from a scientific point of view. We will employ this demarcation line in the way Max Weber conceived of it in order to analyse the epistemology of the emerging public choice approach ([Weber, 1923, 1949](#)). It is argued that the public choice framework for the analysis of public sector decision-making and implementation is deficient in terms of the distinction between science and values. Is this accusation warranted? Let me state from the beginning that I certainly do not wish to argue that normative theory is inherently bad or that the statement of an ideology is a 'meaningless' undertaking. My point is only that we remain

clear about the implications of the demarcation between the IS and the OUGHT.

Public choice and the Virginia School

It is not difficult to find in the Virginia school of public choice highly critical statements about the nature of politics and the essence of bureaucracy. It is not only argued that political behaviour sometimes displays deficiencies of various types, to be pointed out in normal scientific discourse; nor is it only claimed that the lives of bureaux are sometimes despicable, a theme often repeated in the sociology of formal organizations. Much more is implied in the Virginia version of the public choice approach:

The basic structure of property rights is now threatened more seriously than at any period in the two-century history of the United States But there is more of it. We may be witnessing the disintegration of our effective constitutional rights, regardless of the prattle about 'the constitution' as seen by our judicial tyrants from their own visions of the entrails of their sacrificial beats (Buchanan, 1977, 93).

Perhaps James Buchanan would defend such a general statement about the misfortunes of modern political life in the welfare state by claiming that it is a piece of neutral observation. However, it is not difficult to find the action emphasis in Buchanan:

'Government failure' against standard efficiency norms may be demonstrated, analytically and empirically, but I seen no basis for the faith that such demonstrations will magically produce institutional reform. I come back to constitutional revolution as the only attractive alternative to the scenario that we have seen bent to act out. In the decade ahead, we shall approach the bicentenary of the constitution itself. Can this occasion spur the dialogue that must precede action? (Buchanan, 1978, 368).

One would, of course, be interested in finding out why revolutionary action is of such utmost importance. The answer could not possibly be simply a neutral and objective analysis of the public sector, but would have to include some normative

theory of the state. Thus, Buchanan moves from public choice analysis to the quest for public action.

In Gordon Tullock we find the same sweeping generalizations about the unhappy state of politics. Each and every bureau is a burden for society:

We are saddled with a large and basically inefficient bureaucracy. Improved efficiency in this sector could, looking at the matter economically, raise our national income and improve our rate of growth. Politically, it could both increase the degree of control the citizen, qua voter, has over many fields of our national life and enlarge his personal freedom (Tullock, 1965, 221).

Among other scholars tied to the Virginia school of public choice we find the same vehement rejection of present-day democracy, not least the usual majoritarian decision technique:

The expansion in the powers of government - particularly the federal government - and the accompanying erosion of wealth and liberty is not the result of incompetent public officials motivated by evil intentions. Rather the core of the problem emanates from the incentives that ordinary people confront within the prevailing system of majoritarian government (Gwartney & Wagner, 1988).

The Virginia school argues that the public sector is inherently suffering from systemic failure in terms of policy-making and policy implementation. Political failure is more severe than market failure. The action implication is that the public sector must be rolled back by means of a new political revolution leading to constitutional contracts limiting the power of the state - the Leviathan of the twentieth century (Tullock, 1970; Buchanan, 1975, 1977, 1986; Brennan & Buchanan, 1980).

What we are here talking about is the Virginia interpretation of the advanced societies with a liberal-democratic constitution. And the content of the interpretation is a fully fledged rejection of the welfare state and its values. What is science and what is ideology in the Virginia interpretation? In the Virginia version of the public choice approach there are not only strong implicit elements of values in the analysis of the welfare state; there is also an explicit

normative theory about how these societies ought to be changed. Does the same hold for the public choice approach in general? Since we as social scientists are better able to distinguish between the neutral and objective analysis of the public choice domain and the normative evaluation of what public choice ought to be taken, it seems vital to discern whether the same confusion of the IS and the OUGHT is of necessity true of public choice theory in general.

Public choice and the public choice approach

The domain of public choice is one thing and the variety of approaches to the analysis of this domain are quite another. There is a large variety of frameworks for the understanding of public sector decision-making and implementation, one subset of which constitutes the so-called public choice school. However, within this school there is space for a number of varying approaches, one of which is the Virginia school. I will argue that its distinctive trait is the confusion of the IS and the OUGHT in the form of a peculiar mix of positive and normative state theory.

It is often argued against the public choice approach that it is not unbiased in the sense of scientific neutrality. It scores low on objectivity as it is inherently oriented towards market values. It is critical of the state and welfare spending simply because it favours market allocation and market values out of ideological right-wing motives. This criticism is a serious one and it requires explicit consideration, particularly from those that argue that the public choice approach is a new set of innovative scientific models (McLean, 1987). How is this claim about the fundamentally biased nature of the public choice approach to be countered? There are two options: either one accepts the accusation but argues that each and every approach is bound to be biased one way or the other, or one rebuts the criticism. I will strongly argue against the first and for the second; at the same time it is important to take a look at the grounds for the accusation.

It is symptomatic that a Swedish scholar ridiculed the whole enterprise as a set of 'wallet theories' by invoking the antique

and nowadays abandoned concept of the public interest (Lewin, 1990). I will try to argue the case that the accusation of scientific subjectivity and a lack of scientific neutrality is not correct with regard to the general public choice approach, although one may find in the peculiar Virginia-school interpretation of public choice strong ingredients of an explicit right-wing ideology based on a normative state theory.

Ethical neutrality and scientific objectivity

The notions of ethical neutrality and scientific objectivity are regulative concepts. They are meaningful even if it is the case that there exist no texts that fulfil the criteria on neutrality or objectivity. Like the notion of truth they are important to the conduct of scientific enquiry because they provide us with criteria with which to evaluate arguments. Just as one cannot show that a theory is true once and for all but detect that a theory is false, so one may use the criteria on neutrality and objectivity to point out the occurrence of biases in arguments, although it may be impossible to vindicate that an argument is neutral and objective.

Some argue that ethical neutrality and scientific objectivity do not matter in scientific discourse. The logic of scientific discovery is complete anarchy, meaning that anything goes as long as it works (Feyerabend, 1975). Others claim that the criteria of ethical neutrality and scientific objectivity are not feasible, because it is impossible for a theory to be unbiased as it is bound to be value-ingrained (Myrdal, 1970). Neither position appears to be particularly convincing. It seems difficult to do away with the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification (Scheffler, 1967), as scientific arguments do carry a claim to being justified beyond mere personal factors. And though it certainly is true that social science concepts often are value-loaded (Myrdal, 1961), this in itself does not prove that neutrality or objectivity is impossible in principle (Nagel, 1961). Actually, the continuous detection of bias in social science theories does indicate that ethical neutrality and scientific objectivity are important and valid concepts. Stating that an approach like the public choice

perspective is biased is a serious challenge that needs to be considered not simply by responding that each and every approach is subjective.

The case for ethical neutrality or scientific objectivity may be based on either a thin or a thick epistemological theory. A thick defence of these regulative notions would take us into basic issues in meta-ethical argument about the status of values or bring up fundamental epistemic problems about the relationship between perspective and object. A thin defence of the notions of ethical neutrality and scientific objectivity is all that is needed here, because it is enough to start from an assumption that truth and value are different and that objectivity is distinct from subjectivity - that is the classical Weberian position (Weber, 1923). Scientific inquiry is somehow very different from ethics or political ideology - a difference that has to do with ethical neutrality and objectivity in research.

	Public Choice Approach	Other Public Sector Approach
Scientific Objectivity	I	II
Scientific Subjectivity	III	IV

Figure 1. *Public Choice and Scientific Neutrality.*

Thus, we have two distinctions, one between the public choice approach in general and other public sector perspectives on the one hand, and another one between scientific objectivity and subjectivity on the other hand. These distinctions may be illustrated by means of a diagram (see Fig. 1). The accusation towards the public choice approach is that it by necessity ends up in combination III whereas other approaches to the analysis of the public sector tend to end up in combination II. In order to evaluate this statement we must take a close look at the basic elements of the public choice epistemology.

What is the public choice approach?

In order to deal with the objection that the public choice approach is biased - a right-wing perspective on the state, as it

were - we need to identify the entire enterprise in a way that makes the accusation of an implicit ideological bias an open question. If we start from the identification of the public choice approach as the science of political failure (Buchanan, 1988), then there is indeed a risk that the bias is already there from the start. Claiming that politics as a mechanism for the solution to a practical problem is bound to result in disaster is after all a typical commitment in classical liberal ideology as well as in neo-conservatism. Why would public choice necessarily refer to political failure and not to one single case of political success (Amacher *et al.* 1976)?

The public choice approach is no doubt oriented towards the understanding of the domain of public choice, i.e. politics and bureaucracy. As Mueller states in his authoritative interpretation:

Public choice can be defined as the economics of nonmarket decisionmaking, or simply the application of economics to political science. The subject matter of public choice is the same as that of political science: the theory of the state, voting rules, voter behavior, party politics, the bureaucracy, and so on. The methodology of public choice is that of economics, however (Mueller, 1979, I).

The Mueller identification is not only exceptionally clear but also ethically neutral. It does not imply that public choice is the science of the public sector as misfortune. At the same time it, of course, carries no commitment to some naive model of politics as straightforward achievement of objectives in an efficient manner.

The combination of politics and the economic method is usually singled out as characteristic of public choice. In his *The Political Economy of Public Choice*, Sugden arrives at a slightly different identification by means of a more complex route. He states:

I attempt to integrate two broad themes in economic theory: traditional Paretian welfare economics ... and the theory of social choice. Both of these bodies of theory, I shall suggest, are to be understood as analyses of the logic of value judgements that may be made about public choice: they analyse the logic of arguments that

can be put forward to justify particular public decisions, or to justify particular procedures for taking public decisions (Sugden, 1981, ix).

Evidently, welfare economics is more narrow than the economic method itself and social choice broader than politics and bureaucracy. The emphasis on value judgements and justification is misleading as it somehow places moral argument at the heart of the public choice approach. Such an identification would make the problem of ethical neutrality troublesome already from the beginning. The Mueller description of the focus and method of public choice is to be preferred.

If public choice is the economic method applied in the analysis of the public sector, then which are the basic epistemological commitments? Two fundamental notions lie at the foundation of all layers of public choice models: methodological individualism and the homo economicus model (Buchanan, 1975a; Mueller, 1979; Buchanan, 1986; Sugden, 1981; Tullock, 1988). Thus, we have:

- (1) Public sector actors behave as if they maximize their own interests.
- (2) All social entities are fundamentally sets of individual actors.

These two methodological themes have been discussed in a large literature (Friedman, 1953; Kaplan, 1964). Suffice it here to focus on whether they entail a problem in relation to scientific objectivity when they are employed in modelling behaviour in the public sector domain. Is it true that methodological individualism and the homo economicus model implicitly entail a right-wing ideological bias?

The behaviour postulate

The doctrine of methodological individualism in the social sciences requires that the fundamental units of analysis be identified as individual actors and that various social aggregates or entities be regarded as somehow reducible to actors and their properties. Buchanan states: "The basic units are choosing units, acting, behaving persons rather than

organic units such as parties, provinces, or nations' (Buchanan, 1984, 13). Buchanan combines the doctrine of methodological individualism with the typical 'economic-man' assumption: 'persons seek to maximize their own utilities, and that their own narrowly defined economic well-being is an important component of these utilities' (Buchanan, 1984, 13).

Buchanan explicitly recognizes that the tie between methodological individualism and the self-interest axiom is not a necessary relationship, but it lays the foundation for the peculiar public choice perspective of looking at the public sector and all its aggregates in terms of individual choice on a par with market behaviour. There must be a fundamental symmetry between public action and private action: ... the burden of proof should rest with those who suggest that wholly different models of man apply in the political and economic realms of behavior' (Buchanan & Tollison, 1984, 13-14).

By combining the doctrine of methodological individualism with the model of self-interest maximizing behaviour we face the most basic problems concerning the structure of the public sector and the motivation of public action. Are political parties or bureaux or nation-states nothing but sums of persons? Is social choice simply a function of self-interest? Granted that the basic motive is self-interest, why does it have to be only economic interests? What about the role of the public interest or ideology?

As Tullock has recently argued, these serious problems have to be faced within the framework of public choice analysis and not be resolved by means of simply placing the burden of argument with those who question these implications (Tullock, 1988, 158-170). Yet, Tullock himself very succinctly stated the selfishness axiom without any qualifications as to how social benefits are promoted in modern society:

It is my opinion that most human beings are (except within their families) to a very large extent interested in fairly narrow selfish goals. The point I am making is simply that the resources they are willing to invest in these goals are customarily very much less than the amount they are willing to invest to reach straightforward selfish goals (Tullock, 1970, 33).

The reductionist bias in the public choice approach locating all behaviour motivation with singular individuals whatever their role or position and underlining the narrow economic self-interests as the decisive incentive is bound to result in difficulties when it comes to the understanding of the public sector and its complexity. However, what may be lost in descriptive realism is gained in analytical power. By employing the standard assumptions of economic method powerful implications may be derived from a strong theoretical core. Deductive strength is gained at the expense of descriptive accuracy. Let us look at each of the two components separately, the self-interest maxim first, and then, secondly, methodological individualism. My point is that it is not these two assumptions per se that create the problem of ideology with regard to the public choice approach. Only if we add other assumptions do we end up in the Virginia right-wing corner.

Interest maximization

In a fundamental methodological sense all political action is behaviour by individuals. In politics, persons tend to be members of various formal organizations, be these political parties, interest groups or public institutions. And with membership in large-scale organizations as the basis for political action individuals become spokesmen for the ideology that formal organizations employ to state their rationale. Now, if individuals are the basic units in the public sector, does it follow that the organizations involved in public action are just sets of individual persons? Buchanan seems to take such a stance, for example, in the debate about social justice in society:

As is the case with efficiency, persons are not likely to express interests in abstract distributional ideals for the society in general when in political decisions. They are likely, instead, to seek to further their own well-defined interests (Buchanan, 1988, 11).

Politicians in a wide sense, including not simply political-party people but also the representatives of organized groups, do make statements about distributional justice and do argue such notions as the reason for various policy demands. Such abstract distributional ideologies may focus on different

definitions of justice as need, desert or rights (Miller, 1976). As a matter of simple fact it is not correct to deny that political argument is to a large extent about such contesting distributional ideals. However, one may argue that such abstract notions simply reflect narrow self-centred interests; but whose interests? Why does it have to be the 'well-defined interests' of individual persons?

Let me call this theory about public motivation the 'simplicity theory'. It assumes that public action may be fully accounted for in terms of the well-defined economic self-interests of individuals. There are two fundamental problems involved here. On the one hand there is the enormous difficulty tied to the doctrine of selfishness as the basic motivational force of persons. On the other hand, we have the collective-action problem, meaning that public wishes are somehow a function of the aggregation of individual wishes about not only their self-interest but also social states in general. I can see no reason why the public choice approach has to commit itself to the simplicity theory, because it faces tremendous difficulties with regard to the distinctions between selfishness and altruism on the one hand and between economic and other interests on the other hand, as well as in relation to the institutional context of preference aggregation.

If we start from the traditional separation between decision-making and implementation in public choice (van den Doe! 1978), we may pinpoint the profound difficulties of the simplicity theory. When persons argue publicly for a policy position whether in elections or in Parliament, are they promoting their own well-defined economic interests? Presumably, they argue for policy options that are public in the sense that their implementation would concern each and everyone, not just the person arguing the case. If so, are we not forced to make a distinction between self-centred interests and public interests or some similar kind of separation between private interests and social interests? Or take the case of a bureaucrat or a professional doing service in a public programme. When they act in the implementation of policies, are they ipso facto pursuing the well-defined economic interests of their own? Or if they put a lot of effort into improving existing technologies,

would they do that only because their own economic interests are at stake?

Some public choice scholars not only recognize the validity of these distinctions, but they also claim they are vital in the analysis of the domain of public choice. Let us quote Michael Laver:

... the two general families of evaluation criteria that I shall be using relate to the direct consumption of costs and benefits by the person making the evaluation and to her vicarious interest in the consumption of others (Laver, 1986, 58).

The distinction that Laver aims at is traditionally expressed by means of the selfishness-altruism separation. Any person would thus have two types of evaluations: selfish and vicarious. However, both types of interests are personal in the sense of accruing to the person in question. Yet there is a need for a second distinction, between consumer-controlled actions and spillover effects (Laver, 1986, 65 ff.) Thus, besides the two types of private or personal interests - selfish ones and vicarious or altruistic ones - we must take into account interests related to the existence of social costs and benefits. If so, how can we argue that individuals in public choice settings proceed to act on the basis of their own well-defined economic interests? What does it really mean?

	Personal	Social
Selfish	I	II
Vicarious	III	IV

Figure 2. Types of Interests

The identification of vicarious interests in combination with social costs and benefits may appear as a restriction on the applicability of the public choice approach to the understanding of the domain of public choice. If it is true, as Mueller states, that 'The basic behavioral postulate of public choice, as for economics, is that man is an egoistic, rational, utility maximizer' (Mueller, 1979), then there are only two alternatives. Either one must accept that the public choice approach lacks fundamental concepts for entities that are

important in politics or one has to redefine the methodology of economics so that it takes into account the variety of interests or preferences. In his *Selfishness, Altruism and Rationality* (1982) Margolis argues for the first solution, though he notes that the scope of the economic model was never strictly limited to competitive market behaviour:

...important areas of economics do not have any simple relation to the empirical study of prices and quantities in markets, and among these are a number of topics (welfare economics, decision theory, public goods) with obvious relevance to broader questions of social choice (Margolis, 1982, 10).

Yet, in order to extend the economic method to the analysis of the domain of public choice Margolis states that we need to add new entities besides the utility-maximizing individual. To quote:

...we have good reason to expect that a viable formal theory of politics needs to extend the traditional model of rational choice in at least three ways: provision of a central role for public goods; explicit treatment of altruistic motivation; and explicit treatment of the role of persuasion (Margolis, 1982, 13).

The maximization axiom results in difficulties, because it is not clear which interests are being maximized by public sector officials. By combining the distinctions above we arrive at the possibilities outlined in Fig. 2.

The behaviour axiom of the public choice approach may be interpreted in a narrow fashion meaning that it focuses only on combination I (Fig. 2); however, it may also be interpreted in a broader way. to cover all the various combinations as long as they somehow relate to the utility of the actor, the self-interest axiom as tautologically true. The main alternative to the simplicity theory would be to re-examine the structure of preferences. When persons act publicly, why do we have to assume that they either pursue their own interests (selfishness) or the interests of others (altruism)? Why could not one be a means to the other?

Obviously, public behaviour is strongly oriented in terms of social goals whether they take the form of altruistic motivations or the target is social cost or collective benefit.

When a premier or a president runs the country, or when a parliamentarian promotes a piece of legislation, or when a bureaucrat administers a system of rules, or when a citizen takes a stand on the issue of nuclear power, then they all pay attention to interests that are broader than their own well-defined interests. When Ronald Reagan asks for more support from the Congress to the Contras in Nicaragua, then the motive is not his own economic interests; nor could the refusal of the majority of the Congress to go along with this support be explained by their well-defined self-interests. These policy options may be argued because they are believed to enhance abstract liberty or power of institutions or groups, for which in turn the various actors have selfish or altruistic evaluations. Be that as it may, the doctrine that individuals somehow maximize some utility function consisting of their evaluation of personal or social affairs does not imply that they necessarily seek their own well-defined economic interests in each and every activity.

Methodological individualism

When the simplicity theory about human motivation is combined with a strong version of the doctrine of methodological individualism, then the difficulties become pronounced. Methodological individualism is the theory that social aggregates of whatever form - mere groups or huge formal organizations - are in reality nothing but sets of human beings (Hayek, 1945; Popper, 1960). Thus, the properties of social aggregates are reducible to the properties of individuals. The reductionist hypothesis about the construction of social reality has caused much debate about the nature of wholes (Nagel, 1980). If we accept the starting-point that there could be no other actors than human beings, must we then also negate the possibility that human organization resulting in organized collective action cannot result in emergent properties that are not reducible to individual beings? The problem of wholism versus reductionism becomes acute as we enter the domain of public choice. Here, the participants in the arena of policy-making and policy implementation are organized collectivities of various kinds: institutions, parties,

interest organizations, social movements. How about their motivation? What is it that drives these formal organizations to act and do certain things in the public arena?

The simplicity theory, in combination with a strong version of methodological individualism, implies that the individuals that occupy the crucial positions in the domain of public choice watch their own well-defined economic interests (Breton, 1974). Thus, public officials seek re-election and private remuneration (Downs, 1957, 1967); bureaucrats act in order to maximize their salaries, power and prestige (Niskanen, 1971). This is not denying that such interests may play a vital role in politics and bureaucracies. What is wrong is the extreme simplification meaning that things have been left out: group interests. When organizations- political parties, interest groups, citizens movements- take action, then more than the well-defined economic interests of individuals is at stake.

Collective action, which is a very prominent feature in the domain of public choice, is about group interests. And collective interests may range across the spectrum from the very selfish narrow interests of small lobby groups to widely shared public interests. Such public interests in peace, prosperity, fairness and equal treatment under the law may be promoted in the public sector by means of public choice activities. I take the theory of rent-seeking behaviour to be a recognition of the fact that broad social interests may be enhanced by large collectivities (Buchanan *et al.* 1980, Tollison, 1982).

The typical motivation assumption in the public choice perspective creates difficulties when public sector behaviour is to be analysed. Yet it may be defended by the argument that there are limits to the explanatory power of any assumptions. It is well to be aware of how far the self-interest assumption works when explaining public action. Whether it works well depends on whether there are other assumptions that may allow for the same amount or more of integration of knowledge in this area. That it cannot explain everything is not the same as that it fails to explain anything. Moreover, the self-interest axiom is not a normative proposition to the extent that actors in the public sector should only pay attention to their own well-

defined interests. In order to move to normative public choice theory we need additional assumptions.

The Wicksell state ideology

The Virginia version of the public choice approach is not just a positive theory about the public sector based on the two fundamental assumptions of utility maximization and methodological individualism. Crucial in the Virginia interpretation is a normative theory about the state that is straight-forward right-wing ideology of a neo-liberal kind, or what used to be called Manchester liberalism. It is vehemently opposed to the welfare state and its justification in externalities and equity. The foundation of the normative approach is the elements of a state theory proposed in 1896 by Knut Wicksell in *A New Principle of Just Taxation*, in which Wicksell launched his special decision rule for policy-making: the unanimity rule. In a very original way, Buchanan has employed the unanimity rule as the basis for a contractarian theory of the state. Considering the fact that the Wicksell idea never had any practical consequences - the article was not even available for a wider Swedish audience until 1987 - this is no small accomplishment ([Buchanan, 1960, 1986](#)).

Buchanan argues that his neo-liberal theory of the state is at the heart of the public choice approach. This is erroneous. The public choice approach has no special link to any normative theory about the state - its proper size or appropriate programme structure. The insistence on a distinction between the IS and the OUGHT is not meant as part of any positivistic philosophy of science. It is interesting, meaningful and valid to do both positive and normative analysis of the public sector. However, the public choice approach as a scientific framework cannot possibly be logically committed to the values that the Virginia school wishes to promote ([Buchanan, 1975b, 1986](#)).

The Wicksell state theory derived from considerations of efficiency in taxation argued a strong case for a quid-pro-quo rule on an individual basis. Efficiency demands that each citizen can balance the value and cost of a particular item on the state budget at the margin. Equating marginal value with

marginal cost may be accomplished by means of the benefit approach to taxation as long as we do not face public goods. In relation to the free-rider problem, the only mechanism that will guarantee optimal taxation for public goods provision is the unanimity rule of the individual-veto principle in a legislative context (Musgrave & Peacock, 1967).

Buchanan employs the Wicksellian decision principle to derive two normative rules that he considers are constitutive of the public choice approach: politics as exchange and economic constitutionalism or contractarianism as the basis of public policy-making (Buchanan 1977, 1986, 1987). Yet these two normative principles are very different from the two basic assumptions of the public choice approach listed above; they are different, because they orient the entire analysis of the public sector in a right-wing ideological direction with logical necessity. Thus, we have two new principles:

- (3) Political interaction is to be based on voluntary exchange.
- (4) Politics as voluntary exchange requires the making of an economic constitution that is to guide the relationship between the state and the individual.

It is obvious that the basic assumptions of the public choice approach - (1) and (2) above - do not imply or contain the fundamental principles of the Wicksellian state ideology, (3) and (4). This is not to say that one could not adhere to all four axioms without contradiction; the point is only that the axioms be kept separate as (1) and (2) refer to the IS whereas (3) and (4) deal with the OUGHT.

Politics as exchange

The axiom of politics as exchange means that each and every public policy must be based on the consent of all the citizens, as unanimity is the criterion through which the policy is in the interest of the citizen. This is certainly, as Buchanan emphasizes, a very optimistic interpretation of the nature of politics as legitimated by the interests of the citizens. However, this is not positive theory but elements of an ethical theory of the state. In the public choice domain, which the public choice approach is aimed at understanding, politics reveals itself in a

number of different ways, from coercion over corporate interests formed at the expense of consumer interests to the few cases where broad citizen interests rule.

The unanimity rule introduced by Wicksell may be given two different interpretations between which Buchanan does not distinguish. On the one hand we have the positivist interpretation meaning that politics is exchange between individuals in a setting of political institutions. Politics is not about the definition and implementation of the common good - some ultimate principle that stands above the interests of individual: 'In the absence of individual interest, there is no interest' (Buchanan, 1987, 338). Public choice analysis means the unpacking of the notion of the public interest into the interests of the participating individuals. But if it is admitted that politics is not about the common good, then what prevents a public choice approach from modelling politics as coercion or the exploitation of some interests by other interests? Why is politics as symmetrical as market exchange? Buchanan would answer thus:

The observed presence of coercive elements in the activity of the state seems difficult to reconcile with the model of voluntary exchange among individuals. We may, however, ask: Coercion to what purpose? Why must individuals subject themselves to the coercion inherent in collective action? The answer is evident. Individuals acquiesce in the coercion of the state, of politics, only if the ultimate constitutional 'exchange' furthers their interests. Without some model of exchange, no coercion of the individual by the state is consistent with the individualistic value norm upon which a liberal order is grounded (Buchanan, 1987, 338).

This is clearly a confusion of the IS and the OUGHT. Individuals acquiesce in coercive politics because to do otherwise is not in accordance with liberal political values. This will not do as a foundation for a public choice analysis of politics as long as the purpose is scientific neutrality and objectivity.

On the other hand we have the normative interpretation, meaning that only those policies which meet with unanimous consent from among the individual citizens can be called just.

But why is this so? That unanimity is the criterion on social justice is obvious beyond all reasonable doubt to Buchanan, but why? Wicksell states:

It would seem to be a blatant injustice if someone should be forced to contribute toward the costs of some activity which does not further his interests or may even be diametrically opposed to them (Wicksell, 1896, 89).

If one accepts the unanimity criterion on efficiency and justice, then naturally Wicksell's conclusion follows. But why do we have to do that? We are here in the realms of ethical argument where there are contending views about what social justice requires. If Wicksell's position is the only reasonable one, then we would have to do away with all kinds of welfare programmes that can not be derived from unanimous consent - which one would be thus derivable, one may ask? This is Buchanan's conclusion from applying the Wicksell justice or efficiency rule to the existing welfare state, but it is not scientific analysis. It is normative theory, neither more nor less. One may also be reminded of the fact that Wicksell did make a distinction between political justice or efficiency as unanimity and social justice in an ethical sense. The latter could certainly demand that some vested interests be removed in the name of social justice whether or not there be unanimous consent.

Constitutional economics

The normative framework in the Virginia public choice interpretation becomes very visible in the theory about economic constitutionalism. The theory of normative public policy is to be a theory about the rules of the political decision-making process which could meet with unanimity. Buchanan states:

Existing constitutions, or structures or rules, are the subject of critical scrutiny. The conjectural question becomes: Could these rules have emerged from agreement by participants in an authentic constitutional convention? (Buchanan, 1987, 341).

Since there exists no system of constitutional revisions on a permanent basis one could only speculate about what citizens would agree to, were they in a constitutional setting. Thus, the

idea of a constitutional economics is not an analysis of reality but a mechanism for the expression of political criticism (Brennan & Buchanan, 1985).

At the same time as the notion of a constitutional economics is a normative one, it is part of a highly restricted normative theory about politics. It not only admonishes the public choice scholar to evaluate existing politico-economic institutions but it also forbids all evaluative approaches except the unanimity rule. We are not allowed according to Buchanan to employ some ethical criteria and evaluate the state:

There is no criterion through which policy may be directly evaluated. An indirect evaluation may be based on some measure of the degree to which the political process facilitates the translation of expressed individual preferences into observed political outcomes. The focus of evaluative attention becomes the process itself, as contrasted with end-state or outcome patterns (Buchanan, 1987, 339).

The distinction that Buchanan refers to - outcome criteria or process criteria - is well-known in ethical argument, but why should a public choice scholar have to accept the solution that Buchanan prefers? There is no scientific basis whatsoever for the claim that we cannot evaluate policies by means of utilitarian or Rawlsian criteria. I do not mean to say that a debate about the grounds for the evaluation of politico-economic regimes is not meaningful or that the arguments pro and contra various solutions cannot be scrutinized. I am only saying that the public choice approach as such cannot commit itself to any one special ethical doctrine about social justice or the proper economic constitution simply because the fundamental problem involved here is the choice of ultimate values, which question the social sciences cannot resolve by means of their special methodology (Brecht, 1959).

Conclusion

The public choice approach has been attacked for not being scientifically neutral and objective. It has been argued that its epistemological core includes the acceptance of political values that correctly belong to a special ideology. Thus, the emergent

public choice school would mix the IS and the OUGHT to the same extent as the earlier prevailing political economy, i.e. the set of Marxist approaches. Admitting that it is often difficult to distinguish the IS and the OUGHT and that social science theories often are biased, it is still vital to maintain the concepts of scientific neutrality and objectivity as Weber interpreted them. It must be possible to employ the public choice approach for the understanding of the public choice domain without advocating some political ideology.

Public choice theories should stand on their own, supported by means of the ordinary canons employed in the conduct of scientific inquiry. The two peculiar assumptions in the public choice approach - methodological individualism and the self-interest motivation - afford necessary and sufficient identification criteria. No ethical assumptions need to be resorted to. This is not to deny that ethical argument is important and that public choice scholars could not possibly engage in both activities, adding, for example, politics as exchange and a very special conception of constitutional economics to the typical public choice assumptions. However, it would clarify epistemological matters if the scientific framework is separated explicitly from the ethical framework. You do not have to adhere to the political values that the Virginia public choice school propagates in order to do serious public choice analysis of the public sector domain.

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Author: **Jan-Erik Lane**

University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland.

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Jan-Erik Lane

Born in 1946 in Gothenburg, Jan-Erik Lane was raised in Stockholm and Malmö. He finished his school education in the classics in 1965. At university of Lund and Umeå he took grades in History, Political Science, Economics and Philosophy. He has held tenured positions at Umeå University, Oslo University and Geneva University.

Invited as full professor, he has taught at several universities like e.g. Singapore, Hongkong, Cape Town, Rotterdam, and Jerusalem as well as Freiburg in Breisgau.

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